PC3 Phase 3.3: rate-limit the auth endpoints
app/rate_limit.py: an in-process sliding-window limiter (single-worker backend, so no Redis needed -- flagged for if that changes). /register and /login are capped at 10 attempts / minute / client IP (X-Forwarded-For aware), returning 429 + Retry-After past that. Blunts credential brute-force, which the backend had no protection against. - conftest.py resets the limiter between tests (every TestClient request looks like one IP). - tests/test_rate_limit.py: threshold, shared bucket, per-key window. 77 passed. CORS reviewed while here: already an explicit origin allowlist (settings.CORS_ORIGINS), not "*" -- and the Godot client isn't a browser so it doesn't apply there anyway. Left as-is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015jtxAiu5dAW4WxCNdGkrkJ
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"""Lightweight in-process rate limiting.
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The backend runs single-worker (required by the game-server supervisor), so a
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process-local sliding-window counter is sufficient and needs no Redis. Keyed
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by client IP. Used to blunt credential brute-force on the auth endpoints.
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If the backend is ever scaled to multiple workers/hosts this must move to a
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shared store (Redis) -- flagged here rather than silently under-enforcing.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import time
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from collections import defaultdict, deque
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from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
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class SlidingWindowLimiter:
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def __init__(self, max_hits: int, window_seconds: float) -> None:
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self.max_hits = max_hits
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self.window = window_seconds
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self._hits: dict[str, deque[float]] = defaultdict(deque)
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def check(self, key: str) -> None:
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now = time.monotonic()
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q = self._hits[key]
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cutoff = now - self.window
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while q and q[0] < cutoff:
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q.popleft()
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if len(q) >= self.max_hits:
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retry = max(1, int(q[0] + self.window - now))
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
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detail="Too many attempts. Try again shortly.",
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headers={"Retry-After": str(retry)},
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)
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q.append(now)
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def reset(self) -> None:
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self._hits.clear()
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def _client_key(request: Request) -> str:
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# X-Forwarded-For first hop when behind the reverse proxy, else the socket.
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fwd = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
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if fwd:
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return fwd.split(",")[0].strip()
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return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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# 10 auth attempts / minute / IP -- generous for a human, painful for a
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# brute-forcer.
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_auth_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_hits=10, window_seconds=60)
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async def auth_rate_limit(request: Request) -> None:
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"""FastAPI dependency: rate-limit auth attempts per client IP."""
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_auth_limiter.check(f"auth:{_client_key(request)}")
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def reset_all() -> None:
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"""Test hook."""
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_auth_limiter.reset()
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