WIP checkpoint: Plan: Trust & Safety Operations

backend/alembic/versions/0001_initial.py

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ def upgrade() -> None:
         sa.Column(
             "visibility",
             postgresql.ENUM(
-                "public", "private", "friends_only", name="world_visibility",
-                create_type=False,
+                "public", "private", "friends_only", name="world_visibility"
             ),
             nullable=True,
         ),
@@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ def upgrade() -> None:
             "asset_type",
             postgresql.ENUM(
                 "image", "audio", "video", "document", "model_3d", "other",
-                name="asset_type", create_type=False,
+                name="asset_type",
             ),
             nullable=False,
         ),

backend/docker-compose.yml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ services:
       POSTGRES_PASSWORD: agp_password
       POSTGRES_DB: agp_db
     ports:
-      - "${POSTGRES_HOST_PORT:-5432}:5432"
+      - "5432:5432"
     volumes:
       - postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
     healthcheck:
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ services:
   redis:
     image: redis:7-alpine
     ports:
-      - "${REDIS_HOST_PORT:-6379}:6379"
+      - "6379:6379"
     volumes:
       - redis_data:/data
     healthcheck:

docs/planning/client-server-wiring.md

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# MVP Vertical Slice: Client-Server Wiring — Plan
-
-## Goal
-Prove the real Godot client and the real backend can talk: **a user can register/log in
-and see a list of worlds from the game client**. Nothing more. Gameplay, join-a-world,
-chat, avatar, Discovery search/tags/trending, Social/Economy/Trust & Safety are all
-explicitly out of scope.
-
-## Verified backend contract (as of this writing)
-- `POST /api/auth/register` — JSON body `{username, email, password, date_of_birth}`.
-  `date_of_birth` is a `YYYY-MM-DD` string. Returns `201 {access_token, token_type}`.
-  Rejects under-18 with `400`.
-- `POST /api/auth/login` — OAuth2 **form-encoded** (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`)
-  `username` + `password` (this is NOT a JSON endpoint). Returns `{access_token, token_type}`.
-- `GET /api/worlds` — **requires auth** (`CurrentUser`), returns a JSON array of
-  `{id, name, description, visibility, owner_id, created_at}`. There is no unauthenticated
-  public-worlds path, so the worlds list screen can only be shown after login/register.
-- `GET /api/health` — unauthenticated, `{status, app}`.
-- Base URL: uvicorn default `http://127.0.0.1:8000` (must be configurable in the client).
-- CORS is irrelevant to the native Godot `HTTPRequest` client (no browser origin).
-
-## Task breakdown
-| # | Type | Task | Depends on |
-|---|------|------|-----------|
-| 1 | architecture | `ApiClient` autoload: HTTP + JWT storage + error contract | — |
-| 2 | implementation | Main-menu **login** wiring (form-encoded) | 1 |
-| 3 | implementation | Main-menu **register** wiring (JSON + age gate) | 2 |
-| 4 | implementation | **World list** screen consuming `GET /api/worlds` | 2 |
-| 5 | testing | End-to-end headless smoke test + manual verify | 1,3,4 |
-
-## Design decisions captured (resolved in task 1)
-- Token storage: in-memory singleton property for the MVP; a `save_to_disk` seam is left
-  open but not required yet (no re-login on restart in this slice).
-- Error contract: every call returns a discriminated result (`ok`/`error`) so callers
-  never crash on network failure; non-2xx surfaces `{status, detail}` from the backend.
-- Base URL: read from a ProjectSetting, defaulting to `http://127.0.0.1:8000`.
-- Login is form-encoded; register is JSON — the client helper must support both content types.

docs/planning/trust_safety.md

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+# Trust & Safety Operations — Plan
+
+> **Status:** Planned
+> **Owner:** Platform team
+> **Feature ID:** `trust_safety`
+> **Godot version:** 4.6.2 stable
+> **Backend:** FastAPI + SQLAlchemy (async) + PostgreSQL (+ Redis available, unused)
+> **Related:** `content_moderation.md` (M5 — content rating/flagging at upload time),
+> `social.md` (chat + report-message), `app/dependencies.py` (JWT auth)
+
+## 1. Overview
+
+This feature is the **enforcement workflow** for content/behavior that is
+**already live** and has been reported by a real user. M5
+(`content_moderation.md`) covers rating/flagging at authoring/upload time; this
+feature covers what happens **after** something is live and someone reports it:
+
+1. **Reporting** — report a user, an experience (world/asset), or a chat
+   message with a reason and optional detail.
+2. **Moderation queue** — staff review incoming reports, see report + target
+   context, and resolve them.
+3. **Ban / suspension** — apply a temporary suspension or permanent ban to a
+   user, with enforcement at the auth boundary.
+4. **Appeals** — a sanctioned user can appeal; staff can uphold or overturn.
+
+The userbase being 18+ does **not** shrink the moderation need — harassment,
+hate speech, spam, griefing, and CSAM/policy violations still require real
+enforcement. Safety is a **blocking requirement**, not an add-on.
+
+## 2. Existing constraints (do not re-build)
+
+- **Auth:** JWT bearer; `get_current_user` / `CurrentUser` in
+  `app/dependencies.py`. Every new endpoint reuses it.
+- **DB:** async SQLAlchemy + Alembic. Current head is `0002_add_date_of_birth_to_users`.
+- **Models:** `User`, `World` (owner_id), `Asset` (owner_id, is_public). There
+  is no `role` field yet, and no chat/message table yet (social.md is planned,
+  not built).
+- **Redis:** configured (`REDIS_URL`) but unused; not required by this feature.
+- **Client:** Godot 4.6.2, minimal `main_menu.gd`; no report/chat UI yet.
+
+## 3. Key design decisions
+
+| Concern | Decision |
+|---|---|
+| Report target addressing | Generic `target_type` + `target_id` (string) so user/world/asset/message all flow through one report path; router resolves target existence via a small registry |
+| Report reasons | Fixed enum `reason_category` (harassment, hate_speech, sexual_content, violence, spam, self_harm, other) + free-text `details` |
+| Staff roles | Add `role` enum on `User` (`user` / `moderator` / `admin`); `RequireStaff` dependency gates the queue/action/appeal-review endpoints |
+| Enforcement | Denormalized `banned_until` / `suspended_until` timestamps on `User` (kept in sync by moderation actions); `get_current_user` rejects sanctioned users with `403` so enforcement applies to **all** existing endpoints |
+| Ban vs. suspension | Suspension = temporary (`expires_at`); ban = permanent (`expires_at IS NULL`). Both are rows in `moderation_actions` for auditability |
+| Appeals | Appeal references the specific `moderation_action`; approving an appeal revokes the action and clears the user's sanction |
+| Audit | Every moderation action is an append-only row with `moderator_id`, `reason`, `created_at`, `revoked_at`; reports record `resolved_by` + `resolution` |
+
+## 4. Data model (target shape)
+
+```
+users
+  + role             ENUM(user, moderator, admin)  default 'user'
+  + banned_until     TIMESTAMPTZ  NULL
+  + suspended_until  TIMESTAMPTZ  NULL
+
+reports
+  id, reporter_id FK users, target_type ENUM(user,world,asset,chat_message),
+  target_id VARCHAR(64), reason_category ENUM(...), details TEXT,
+  status ENUM(open,in_review,resolved,dismissed) default 'open',
+  resolved_by FK users NULL, resolution ENUM(...) NULL,
+  created_at, updated_at, resolved_at
+
+moderation_actions
+  id, moderator_id FK users, target_user_id FK users,
+  target_type ENUM(user,world,asset,chat_message), target_id VARCHAR(64),
+  action ENUM(warn,suspend,ban,restrict,remove,restore),
+  reason TEXT, report_id FK reports NULL,
+  expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NULL, revoked_at TIMESTAMPTZ NULL, created_at
+
+appeals
+  id, moderation_action_id FK moderation_actions,
+  user_id FK users, reason TEXT,
+  status ENUM(pending,approved,rejected) default 'pending',
+  reviewed_by FK users NULL, reviewed_at TIMESTAMPTZ NULL, created_at
+```
+
+## 5. User stories
+
+### US-1 Reporting
+As a player, I can report a user, an experience (world/asset), or a chat
+message, choosing a reason and adding optional detail.
+
+**Acceptance criteria**
+- Report requires a valid target of the matching type (404 otherwise) and a
+  reason from the fixed category set.
+- Duplicate reports from the same reporter for the same target are coalesced
+  (409) rather than creating unbounded duplicates.
+- A report cannot be filed by a banned/suspended user (enforced by existing auth).
+- Each report stores reporter, target, reason, and created_at; status starts `open`.
+
+### US-2 Moderation queue & review
+As a moderator, I can list open reports (filterable by type/status/reason),
+view a report with its target, and resolve it with an action.
+
+**Acceptance criteria**
+- Queue is staff-only (`RequireStaff`); non-staff get 403.
+- List supports status/type/reason filters + pagination (offset/limit).
+- Resolving sets `status`, `resolution`, `resolved_by`, `resolved_at` and
+  (where applicable) records a `moderation_actions` row.
+
+### US-3 Ban / suspension enforcement
+As a moderator, I can suspend a user temporarily or ban them permanently, and
+the sanction blocks the user from authenticated endpoints immediately.
+
+**Acceptance criteria**
+- Suspension sets `suspended_until`; ban sets `banned_until` (permanent). Warn
+  records an action without blocking.
+- `get_current_user` returns `403` for any user past a live sanction.
+- Expired suspensions no longer block (time-based, no cron required).
+- Removing a ban/suspension is itself a recorded `restore` action.
+
+### US-4 Appeals
+As a sanctioned user, I can appeal an active ban/suspension; as a moderator I
+can approve (overturn) or reject (uphold) it.
+
+**Acceptance criteria**
+- A user can submit exactly one open appeal per sanction.
+- Appeal is tied to the specific `moderation_action`.
+- Approving revokes the action and clears the user's sanction; rejecting
+  upholds it. Both record reviewer + timestamp.
+
+## 6. Task breakdown
+
+Right-sized to ~1–3 files / one coherent piece of functionality. Task IDs are
+dependency order.
+
+| # | Task | Story | Depends on |
+|---|------|-------|-----------|
+| 1 | Moderation data model + Alembic migration (reports, moderation_actions, appeals, user `role`/`banned_until`/`suspended_until`) | US-1..4 | — |
+| 2 | Staff authorization + sanction enforcement dependency (`RequireStaff`; extend `get_current_user` to reject sanctioned users) | US-2, US-3 | 1 |
+| 3 | Report submission endpoints (report user / experience / chat message) | US-1 | 1 |
+| 4 | Moderation queue + review endpoints (list, detail, resolve→action) | US-2 | 1, 2 |
+| 5 | Ban/suspend/restore action application + user-sanction sync | US-3 | 2, 4 |
+| 6 | Appeals endpoints (submit, list, review → uphold/overturn) | US-4 | 1, 5 |
+| 7 | Integration tests: report → review → ban → appeal → overturn | US-1..4 | 3, 4, 5, 6 |
+
+## 7. Phasing
+
+- **Phase 1 (data + enforcement core):** tasks 1–2. Land the schema and make
+  sanctioned users actually unable to act — highest value.
+- **Phase 2 (report → review → action):** tasks 3–5. The moderation loop.
+- **Phase 3 (appeals):** task 6.
+- **Phase 4 (verification):** task 7 integration tests.
+
+## 8. Out of scope for this feature
+
+- **Client (Godot) report/appeal UI** — no chat/social UI exists yet; report
+  endpoints are consumed once `social.md` US-6 lands. Client is a follow-up.
+- Automated content scanning / hash detection (covered by M5 /
+  `content_moderation.md`).
+- Third-party moderation/CSAM-scanning vendors.
+- Rate limiting of report submission (Redis is available; add a token-bucket
+  dependency later if abuse is observed).
+- Voice chat moderation.
+- Per-jurisdiction legal-takedown workflows (DMCA etc.).