- POST /api/chat/messages/{message_id}/report for reporting messages with category/reason
- Idempotent duplicate report rejection (409)
- GET /api/moderation/reports for queue listing (restricted to moderators/admins)
- POST /api/moderation/reports/{id}/resolve supporting dismiss, remove, warn, ban actions
- Audit fields (moderator_id, resolved_at, action) recorded on resolution
- Added 9 integration tests in backend/tests/test_chat_reports.py (all passing)
- Implemented GET /api/profile/{user_id} in backend/app/routers/profiles.py
- Server-side privacy enforcement for profile_visibility, favorites_visibility, and friends_list_visibility
- Block relationships enforce restricted view (no bio, empty favorites, empty friends)
- Non-friends restricted when profile_visibility or sections set to friends-only
- Asset public check for avatar in restricted view
- No private user fields leaked (email, password excluded)
- Added 7 integration tests in backend/tests/test_profile.py covering all privacy and block permutations
Independently verified: 26/26 profile tests passing.
Implements direct-message (DM) chat send and history endpoints:
- Migration 0011_add_dm_last_read.py (last_read_at on conversation_participants)
- Models updated in backend/app/models/chat.py
- Router in backend/app/routers/chat_dm.py:
- POST /api/chat/dm/{user_id}/messages (send DM, filtered via TextFilter, rate-limited via Redis)
- GET /api/chat/dm/{user_id}/messages (paginated history, updates last_read_at)
- GET /api/chat/dm/conversations (conversations list, last message, unread count)
- Blocks enforced in both directions (cannot send to/from blocked users)
- Self-messaging prevented, peer exist check, auth required
- Integration tests in backend/tests/test_chat_dm.py
Independently re-verified: 14/14 new DM chat tests pass,
272/272 full backend regression suite passes with zero regressions.
Implements user profile data model and own-profile management endpoints:
- Profile and ProfileFavorites models in backend/app/models/profile.py
- Migration 0010_add_profile_tables.py (profiles, profile_favorites)
- Endpoints in backend/app/routers/profiles.py:
- GET /api/profile/me (own profile with default fallback)
- PUT /api/profile/me (upsert bio, avatar_asset_id, privacy settings)
- GET /api/profile/me/favorites (list favorite world IDs)
- PUT /api/profile/me/favorites (replace favorite world IDs)
- Fixes values_callable on Asset.asset_type ENUM in app/models/asset.py
- Added test_profile.py covering auth, validation, favorites, privacy
Independently re-verified: 19/19 new profile tests pass,
258/258 full backend regression suite passes with zero regressions.
Implements docs/planning/social.md US-1's API layer on top of the
merged Friendship/Follow/Block models (app/models/social.py):
- POST/GET /api/friends/requests, POST .../accept, POST .../decline
- DELETE /api/friends/{user_id} (unfriend)
- POST/DELETE /api/friends/{user_id}/follow, GET /api/friends/following
- POST/DELETE /api/friends/{user_id}/block, GET /api/friends/blocked
- GET /api/friends (mutual friends list)
All endpoints require JWT auth. Requests are scoped to caller (no
cross-account enumeration); duplicate/self requests are rejected
idempotently; block clears mutual friendship and follow in both directions.
Independently re-verified: 19/19 new unit/integration tests pass,
239/239 full backend test suite passes with zero regressions.
Implements docs/planning/social.md US-5's API layer on top of the
already-merged Group/GroupMember models (app/models/groups.py):
- POST/GET /api/groups, GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/groups/{id}
- POST .../join (idempotent), .../leave (owner must transfer first)
- POST .../members/{user_id}/role (owner-only, admin/member),
.../transfer (owner-only, demotes prior owner to admin)
Group page member list is a dedicated schema (user_id/username/role/
joined_at) so no private User fields leak. 27 new tests cover
authorization boundaries, idempotency, and exactly-one-owner invariants;
full backend suite (220 tests) passes with zero regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QFSPt6rX1gwZmcr2HEfvzg
Hardcoded _COMPOSE_PROJECT="agp-pytest" + fixed ports meant every
concurrent checkout running pytest (e.g. multiple Agent-tool subagents,
each in their own workspace clone) fought over the same Docker Compose
project and host ports -- one run's pytest_unconfigure teardown could
yank the ephemeral Postgres out from under a completely unrelated
concurrent run. Confirmed live running 3 parallel subagents: one hit
"connection was closed in the middle of operation", another independently
hit a transient DeadlockDetectedError from concurrent table truncation on
the same shared container. Same root cause and fix pattern as the
agent_core workspace/Docker-Compose collision documented in project_agp
memory -- derive both the project name and the ports from a hash of the
checkout directory so concurrent checkouts land on different
projects/ports while a single checkout stays stable across repeated runs.
Deterministic default (ListBasedTextFilter) backed by a configurable JSON
term list, with normalization (case-fold, leetspeak substitutions,
stripped punctuation/spacing between letters) so trivial evasion doesn't
slip through. Supports both reject (blocking) and redact (asterisk
replacement) modes. TextFilter is a Protocol, leaving an explicit
extension point for a future third-party moderation provider.
Standalone module, not wired into any router/endpoint -- sibling chat
tasks depend on this one. No DB/migration work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y2FESCaMXeJpC9gSctiEeD
docs/planning/social.md US-5 (task 13). Models + Alembic migration only,
per the sibling-dependency boundary with the Groups API task.
- groups: id, name, description, owner_id (FK users, ON DELETE SET NULL --
a group is a durable multi-member community, so it and its full roster
survive the owner deleting their account; the API task handles surfacing
an ownerless group for reassignment).
- group_members: group_id/user_id (both FK, ON DELETE CASCADE -- pure
join-table rows with no meaning without either side), role
(owner/admin/member native enum, default member), joined_at, unique
constraint on (group_id, user_id).
- User gets owned_groups / group_memberships relationships.
- tests/conftest.py TEST_TABLES updated for truncation between tests.
- New tests/test_group_models.py: role assignment, unique-membership
rejection, group-delete cascade, member-delete cascade, and owner-delete
SET NULL survival -- all verified against real Postgres.
Verified: upgrade/downgrade/upgrade round-trip, \d-inspected schema matches
spec (FKs, cascade behavior, unique constraint, indexes), full backend
suite 166 passed / 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y2FESCaMXeJpC9gSctiEeD
Adds rate_limit(name, max_hits=, window_seconds=) as a factory for FastAPI
dependencies, generalizing the auth_rate_limit pattern for future endpoints
(chat send, message report) without touching auth_rate_limit's own behavior.
Reuses SlidingWindowLimiter for counting and the existing 429 + Retry-After
response, and respects RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED the same way auth_rate_limit does.
reset_all() now clears every registered limiter (auth's plus any named ones),
so the conftest autouse fixture keeps working for sibling tasks automatically.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y2FESCaMXeJpC9gSctiEeD
docs/planning/social.md US-4, task 6: conversations,
conversation_participants, messages (DM + world/room chat), and
message_reports, following app/models/social.py's conventions (native
enums, explicit index/constraint names, CASCADE FKs where appropriate).
Delete behavior, chosen per-relationship:
- conversations.user_a_id/user_b_id -> CASCADE: a DM is meaningless with
one of its two participants gone, so it cascades away entirely
(participants + messages with it).
- messages.sender_id -> SET NULL: world/room chat history and reported
messages must survive the sender's account being deleted, matching the
existing actor-reference convention (WorldChunk.updated_by_id,
WorldChunkRevision.actor_id).
- messages.world_id/room_id -> CASCADE: chat scoped to a world/room has no
meaning once that world/room is gone (mirrors WorldChunk).
- message_reports.message_id -> SET NULL (not CASCADE): a moderation
report must outlive the message it's about, mirroring
WorldChunkRevision's audit-trail-survives-deletion precedent.
- message_reports.reporter_id/moderator_id -> SET NULL: audit-actor
references, same reasoning.
Models + migration only, no endpoints, no text filtering (sibling tasks).
Verified: migration upgrade/downgrade/upgrade round-trip against a real
Postgres with schema inspected via \d against spec; new model tests cover
DM creation, pair uniqueness + ordering check constraint, world/room
messages, report defaults, and cascade behavior for both
conversation-deletion and sender-deletion; full backend suite (160 tests)
passes with no regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y2FESCaMXeJpC9gSctiEeD
Models + Alembic migration (0007, head) only, per docs/planning/social.md
US-1 -- the friends/follow API router is a separate sibling task.
- friendships: requester_id/addressee_id (FK users, CASCADE), status
(pending/accepted native enum), unique pair constraint, indexed FKs.
- follows: follower_id/followed_id (FK users, CASCADE), unique pair.
- blocks: blocker_id/blocked_id (FK users, CASCADE), unique pair.
- Relationships wired onto User for both directions of each table.
- tests/test_social_models.py exercises request/accept, the unique-pair
constraint, follow, block, and DB-level CASCADE delete against real
Postgres. Full backend suite (152 tests) still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y2FESCaMXeJpC9gSctiEeD
Recovers a real August feature that was never merged (3 WIP checkpoints +
fix commit 47ab492, 225 commits behind main): a Redis-backed heartbeat
presence store plus /api/presence/{heartbeat,presence,status} endpoints.
Ported onto current main's conventions rather than rebuilt:
- app/models/user.py: last_seen_at/status_message columns (unchanged from
the orphaned branch; still compatible with the current model).
- alembic/versions/0006_add_presence_columns.py: same column migration,
rebased as the new head after 0005_add_world_content_tables (was
2a9b9873244a off 0001_initial).
- app/routers/presence.py: same three endpoints, updated to the DbDep
pattern other routers (avatar.py) now use; retains the 47ab492 fix
(is_online_batch via MGET, correct StatusUpdate Field annotation).
- app/services/presence.py: real adaptation beyond a mechanical port --
the original PresenceStore required an explicit connect() that nothing
ever called (main.py's lifespan never wired it up), so every real
request would have raised "not connected". Made the Redis client connect
lazily on first use instead, and cache it per running event loop rather
than globally: this repo's TestClient(app) pattern (no `with` block) can
dispatch different requests onto different event loops, which broke a
single cached connection the same way NullPool's comment in conftest.py
describes for asyncpg. Dropped the unused get_presence()/
update_status_message() methods and the never-wired init/shutdown
singleton helpers -- dead code even in the original.
- tests/conftest.py: extended the existing ephemeral-Postgres bootstrap to
also bring up ephemeral Redis (docker-compose.yml already defined the
service) when REDIS_URL isn't already reachable, so `pytest` stays
hermetic.
- tests/test_presence.py: heartbeat sets online, batch presence over
mixed online/offline/unknown ids (the exact 47ab492 regression), status
message update/strip/length-limit, and TTL expiry via a short-TTL
PresenceStore instance (real Redis SET/EXISTS/MGET, no 60s sleep needed).
Verified: full backend pytest suite (144 tests) passes against a fresh
Postgres+Redis. Also drove the real endpoints end-to-end against a running
uvicorn + docker-compose Postgres/Redis: heartbeat -> online, batch query,
forced TTL expiry -> offline with last_seen_at retained, status message
trim + 422 over 140 chars.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y2FESCaMXeJpC9gSctiEeD
No test ever exercised the client ChunkDataDecoder against real byte data
before this (M2 chunk streaming was never fed real content on PC2/PC3).
Added scripts/smoke_test_chunk_codec_interop.gd, decoding the backend's
exact golden fixtures (backend/tests/fixtures/chunks/*.bin) and asserting
byte-identical logical values -- the real cross-language contract this
whole persistence system depends on. It found three bugs on first run:
1. chunk_data_decoder.gd's _read_float32/_write_float32 used `bits as
float`/`val as int`, a numeric cast in GDScript, not an IEEE-754
bitcast -- silently corrupted every non-integer position/rotation/
scale/bounds value (1.5 decoded as 1069547520.0, verified). Fixed with
PackedByteArray.decode_float/encode_float (real bitcast, same
little-endian order as the rest of this format).
2. backend/app/services/chunk_codec.py's binary codec wrote bounds as
min+size, disagreeing with world.md §3's documented min+max wire
format and with the client's actual (correct) decoder -- corrupted
every chunk's bounds on the wire despite the backend's own JSON path
using min+max correctly. Fixed the binary encode/decode to match the
spec; regenerated the golden fixtures.
3. chunk_data_decoder.gd's object-properties parsing used
`JSON.parse_string(props_str) or {}` -- GDScript's `or` is a boolean
operator, not Python/JS-style short-circuit-return, so this silently
evaluated to a bool for any object with real property data, crashing
on assignment to the typed `properties: Dictionary` field. Fixed with
an explicit type check.
Full backend suite (132/132) and 4 sibling client smoke tests re-verified
clean after all three fixes; no other `or {}`/`or []` instances of bug 3's
pattern found elsewhere in the codebase.
Implements docs/architecture/world_persistence_impl.md §9's backend task:
chunk/room/revision Postgres schema (migration 0005), a Python port of the
world.md §3.6 binary chunk codec with golden-file tests, a WorldStore
service (world.md §5.1 minus flush_dirty/rebuild_index), the public
world-content router (rooms/chunks CRUD, optimistic concurrency, batch
writes) and the internal read-only API for dedicated servers, and
game_servers.py changes: a per-spawn bearer token, --api-url/--server-token
args, and a real "ready"-field wait replacing _await_port, which bound the
UDP port before content existed and failed open (no error) past its
deadline.
create_world now auto-creates the "main" room.
Deviations/findings, not silently decided:
- chunk_codec.py implements real IEEE-754 float32 packing rather than
mirroring a confirmed bug in scripts/chunk_data_decoder.gd's
_read_float32/_write_float32, which do a lossy int<->float cast instead
of a bit reinterpretation (verified against Godot 4.6.2 headless) and
will corrupt any non-integer position/rotation/scale/bounds value. Not
fixed here (client-side, out of scope); flagged for the client task.
- world_persistence_impl.md references a world's monotonic
content_revision (§6/§7.2/§8.1) but never defines where it's stored.
Resolved as MAX(id) over the append-only world_chunk_revisions table,
scoped to world_id, rather than adding an undocumented column.
- No existing Godot-side golden fixture/test vectors were found to reuse,
so tests/fixtures/chunks/*.bin are authored fresh from this
implementation (see generate_fixtures.py).
Verification: 132/132 backend pytest tests pass against a real ephemeral
Postgres (both reusing an already-running instance and cold via
conftest.py's own docker-compose bootstrap), including migration
upgrade/downgrade/upgrade, codec round-trip + validation-error tests, and
full HTTP round trips for PUT/GET/batch/delete/revisions/rollback and the
internal API's token auth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y2FESCaMXeJpC9gSctiEeD
Every checkpoint smoke test registers users against one backend from one
client IP, so the per-IP auth limit tripped mid-suite (main_menu_full_flow
-> 2/12). Add RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED (default true); run_checkpoint_tests.py
sets it false for its backend. test_rate_limit.py forces it on in-fixture
so the limiter is still really tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015jtxAiu5dAW4WxCNdGkrkJ
app/rate_limit.py: an in-process sliding-window limiter (single-worker
backend, so no Redis needed -- flagged for if that changes). /register and
/login are capped at 10 attempts / minute / client IP (X-Forwarded-For
aware), returning 429 + Retry-After past that. Blunts credential
brute-force, which the backend had no protection against.
- conftest.py resets the limiter between tests (every TestClient request
looks like one IP).
- tests/test_rate_limit.py: threshold, shared bucket, per-key window. 77 passed.
CORS reviewed while here: already an explicit origin allowlist
(settings.CORS_ORIGINS), not "*" -- and the Godot client isn't a browser
so it doesn't apply there anyway. Left as-is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015jtxAiu5dAW4WxCNdGkrkJ
POST /api/auth/register now requires a real date_of_birth (ISO YYYY-MM-DD).
The server computes age (auth.calculate_age) and rejects under-18s with 403;
a future/nonsensical date is 400. The DOB is stored and surfaced only to
that user (/api/auth/me).
Still self-attested (a user can enter a false DOB) -- but a concrete,
stored, legally-meaningful data point and the seam for a future ID-check
pass. Encryption-at-rest for the column and the Tier-2 hook are not done;
the limitation is stated plainly in docs/architecture/content_moderation.md 5.2.
- auth.py: RegisterRequest.date_of_birth (date); MIN_AGE=18; register()
computes + enforces; UserResponse.date_of_birth typed `date | None`
(the old `str | None` would have 500'd /me once a DOB was actually stored).
- api_client.gd / main_menu.gd: the Over18 checkbox is now a
"Date of birth (YYYY-MM-DD)" field with a client-side sanity check.
- tests: test_auth_age_gate.py rewritten around the endpoint + age math
(adult/minor/exactly-18/future-dob/stored); ~25 over_18 references across
6 backend test files + 6 game smoke tests updated. Backend 74 passed;
game smokes green (auth 6/6, menu_full_flow 12/12, e2e 4/4, etc.);
fresh-clone boot PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015jtxAiu5dAW4WxCNdGkrkJ
- backend/tests/conftest.py: pytest_configure brings up an ephemeral
Postgres via docker compose + runs migrations when DATABASE_URL isn't
already reachable, and tears it down after. `cd backend && pytest` now
works from a clean checkout with zero manual setup (72 passed in ~28s);
no docker and no DB -> the whole suite skips with a clear message instead
of erroring 60+ times.
- scripts/verify_fresh_clone.sh: exports a pristine tree (git archive, so no
.godot), imports from scratch, headless-boots the main menu + game scene,
fails on any SCRIPT ERROR / failed autoload. Catches the stale-class-cache
class of bug. PASS.
- run_checkpoint_tests.py runs both the 2p multiplayer test and the
fresh-clone check.
- .forgejo/workflows/checkpoint.yml + docs/ci.md: the CI workflow (runs the
checkpoint suite on push/PR) and how to enable it -- it needs a Forgejo
Actions `host` runner registered on the AGP box, a one-time operator step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015jtxAiu5dAW4WxCNdGkrkJ
- backend/app/services/game_servers.py: an in-process supervisor. One
headless Godot dedicated-server process per world, keyed by world_id,
spawned on demand from the join endpoint, port-allocated from a
configured range, with a background reaper that kills a world's server
once its status file reports 0 players for the idle timeout. Off by
default (GAME_SERVERS_ENABLED); the checkpoint/playtest launcher enables it.
- POST /api/worlds/{id}/join -> {world_id, host, port}; 404 for
unknown/hidden worlds, 503 when orchestration is disabled. Auth required.
- main.py lifespan starts/stops the supervisor.
- config.py: GODOT_BIN, GAME_PROJECT_DIR, GAME_SERVER_HOST, port range,
idle timeout.
- tests/test_world_join.py (auth / 404 / visibility / 503) -- suite 72 passed.
- checkpoint runner also runs the 2p multiplayer shell test.
Verified end to end: enabled orchestration, POST /join spawned the Godot
server, a real client connected to the returned address and moved; backend
shutdown reaped the process.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015jtxAiu5dAW4WxCNdGkrkJ
New avatar_loadouts table (one row per user, loadout stored as a single
JSONB document matching the client's AvatarLoadout.to_json() shape) and
GET/PUT /api/avatar/loadout.
The server has no copy of the asset catalog, so it validates only the
envelope (JSON object, non-empty base_body, object slots, size cap) --
which-asset-in-which-slot validation stays client-side. New accounts get a
server default (base_human_male_01, no slots) with is_default:true so the
client can tell "never customised" from "customised back to base".
- models/avatar_loadout.py + 0004 migration + User.avatar_loadout relation
- routers/avatar.py wired into main.py
- tests/test_avatar_loadout.py (7 tests: default, save/read, replace,
validation, auth) -- full suite 68 passed
- lifted the duplicated _override_db fixture from 3 test files into
conftest.py (new test files need it too)
- docs/architecture/avatar.md §9a: the persistence design
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015jtxAiu5dAW4WxCNdGkrkJ
The register form collected and validated an actual date of birth just to
throw it away (backend never stored it beyond a nullable column). Per the
roadmap note: don't collect/store DOB right now, just get a client-side
"I am 18 or older" confirmation. RegisterRequest.date_of_birth (str) is now
over_18 (bool); the endpoint rejects over_18=false with 400 same as before.
calculate_age() is kept (unused by /register now) since real DOB collection
is coming back in a future pass and deleting it broke test_auth_age_gate.py's
import for no benefit.
Frontend: DOBEdit LineEdit replaced with an Over18Check CheckBox; api_client.gd's
register() now takes a bool instead of a date string. All Godot callers
(smoke_test_auth/e2e/world_list/main_menu_ui/main_menu_full_flow) and backend
test files updated to match. Full suite verified against a live backend:
61/61 pytest, 6/6 Godot smoke tests (33 individual assertions), all passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M6rUEynmv2QmweocAQYARN
- auth.py: _create_access_token had no jti claim, so two refreshes
within the same wall-clock second produced byte-identical access
tokens (same failure mode already fixed for refresh tokens earlier)
- test_refresh_endpoint.py: usernames (jwttoken, refreshuser, etc.)
collided with test_auth_endpoints.py's own test usernames once run
in the same pytest session against a shared DB with no per-test
isolation -- exactly how run_checkpoint_tests.py invokes pytest.
Namespaced this file's usernames with a refep_ prefix.
Full backend suite (63 tests) passes clean end-to-end against a real
Postgres with real migrations applied.
Verified end-to-end before this fix: the actual deliverable (login/register
UI + ApiClient wiring) already worked correctly -- confirmed via the real
Godot headless smoke test (scripts/smoke_test_auth.gd), 6/6 passing against
a live backend. This commit only fixes the bonus backend integration test
file the task also added, which had 4 separate real bugs:
1. Imported override_get_db/SessionLocal from app.database -- neither
exists, ImportError on collection (backend/app/database.py only ever
exposed get_db + the async engine/session factory).
2. Base.metadata.create_all(bind=engine) used the sync API against an
async engine -- doesn't work, and unnecessary anyway since Alembic
migrations already create the real tables.
3. Reusing the app's shared (pooled) async engine across FastAPI
TestClient's per-request anyio portals corrupted asyncpg connections
handed to a different event loop than the one that opened them
("cannot perform operation: another operation is in progress") the
moment any test made more than one request. Fixed with a NullPool
test-only engine so every request gets a genuinely fresh connection.
4. test_login_success and test_login_wrong_password both hardcoded the
same username ("loginuser") with no per-test DB isolation/rollback --
the second test's register call 409'd against the first test's already-
created user instead of exercising the wrong-password path it was
actually testing.
Also fixed 2 pre-existing collision-prone tests by re-running against a
freshly truncated DB and confirming clean. Full suite: 49/49 passing
(38 pre-existing + 11 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
daddy
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