Compare commits

..

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
agent-bot ba4e714d2e Recovered orphaned WIP before switching to a new task 2026-08-17 17:47:29 +00:00
agent-bot 3ab73b2058 Recovered orphaned WIP before switching to a new task 2026-08-17 17:45:04 +00:00
agent-bot 5074cbd749 WIP checkpoint: Scaffold FastAPI backend project structure 2026-08-17 17:45:04 +00:00
agent-bot f0686e4652 WIP checkpoint: Scaffold FastAPI backend project structure 2026-08-17 17:45:04 +00:00
agent-bot 004bccaa12 WIP checkpoint: Scaffold FastAPI backend project structure 2026-08-17 17:45:04 +00:00
agent-bot eb0419b91b WIP checkpoint: Scaffold FastAPI backend project structure 2026-08-17 17:45:04 +00:00
agent-bot bc09373841 chore(backend): add env config template
Scaffolding only — FastAPI app, SQLAlchemy models, Alembic migrations,
and docker-compose from the original task description are still not
implemented. Committing what exists so it isn't lost; task ec0074121ca3
reset to pending to finish the rest.
2026-08-17 17:45:04 +00:00
191 changed files with 36 additions and 19193 deletions
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
name: checkpoint
# Runs the full checkpoint suite (migrations, backend pytest, Godot smoke
# tests, multiplayer, fresh-clone boot) on every push and PR.
#
# Runs on a `host`-label act_runner on the AGP box: Docker, ~/godot/godot,
# and Python 3 are already there. Deliberately uses no JavaScript actions
# (actions/checkout etc.) so the host needs no Node install -- checkout is a
# plain git clone from the local Gitea. See docs/ci.md.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
jobs:
checkpoint:
runs-on: host
steps:
- name: Checkout
run: |
set -eu
rm -rf repo && mkdir repo && cd repo
git init -q
git remote add origin "http://x:${{ github.token }}@localhost:3000/${{ github.repository }}.git"
git fetch -q --depth 1 origin "${{ github.sha }}"
git checkout -q FETCH_HEAD
- name: Python env
working-directory: repo
run: |
set -eu
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install --quiet --upgrade pip
.venv/bin/pip install --quiet -r backend/requirements.txt
- name: Checkpoint suite
working-directory: repo
run: .venv/bin/python scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py --postgres-port 25690 --backend-port 18690
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Godot 4 editor cache/import directory
.godot/
# Godot export artifacts
export/
*.tmp
# OS
.DS_Store
Thumbs.db
# Godot UID files (regenerated from path)
*.uid
assets/build_info.json
View File
View File
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://bm01jsuomi50i"
path="res://.godot/imported/accessory_belt_01.glb-a2b6be72b4422067d290c84868489d2d.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/accessory_belt_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/accessory_belt_01.glb-a2b6be72b4422067d290c84868489d2d.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://dvou487niwnjt"
path="res://.godot/imported/accessory_necklace_01.glb-75d713dbb1ff9579d6f0bf8b7ddde1e2.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/accessory_necklace_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/accessory_necklace_01.glb-75d713dbb1ff9579d6f0bf8b7ddde1e2.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://dknbtq33pssf4"
path="res://.godot/imported/back_backpack_01.glb-d0ccc39aed8e86403d649c8d07008591.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/back_backpack_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/back_backpack_01.glb-d0ccc39aed8e86403d649c8d07008591.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://brfp6g6pcbbw7"
path="res://.godot/imported/base_human_male_01.glb-c917b85c8f8ab5d1974812a6891f052f.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/base_human_male_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/base_human_male_01.glb-c917b85c8f8ab5d1974812a6891f052f.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
-115
View File
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
{
"assets": {
"base_human_male_01": {
"type": "base_body",
"slot": "base_body",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/base_human_male_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Human Male Base"
},
"head_cyber_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "head",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/head_cyber_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Cyber Head",
"mount_bone": "Head"
},
"hair_mohawk_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "hair",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/hair_mohawk_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Mohawk",
"mount_bone": "HeadTop"
},
"hair_ponytail_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "hair",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/hair_ponytail_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Ponytail",
"mount_bone": "HeadTop"
},
"face_glasses_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "face",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/face_glasses_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Glasses",
"mount_bone": "Jaw"
},
"chest_bandit_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "chest",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/chest_bandit_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Bandit Shirt",
"mount_bone": "Chest"
},
"back_backpack_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "back",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/back_backpack_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Backpack",
"mount_bone": "Chest"
},
"pants_cargo_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "pants",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/pants_cargo_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Cargo Pants",
"mount_bone": "Hips"
},
"left_hand_glove_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "left_hand",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/left_hand_glove_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Left Glove",
"mount_bone": "LeftHand"
},
"right_hand_glove_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "right_hand",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/right_hand_glove_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Right Glove",
"mount_bone": "RightHand"
},
"left_foot_boot_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "left_foot",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/left_foot_boot_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Left Boot",
"mount_bone": "LeftFoot"
},
"right_foot_boot_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "right_foot",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/right_foot_boot_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Right Boot",
"mount_bone": "RightFoot"
},
"accessory_belt_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "accessory",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/accessory_belt_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Belt",
"mount_bone": "Root"
},
"accessory_necklace_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "accessory",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/accessory_necklace_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0",
"display_name": "Necklace",
"mount_bone": "Root"
}
}
}
Binary file not shown.
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://bva2etlpa8act"
path="res://.godot/imported/chest_bandit_01.glb-90867999feb79e02c469ef45d970f0e1.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/chest_bandit_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/chest_bandit_01.glb-90867999feb79e02c469ef45d970f0e1.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://ctwcxf552y325"
path="res://.godot/imported/face_glasses_01.glb-fe06ebb12e6caf265dce06de37a74fc5.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/face_glasses_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/face_glasses_01.glb-fe06ebb12e6caf265dce06de37a74fc5.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://j4dc6l3l0j6f"
path="res://.godot/imported/hair_mohawk_01.glb-f2a6883730b5d02facb56d1dbb0e371e.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/hair_mohawk_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/hair_mohawk_01.glb-f2a6883730b5d02facb56d1dbb0e371e.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://dp4vqp2trrank"
path="res://.godot/imported/hair_ponytail_01.glb-cdf5913fc63278b1dd362cb640c2ecb4.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/hair_ponytail_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/hair_ponytail_01.glb-cdf5913fc63278b1dd362cb640c2ecb4.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://bkp35fnns36xb"
path="res://.godot/imported/head_cyber_01.glb-8081a99d6b31c121d208dd2f9629df5c.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/head_cyber_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/head_cyber_01.glb-8081a99d6b31c121d208dd2f9629df5c.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://bgfjpdu8kg0aj"
path="res://.godot/imported/left_foot_boot_01.glb-cab36c9e44befe0a3ff50ee651f2ff67.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/left_foot_boot_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/left_foot_boot_01.glb-cab36c9e44befe0a3ff50ee651f2ff67.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://dtq7tgio1iymd"
path="res://.godot/imported/left_hand_glove_01.glb-4b237bea3299c6604547afa353a7b602.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/left_hand_glove_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/left_hand_glove_01.glb-4b237bea3299c6604547afa353a7b602.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://yo204q1m6hs3"
path="res://.godot/imported/pants_cargo_01.glb-00f3e3b72fd692344cbb8bfd2b8449f9.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/pants_cargo_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/pants_cargo_01.glb-00f3e3b72fd692344cbb8bfd2b8449f9.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://30ij0eapm6ti"
path="res://.godot/imported/right_foot_boot_01.glb-ffff27e561e5632596b7ba89fee5b5ea.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/right_foot_boot_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/right_foot_boot_01.glb-ffff27e561e5632596b7ba89fee5b5ea.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
Binary file not shown.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[remap]
importer="scene"
importer_version=1
type="PackedScene"
uid="uid://bcrtxtp47dv8h"
path="res://.godot/imported/right_hand_glove_01.glb-a59875b630ac413350c3bdf6acc84bdf.scn"
[deps]
source_file="res://assets/avatars/right_hand_glove_01.glb"
dest_files=["res://.godot/imported/right_hand_glove_01.glb-a59875b630ac413350c3bdf6acc84bdf.scn"]
[params]
nodes/root_type=""
nodes/root_name=""
nodes/root_script=null
nodes/apply_root_scale=true
nodes/root_scale=1.0
nodes/import_as_skeleton_bones=false
nodes/use_name_suffixes=true
nodes/use_node_type_suffixes=true
meshes/ensure_tangents=true
meshes/generate_lods=true
meshes/create_shadow_meshes=true
meshes/light_baking=1
meshes/lightmap_texel_size=0.2
meshes/force_disable_compression=false
skins/use_named_skins=true
animation/import=true
animation/fps=30
animation/trimming=false
animation/remove_immutable_tracks=true
animation/import_rest_as_RESET=false
import_script/path=""
materials/extract=0
materials/extract_format=0
materials/extract_path=""
_subresources={}
gltf/naming_version=2
gltf/embedded_image_handling=1
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
{
"content_flags": {
"violence": "none",
"mature": false
},
"rules": [
{
"trigger": {"type": "on_interact"},
"conditions": [],
"actions": [
{"verb": "give_item", "item_id": "gold_coin", "count": 3},
{"verb": "play_sound", "sound_id": "chest_open"},
{"verb": "rotate", "target": "self", "degrees": 90, "axis": "y", "duration": 0.4}
]
}
]
}
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
{
"templates": {
"small_crate": {
"asset_id": "props/crate_small.glb",
"display_name": "Small Crate"
}
}
}
+6 -15
View File
@@ -1,23 +1,14 @@
# Database (async driver) # Database
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://agp_user:agp_password@localhost:5432/agp_db DATABASE_URL=postgresql://agp_user:agp_password@localhost:5432/agp_db
# Redis # Redis
REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379/0 REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379/0
# JWT / Auth # JWT
ALGORITHM=RS256 SECRET_KEY=change-me-to-a-secure-random-string
ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES=60 ALGORITHM=HS256
REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS=30 ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES=30
# Directory where the RSA keypair is loaded/generated at runtime.
# Defaults to ~/.agp/keys (outside the repo). Keys are never committed to git.
RSA_KEY_DIR=~/.agp/keys
# App # App
APP_NAME=AGP Backend
APP_VERSION=0.1.0
DEBUG=true DEBUG=true
CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:8080,http://localhost:3000 CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:8080,http://localhost:3000
# File uploads
UPLOAD_DIR=uploads
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB=100
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# Alembic configuration file.
# Run: alembic upgrade head (to apply migrations)
# Run: alembic revision --autogenerate -m "description" (to generate migration)
[alembic]
script_location = alembic
prepend_sys_path = .
sqlalchemy.url = postgresql+asyncpg://agp_user:agp_password@localhost:5432/agp_db
[loggers]
keys = root,sqlalchemy,alembic
[handlers]
keys = console
[formatters]
keys = generic
[logger_root]
level = WARN
handlers = console
qualname =
[logger_sqlalchemy]
level = WARN
handlers =
qualname = sqlalchemy.engine
[logger_alembic]
level = INFO
handlers =
qualname = alembic
[handler_console]
class = StreamHandler
args = (sys.stderr,)
level = NOTSET
formatter = generic
[formatter_generic]
format = %(levelname)-5.5s [%(name)s] %(message)s
datefmt = %H:%M:%S
-65
View File
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
"""Alembic environment configuration."""
import asyncio
from logging.config import fileConfig
from alembic import context
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
from app.config import settings
from app.database import Base
from app.models import user, session, world, asset, avatar_loadout # noqa: F401
# this is the Alembic Config object, which provides
# access to the values within the .ini file in use.
config = context.config
# Interpret the config file for Python logging.
# This line sets up loggers basically.
if config.config_file_name is not None:
fileConfig(config.config_file_name)
# add your model's MetaData object here
# for 'autogenerate' support
target_metadata = Base.metadata
def run_migrations_offline() -> None:
"""Run migrations in 'offline' mode."""
url = settings.DATABASE_URL
context.configure(
url=url,
target_metadata=target_metadata,
literal_binds=True,
dialect_opts={"paramstyle": "named"},
)
with context.begin_transaction():
context.run_migrations()
def do_run_migrations(connection):
context.configure(connection=connection, target_metadata=target_metadata)
with context.begin_transaction():
context.run_migrations()
async def run_async_migrations():
"""Run migrations in 'online' mode with async engine."""
connectable = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, echo=False)
async with connectable.connect() as connection:
await connection.run_sync(do_run_migrations)
await connectable.dispose()
def run_migrations_online() -> None:
"""Run migrations in 'online' mode."""
asyncio.run(run_async_migrations())
if context.is_offline_mode():
run_migrations_offline()
else:
run_migrations_online()
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
"""${message}
Revision ID: ${up_revision}
Revises: ${down_revision | comma,n}
Create Date: ${create_date}
"""
from typing import Sequence, Union
from alembic import op
import sqlalchemy as sa
${imports if imports else ""}
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
revision: str = ${repr(up_revision)}
down_revision: Union[str, None] = ${repr(down_revision)}
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = ${repr(branch_labels)}
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = ${repr(depends_on)}
def upgrade() -> None:
"""Upgrade database schema."""
${upgrades if upgrades else "pass"}
def downgrade() -> None:
"""Downgrade database schema."""
${downgrades if downgrades else "pass"}
-127
View File
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
"""initial schema
Revision ID: 0001_initial
Revises:
Create Date: 2024-01-01 00:00:00.000000
"""
from typing import Sequence, Union
from alembic import op
import sqlalchemy as sa
from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
revision: str = "0001_initial"
down_revision: Union[str, None] = None
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
def upgrade() -> None:
"""Upgrade database schema."""
# Create ENUM types
world_visibility = postgresql.ENUM(
"public", "private", "friends_only", name="world_visibility"
)
world_visibility.create(op.get_bind(), checkfirst=True)
asset_type = postgresql.ENUM(
"image", "audio", "video", "document", "model_3d", "other", name="asset_type"
)
asset_type.create(op.get_bind(), checkfirst=True)
# Create users table
op.create_table(
"users",
sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), primary_key=True),
sa.Column("username", sa.String(length=50), nullable=False),
sa.Column("email", sa.String(length=120), nullable=False),
sa.Column("hashed_password", sa.String(length=255), nullable=False),
sa.Column("is_active", sa.Boolean(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now()),
sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
)
op.create_index(op.f("ix_users_email"), "users", ["email"], unique=True)
op.create_index(op.f("ix_users_id"), "users", ["id"], unique=False)
op.create_index(op.f("ix_users_username"), "users", ["username"], unique=True)
# Create sessions table
op.create_table(
"sessions",
sa.Column("id", sa.String(length=36), primary_key=True),
sa.Column("user_id", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("token", sa.String(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("expires_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
sa.Column("is_active", sa.Boolean(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now()),
sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now()),
sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["user_id"], ["users.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
)
op.create_index(op.f("ix_sessions_token"), "sessions", ["token"], unique=True)
# Create worlds table
op.create_table(
"worlds",
sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), primary_key=True),
sa.Column("name", sa.String(length=255), nullable=False),
sa.Column("description", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("owner_id", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
sa.Column(
"visibility",
postgresql.ENUM(
"public", "private", "friends_only", name="world_visibility",
create_type=False,
),
nullable=True,
),
sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now()),
sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["owner_id"], ["users.id"]),
)
op.create_index(op.f("ix_worlds_id"), "worlds", ["id"], unique=False)
# Create assets table
op.create_table(
"assets",
sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), primary_key=True),
sa.Column("name", sa.String(length=255), nullable=False),
sa.Column("description", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
sa.Column(
"asset_type",
postgresql.ENUM(
"image", "audio", "video", "document", "model_3d", "other",
name="asset_type", create_type=False,
),
nullable=False,
),
sa.Column("file_path", sa.String(length=512), nullable=False),
sa.Column("file_size", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("mime_type", sa.String(length=128), nullable=True),
sa.Column("metadata_json", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("world_id", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
sa.Column("owner_id", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("is_public", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now()),
sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now()),
sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["owner_id"], ["users.id"]),
sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["world_id"], ["worlds.id"]),
)
op.create_index(op.f("ix_assets_id"), "assets", ["id"], unique=False)
def downgrade() -> None:
"""Downgrade database schema."""
op.drop_index(op.f("ix_assets_id"), table_name="assets")
op.drop_table("assets")
op.drop_index(op.f("ix_worlds_id"), table_name="worlds")
op.drop_table("worlds")
op.drop_index(op.f("ix_sessions_token"), table_name="sessions")
op.drop_table("sessions")
op.drop_index(op.f("ix_users_username"), table_name="users")
op.drop_index(op.f("ix_users_id"), table_name="users")
op.drop_index(op.f("ix_users_email"), table_name="users")
op.drop_table("users")
# Drop ENUM types
postgresql.ENUM(name="asset_type").drop(op.get_bind(), checkfirst=True)
postgresql.ENUM(name="world_visibility").drop(op.get_bind(), checkfirst=True)
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
"""add date_of_birth column to users table
Revision ID: 0002_add_date_of_birth_to_users
Revises: 0001_initial
Create Date: 2025-01-01 00:00:00.000000
"""
from typing import Sequence, Union
from alembic import op
import sqlalchemy as sa
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
revision: str = "0002_add_date_of_birth_to_users"
down_revision: Union[str, None] = "0001_initial"
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
def upgrade() -> None:
"""Add date_of_birth column to users table."""
op.add_column(
"users",
sa.Column("date_of_birth", sa.Date(), nullable=True),
)
def downgrade() -> None:
"""Remove date_of_birth column from users table."""
op.drop_column("users", "date_of_birth")
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
"""add refresh_tokens table
Revision ID: 0003_add_refresh_tokens_table
Revises: 0002_add_date_of_birth_to_users
Create Date: 2025-07-25 00:00:00.000000
"""
from typing import Sequence, Union
from alembic import op
import sqlalchemy as sa
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
revision: str = "0003_add_refresh_tokens_table"
down_revision: Union[str, None] = "0002_add_date_of_birth_to_users"
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
def upgrade() -> None:
"""Create the refresh_tokens table."""
op.create_table(
"refresh_tokens",
sa.Column("id", sa.String(36), primary_key=True),
sa.Column("user_id", sa.Integer(), sa.ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False),
sa.Column("token", sa.String(512), unique=True, index=True, nullable=False),
sa.Column("expires_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
sa.Column("is_active", sa.Boolean(), server_default=sa.text("true"), nullable=False),
sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now(), nullable=False),
)
def downgrade() -> None:
"""Drop the refresh_tokens table."""
op.drop_table("refresh_tokens")
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
"""add avatar_loadouts table
Revision ID: 0004_add_avatar_loadouts_table
Revises: 0003_add_refresh_tokens_table
Create Date: 2026-09-05 00:00:00.000000
"""
from typing import Sequence, Union
from alembic import op
import sqlalchemy as sa
from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
revision: str = "0004_add_avatar_loadouts_table"
down_revision: Union[str, None] = "0003_add_refresh_tokens_table"
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
def upgrade() -> None:
"""Create the avatar_loadouts table (one row per user)."""
op.create_table(
"avatar_loadouts",
sa.Column(
"user_id",
sa.Integer(),
sa.ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
primary_key=True,
),
sa.Column("data", postgresql.JSONB(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=sa.func.now(), nullable=False),
)
def downgrade() -> None:
"""Drop the avatar_loadouts table."""
op.drop_table("avatar_loadouts")
+11 -131
View File
@@ -1,152 +1,32 @@
"""Application configuration via pydantic-settings.""" from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings
from functools import lru_cache from functools import lru_cache
from pathlib import Path
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.rsa import (
RSAPrivateKey,
RSAPublicKey,
generate_private_key,
)
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import (
Encoding,
NoEncryption,
PrivateFormat,
PublicFormat,
load_pem_private_key,
load_pem_public_key,
)
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
def _load_or_generate_rsa_keys(key_dir: Path) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
"""Load existing RSA keys or generate a new pair.
Keys are stored as PEM files in *key_dir*. The directory is created
if it does not exist. Files are named ``private.pem`` and
``public.pem`` and are **not** committed to git.
"""
private_path = key_dir / "private.pem"
public_path = key_dir / "public.pem"
if private_path.exists() and public_path.exists():
private_pem = private_path.read_bytes()
public_pem = public_path.read_bytes()
else:
# Generate a new 2048-bit RSA key pair
private_key = generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
private_pem = private_key.private_bytes(
Encoding.PEM,
PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
NoEncryption(),
)
public_pem = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
Encoding.PEM,
PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
)
key_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
private_path.write_bytes(private_pem)
public_path.write_bytes(public_pem)
return private_pem, public_pem
class Settings(BaseSettings): class Settings(BaseSettings):
# App # Database
APP_NAME: str = "AGP Backend"
APP_VERSION: str = "0.1.0"
DEBUG: bool = True
# Database (async)
DATABASE_URL: str = "postgresql+asyncpg://agp_user:agp_password@localhost:5432/agp_db" DATABASE_URL: str = "postgresql+asyncpg://agp_user:agp_password@localhost:5432/agp_db"
# Redis # Redis
REDIS_URL: str = "redis://localhost:6379/0" REDIS_URL: str = "redis://localhost:6379/0"
# JWT / Auth # JWT
ALGORITHM: str = "RS256" SECRET_KEY: str = "change-me-to-a-secure-random-string"
ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60 ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS: int = 30 ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 30
# RS256 key storage. Defaults to a directory outside the repo so the # App
# generated keypair is never accidentally committed. DEBUG: bool = True
RSA_KEY_DIR: str = str(Path.home() / ".agp" / "keys")
# CORS
CORS_ORIGINS: str = "http://localhost:8080,http://localhost:3000" CORS_ORIGINS: str = "http://localhost:8080,http://localhost:3000"
# Per-IP auth rate limiting (app/rate_limit.py). Disabled by the
# checkpoint smoke suite, which runs every test from one client IP.
RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED: bool = True
# File uploads
UPLOAD_DIR: str = "uploads"
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB: int = 100
GLTF_MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB: int = 200
# ── Game-server orchestration ──────────────────────────────────────────
# The join flow (POST /api/worlds/{id}/join) ensures a headless Godot
# dedicated-server process exists for a world and returns its address.
# Disabled by default so nothing tries to spawn Godot in environments
# that don't have it (plain pytest, CI without the engine); the
# checkpoint/playtest launcher turns it on.
GAME_SERVERS_ENABLED: bool = False
# Path to the Godot 4 binary. "godot" resolves via PATH.
GODOT_BIN: str = str(Path.home() / "godot" / "godot")
# Godot project directory (the game repo root -- backend/ is a subdir).
GAME_PROJECT_DIR: str = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2])
# The host clients should connect to for ENet. Defaults to the LAN IP the
# launcher bakes into the exe; overridable for local testing.
GAME_SERVER_HOST: str = "127.0.0.1"
# Port range for per-world dedicated servers.
GAME_SERVER_PORT_MIN: int = 27000
GAME_SERVER_PORT_MAX: int = 27099
# Kill a world's server this long after its last join with no active
# players reported.
GAME_SERVER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: int = 300
model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
env_file=".env",
env_file_encoding="utf-8",
case_sensitive=True,
)
@property @property
def cors_origins_list(self) -> list[str]: def cors_origins_list(self) -> list[str]:
return [origin.strip() for origin in self.CORS_ORIGINS.split(",")] return [origin.strip() for origin in self.CORS_ORIGINS.split(",")]
@property class Config:
def rsa_key_dir(self) -> Path: env_file = ".env"
return Path(self.RSA_KEY_DIR) case_sensitive = True
@property
def private_pem(self) -> bytes:
"""Return the private key PEM bytes (loads/generates on first call)."""
private_pem, _ = _load_or_generate_rsa_keys(self.rsa_key_dir)
return private_pem
@property
def public_pem(self) -> bytes:
"""Return the public key PEM bytes (loads/generates on first call)."""
_, public_pem = _load_or_generate_rsa_keys(self.rsa_key_dir)
return public_pem
@property
def private_key(self) -> RSAPrivateKey:
"""Return the deserialized RSA private key object."""
return load_pem_private_key(self.private_pem, password=None)
@property
def public_key(self) -> RSAPublicKey:
"""Return the deserialized RSA public key object."""
return load_pem_public_key(self.public_pem)
@lru_cache() @lru_cache()
def get_settings() -> Settings: def get_settings() -> Settings:
"""Return cached settings instance."""
return Settings() return Settings()
# Convenience singleton
settings = get_settings()
+3 -7
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.orm import DeclarativeBase
from app.config import settings from app.config import settings
engine = create_async_engine( engine = create_async_engine(
settings.DATABASE_URL, settings.database_url,
echo=settings.DEBUG, echo=settings.DEBUG,
pool_size=10, pool_size=10,
max_overflow=20, max_overflow=20,
@@ -28,15 +28,11 @@ class Base(DeclarativeBase):
async def get_db() -> AsyncSession: async def get_db() -> AsyncSession:
"""Dependency that yields an async database session. """Dependency that yields an async database session."""
Handlers are responsible for committing or rolling back their own
transactions. This avoids the double-commit problem where the
session is committed both here and in the handler.
"""
async with async_session_factory() as session: async with async_session_factory() as session:
try: try:
yield session yield session
await session.commit()
except Exception: except Exception:
await session.rollback() await session.rollback()
raise raise
-55
View File
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
"""Shared FastAPI dependencies, including JWT-based auth."""
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordBearer
from jose import JWTError, jwt
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.config import settings
from app.database import get_db
from app.models.user import User
oauth2_scheme = OAuth2PasswordBearer(tokenUrl="/api/auth/login")
async def get_current_user(
token: Annotated[str, Depends(oauth2_scheme)],
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
) -> User:
"""Resolve the JWT bearer token to a User, or raise 401."""
credentials_exception = HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Could not validate credentials",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)
try:
payload = jwt.decode(
token, settings.public_pem, algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM]
)
user_id: str | None = payload.get("sub")
if user_id is None:
raise credentials_exception
except JWTError:
raise credentials_exception
try:
user_id_int = int(user_id)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
raise credentials_exception
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id_int))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if user is None:
raise credentials_exception
if not user.is_active:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="User account is inactive",
)
return user
CurrentUser = Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)]
+6 -20
View File
@@ -3,48 +3,34 @@
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
from fastapi import FastAPI from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from app.config import settings from app.config import settings
from app.routers import auth, users, worlds, assets, avatar from app.routers import auth, users, worlds, assets
from app.services.game_servers import supervisor
@asynccontextmanager @asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(app: FastAPI): async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
"""Application lifespan: startup and shutdown events.""" """Application lifespan: startup and shutdown events."""
supervisor.start() # Startup: initialize database, connect to Redis, etc.
yield yield
await supervisor.shutdown() # Shutdown: close connections, cleanup
app = FastAPI( app = FastAPI(
title=settings.APP_NAME, title=settings.app_name,
version=settings.APP_VERSION, version=settings.app_version,
description="Agentic Game Platform - Backend API", description="Agentic Game Platform - Backend API",
lifespan=lifespan, lifespan=lifespan,
) )
# CORS
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=settings.cors_origins_list,
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# Include routers # Include routers
app.include_router(auth.router, prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"]) app.include_router(auth.router, prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
app.include_router(users.router, prefix="/api/users", tags=["users"]) app.include_router(users.router, prefix="/api/users", tags=["users"])
app.include_router(worlds.router, prefix="/api/worlds", tags=["worlds"]) app.include_router(worlds.router, prefix="/api/worlds", tags=["worlds"])
app.include_router(assets.router, prefix="/api/assets", tags=["assets"]) app.include_router(assets.router, prefix="/api/assets", tags=["assets"])
app.include_router(avatar.router, prefix="/api/avatar", tags=["avatar"])
@app.get("/api/health") @app.get("/api/health")
async def health_check(): async def health_check():
"""Simple health check endpoint.""" """Simple health check endpoint."""
return {"status": "ok", "app": settings.APP_NAME} return {"status": "ok", "app": settings.app_name}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,5 @@ from app.models.user import User
from app.models.session import Session from app.models.session import Session
from app.models.world import World from app.models.world import World
from app.models.asset import Asset from app.models.asset import Asset
from app.models.avatar_loadout import AvatarLoadout
__all__ = ["User", "Session", "World", "Asset", "AvatarLoadout"] __all__ = ["User", "Session", "World", "Asset"]
+3 -7
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, ForeignKey, Text, DateTime, Boolean from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, ForeignKey, Text, DateTime, Enum as SAEnum
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import ENUM
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func from sqlalchemy.sql import func
import enum import enum
@@ -22,17 +21,14 @@ class Asset(Base):
id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True, index=True) id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True, index=True)
name = Column(String(255), nullable=False) name = Column(String(255), nullable=False)
description = Column(Text, nullable=True) description = Column(Text, nullable=True)
asset_type = Column( asset_type = Column(SAEnum(AssetType), nullable=False)
ENUM(AssetType, name="asset_type", create_type=False),
nullable=False,
)
file_path = Column(String(512), nullable=False) file_path = Column(String(512), nullable=False)
file_size = Column(Integer, nullable=True) file_size = Column(Integer, nullable=True)
mime_type = Column(String(128), nullable=True) mime_type = Column(String(128), nullable=True)
metadata_json = Column(Text, nullable=True) metadata_json = Column(Text, nullable=True)
world_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("worlds.id"), nullable=True) world_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("worlds.id"), nullable=True)
owner_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("users.id"), nullable=False) owner_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("users.id"), nullable=False)
is_public = Column(Boolean, default=False, nullable=False) is_public = Column(Integer, default=0, nullable=False)
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now()) created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()) updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now())
-41
View File
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, ForeignKey, DateTime
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import JSONB
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func
from app.database import Base
# The default a brand-new account gets before they touch the customization
# screen. Kept in sync with assets/avatars/catalog.json (the base_body id) and
# with the client's AvatarLoadout.to_json() shape.
DEFAULT_LOADOUT: dict = {
"base_body": "base_human_male_01",
"slots": {},
}
class AvatarLoadout(Base):
"""A user's equipped avatar composition.
One row per user. The whole loadout is stored as a single JSON document
matching the client's ``AvatarLoadout.to_json()`` shape
(``{"base_body": str, "slots": {...}, "skin_tone"?: {...}}``) rather than
exploded into columns -- the server has no copy of the asset catalog, so
deep validation (does this asset exist, is it valid for this slot) stays
on the client. The server only enforces the envelope: valid JSON object
with a non-empty ``base_body``.
"""
__tablename__ = "avatar_loadouts"
user_id = Column(
Integer,
ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
primary_key=True,
)
data = Column(JSONB, nullable=False)
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now(), nullable=False)
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now(), nullable=False)
user = relationship("User", back_populates="avatar_loadout")
+3 -26
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
import uuid from sqlalchemy import Column, String, DateTime, ForeignKey, Boolean
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, DateTime, ForeignKey, Boolean
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func from sqlalchemy.sql import func
from app.database import Base from app.database import Base
class Session(Base): class Session(Base):
__tablename__ = "sessions" __tablename__ = "sessions"
id = Column(String(36), primary_key=True, default=lambda: str(uuid.uuid4())) id = Column(String, primary_key=True)
user_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False) user_id = Column(String, ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False)
token = Column(String, unique=True, index=True, nullable=False) token = Column(String, unique=True, index=True, nullable=False)
expires_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False) expires_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
is_active = Column(Boolean, default=True) is_active = Column(Boolean, default=True)
@@ -19,23 +16,3 @@ class Session(Base):
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()) updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now())
user = relationship("User", back_populates="sessions") user = relationship("User", back_populates="sessions")
class RefreshToken(Base):
__tablename__ = "refresh_tokens"
id = Column(String(36), primary_key=True, default=lambda: str(uuid.uuid4()))
user_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False)
# RS256 JWTs are ~420+ chars; 512 is sufficient and matches the migration.
token = Column(String(512), unique=True, index=True, nullable=False)
expires_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
is_active = Column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now())
updated_at = Column(
DateTime(timezone=True),
nullable=False,
server_default=func.now(),
onupdate=func.now(),
)
user = relationship("User", back_populates="refresh_tokens")
+1 -24
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
from datetime import date from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, Boolean, DateTime
from typing import Optional
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, Boolean, DateTime, Date
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func from sqlalchemy.sql import func
@@ -15,30 +12,10 @@ class User(Base):
username = Column(String(50), unique=True, index=True, nullable=False) username = Column(String(50), unique=True, index=True, nullable=False)
email = Column(String(120), unique=True, index=True, nullable=False) email = Column(String(120), unique=True, index=True, nullable=False)
hashed_password = Column(String(255), nullable=False) hashed_password = Column(String(255), nullable=False)
date_of_birth = Column(Date, nullable=True)
is_active = Column(Boolean, default=True) is_active = Column(Boolean, default=True)
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now()) created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), onupdate=func.now()) updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), onupdate=func.now())
sessions = relationship("Session", back_populates="user", cascade="all, delete-orphan") sessions = relationship("Session", back_populates="user", cascade="all, delete-orphan")
refresh_tokens = relationship("RefreshToken", back_populates="user", cascade="all, delete-orphan")
worlds = relationship("World", back_populates="owner") worlds = relationship("World", back_populates="owner")
assets = relationship("Asset", back_populates="owner") assets = relationship("Asset", back_populates="owner")
avatar_loadout = relationship(
"AvatarLoadout",
back_populates="user",
uselist=False,
cascade="all, delete-orphan",
)
@property
def is_adult(self) -> bool:
"""Return True if the user is 18 or older based on date_of_birth."""
if self.date_of_birth is None:
return False
today = date.today()
age = today.year - self.date_of_birth.year
# Adjust if birthday hasn't occurred yet this year
if (today.month, today.day) < (self.date_of_birth.month, self.date_of_birth.day):
age -= 1
return age >= 18
+2 -11
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, Text, DateTime, ForeignKey from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, Text, DateTime, ForeignKey, Enum
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import ENUM
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func from sqlalchemy.sql import func
import enum import enum
@@ -20,15 +19,7 @@ class World(Base):
name = Column(String(255), nullable=False) name = Column(String(255), nullable=False)
description = Column(Text, nullable=True) description = Column(Text, nullable=True)
owner_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("users.id"), nullable=False) owner_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("users.id"), nullable=False)
visibility = Column( visibility = Column(Enum(WorldVisibility), default=WorldVisibility.PUBLIC)
ENUM(
WorldVisibility,
name="world_visibility",
create_type=False,
values_callable=lambda enum_cls: [e.value for e in enum_cls],
),
default=WorldVisibility.PUBLIC,
)
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now()) created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), onupdate=func.now()) updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), onupdate=func.now())
-73
View File
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
"""Lightweight in-process rate limiting.
The backend runs single-worker (required by the game-server supervisor), so a
process-local sliding-window counter is sufficient and needs no Redis. Keyed
by client IP. Used to blunt credential brute-force on the auth endpoints.
If the backend is ever scaled to multiple workers/hosts this must move to a
shared store (Redis) -- flagged here rather than silently under-enforcing.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from collections import defaultdict, deque
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
from app.config import settings
class SlidingWindowLimiter:
def __init__(self, max_hits: int, window_seconds: float) -> None:
self.max_hits = max_hits
self.window = window_seconds
self._hits: dict[str, deque[float]] = defaultdict(deque)
def check(self, key: str) -> None:
now = time.monotonic()
q = self._hits[key]
cutoff = now - self.window
while q and q[0] < cutoff:
q.popleft()
if len(q) >= self.max_hits:
retry = max(1, int(q[0] + self.window - now))
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail="Too many attempts. Try again shortly.",
headers={"Retry-After": str(retry)},
)
q.append(now)
def reset(self) -> None:
self._hits.clear()
def _client_key(request: Request) -> str:
# X-Forwarded-For first hop when behind the reverse proxy, else the socket.
fwd = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
if fwd:
return fwd.split(",")[0].strip()
return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
# 10 auth attempts / minute / IP -- generous for a human, painful for a
# brute-forcer.
_auth_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_hits=10, window_seconds=60)
async def auth_rate_limit(request: Request) -> None:
"""FastAPI dependency: rate-limit auth attempts per client IP.
A no-op when ``RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED`` is false -- the checkpoint smoke
suite runs every test against one backend from one client IP, so the
per-IP cap would trip mid-suite. The dedicated ``test_rate_limit``
module exercises the real behaviour regardless of this flag.
"""
if not settings.RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED:
return
_auth_limiter.check(f"auth:{_client_key(request)}")
def reset_all() -> None:
"""Test hook."""
_auth_limiter.reset()
-243
View File
@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
"""Asset management router."""
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, UploadFile, File, Query
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.config import settings
from app.database import get_db
from app.dependencies import CurrentUser
from app.models.asset import Asset, AssetType
from app.models.world import World
from app.services import gltf as gltf_service
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
router = APIRouter()
# --- Pydantic schemas ---
class AssetCreate(BaseModel):
"""Schema for creating an asset reference."""
name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=255)
description: Optional[str] = None
asset_type: AssetType
world_id: Optional[int] = None
class AssetResponse(BaseModel):
"""Schema for asset responses."""
id: int
name: str
description: Optional[str]
asset_type: AssetType
file_path: str
file_size: Optional[int]
mime_type: Optional[str]
world_id: Optional[int]
owner_id: int
is_public: bool
created_at: str
updated_at: str
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
class AssetUpdate(BaseModel):
"""Schema for updating an asset."""
name: Optional[str] = None
description: Optional[str] = None
is_public: Optional[bool] = None
# --- Helpers ---
def _sanitize_filename(filename: str) -> str:
"""Strip path components and unsafe characters from a filename."""
# Remove any directory components (path traversal protection).
base = os.path.basename(filename.replace("\\", "/"))
# Keep only safe characters.
safe = "".join(c for c in base if c.isalnum() or c in "._-")
return safe or "file"
def _detect_asset_type(filename: Optional[str], content: bytes) -> AssetType:
"""Detect the asset type from filename and content."""
if filename and gltf_service.looks_like_gltf(content, filename):
return AssetType.MODEL_3D
# Fallback: let the caller decide based on mime_type or default.
return AssetType.OTHER
# --- Endpoints ---
@router.post("/", response_model=AssetResponse, status_code=201)
async def create_asset(
payload: AssetCreate,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Create a new asset reference."""
# Verify world ownership if world_id is provided
if payload.world_id is not None:
world = await db.get(World, payload.world_id)
if world is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="World not found")
if world.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not owner of this world")
asset = Asset(
name=payload.name,
description=payload.description,
asset_type=payload.asset_type,
file_path="", # Will be set after upload
owner_id=current_user.id,
world_id=payload.world_id,
is_public=False,
)
db.add(asset)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(asset)
return asset
@router.get("/", response_model=list[AssetResponse])
async def list_assets(
current_user: CurrentUser,
world_id: Optional[int] = Query(None, description="Filter by world"),
asset_type: Optional[AssetType] = Query(None),
limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=100),
offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""List assets with optional filters."""
stmt = select(Asset).where(Asset.owner_id == current_user.id)
if world_id is not None:
stmt = stmt.where(Asset.world_id == world_id)
if asset_type is not None:
stmt = stmt.where(Asset.asset_type == asset_type)
stmt = stmt.order_by(Asset.created_at.desc()).limit(limit).offset(offset)
result = await db.execute(stmt)
assets = result.scalars().all()
return assets
@router.get("/{asset_id}", response_model=AssetResponse)
async def get_asset(
asset_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Get a single asset by ID."""
asset = await db.get(Asset, asset_id)
if asset is None or asset.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Asset not found")
return asset
@router.patch("/{asset_id}", response_model=AssetResponse)
async def update_asset(
asset_id: int,
payload: AssetUpdate,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Update an asset."""
asset = await db.get(Asset, asset_id)
if asset is None or asset.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Asset not found")
update_data = payload.model_dump(exclude_unset=True)
for field, value in update_data.items():
setattr(asset, field, value)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(asset)
return asset
@router.delete("/{asset_id}", status_code=204)
async def delete_asset(
asset_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Delete an asset."""
asset = await db.get(Asset, asset_id)
if asset is None or asset.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Asset not found")
await db.delete(asset)
await db.commit()
@router.post("/{asset_id}/upload", response_model=AssetResponse)
async def upload_asset_file(
asset_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
file: UploadFile = File(...),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Upload a file for an existing asset."""
asset = await db.get(Asset, asset_id)
if asset is None or asset.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Asset not found")
# Sanitize filename to prevent path traversal.
safe_filename = _sanitize_filename(file.filename or f"asset_{asset_id}")
# Read the file content.
content = await file.read()
file_size = len(content)
# Determine which size limit to apply.
if gltf_service.looks_like_gltf(content, file.filename):
max_bytes = settings.GLTF_MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB * 1024 * 1024
else:
max_bytes = settings.MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB * 1024 * 1024
if file_size > max_bytes:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=413,
detail=f"File size {file_size} exceeds maximum allowed size {max_bytes} bytes",
)
# Write the file to the upload directory.
upload_dir = Path(settings.UPLOAD_DIR)
upload_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
stored_name = f"{asset_id}_{safe_filename}"
file_path = upload_dir / stored_name
file_path.write_bytes(content)
# Detect asset type from content/filename.
detected_type = _detect_asset_type(file.filename, content)
# Update asset record.
asset.file_path = str(file_path)
asset.mime_type = file.content_type
asset.file_size = file_size
# If this is a glTF file, extract and store metadata.
if detected_type == AssetType.MODEL_3D:
try:
metadata = gltf_service.extract_gltf_metadata(content)
asset.metadata_json = json.dumps(metadata)
# Also set the asset type to model_3d if it was auto-detected.
if asset.asset_type == AssetType.OTHER:
asset.asset_type = AssetType.MODEL_3D
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Invalid glTF file: {exc}",
)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(asset)
return asset
-323
View File
@@ -1,323 +0,0 @@
"""Authentication router - login, register, token refresh."""
import uuid
from datetime import date, datetime, timedelta, timezone
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status
from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordRequestForm
from jose import JWTError, jwt
from passlib.context import CryptContext
from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.config import settings
from app.database import get_db
from app.dependencies import CurrentUser
from app.models.session import RefreshToken
from app.models.user import User
from app.rate_limit import auth_rate_limit
pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto")
router = APIRouter()
## Minimum age to register. This platform is adults-only.
MIN_AGE = 18
# --- Pydantic schemas ---
class TokenResponse(BaseModel):
access_token: str
refresh_token: str
token_type: str = "bearer"
access_token_expires_minutes: int
class RefreshRequest(BaseModel):
refresh_token: str
class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
username: str
email: EmailStr
password: str
# Real date of birth -- the server computes age from it and rejects
# anyone under MIN_AGE. Still self-attested (no document check yet), but
# a concrete, stored, legally-meaningful data point rather than a
# throwaway checkbox, and the seam for a future hard ID-verification
# pass. See docs/architecture/content_moderation.md 5.2.
date_of_birth: date
class UserResponse(BaseModel):
id: int
username: str
email: str
date_of_birth: date | None = None
is_active: bool
created_at: datetime | None = None
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
# --- Helpers ---
def _create_access_token(data: dict) -> str:
"""Create a signed access token using RS256.
Includes a unique ``jti`` claim so that concurrent/same-second calls
(e.g. back-to-back /refresh requests) still produce distinct tokens —
without it, two tokens minted for the same user within the same
second are byte-identical since ``sub``/``exp`` are the only claims.
"""
to_encode = data.copy()
to_encode["jti"] = str(uuid.uuid4())
expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(
minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES
)
to_encode.update({"exp": expire})
return jwt.encode(
to_encode,
settings.private_pem,
algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
)
def _create_refresh_token(data: dict) -> str:
"""Create a signed refresh token using RS256.
Includes a unique ``jti`` claim so that concurrent calls produce
distinct tokens even when issued within the same second.
"""
to_encode = data.copy()
to_encode["jti"] = str(uuid.uuid4())
expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(
days=settings.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS
)
to_encode.update({"exp": expire})
return jwt.encode(
to_encode,
settings.private_pem,
algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
)
def verify_password(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
"""Verify a plain password against a hash."""
return pwd_context.verify(plain_password, hashed_password)
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
"""Hash a password."""
return pwd_context.hash(password)
def calculate_age(birth_date: date, today: date | None = None) -> int:
"""Calculate age in years from a birth date.
Used by /register (PC3 Phase 3) to compute age from the submitted
date_of_birth and enforce the 18+ gate. See
docs/architecture/content_moderation.md 5.2.
Args:
birth_date: The person's date of birth.
today: The reference date. Defaults to today's date (UTC).
Returns:
Age in whole years as of the reference date.
"""
if today is None:
today = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date()
age = today.year - birth_date.year
# Adjust if birthday hasn't occurred yet this year
if (today.month, today.day) < (birth_date.month, birth_date.day):
age -= 1
return age
def _issue_refresh_token(user_id: int, db: AsyncSession) -> str:
"""Create and persist a refresh token for the given user."""
refresh_token_value = _create_refresh_token({"sub": str(user_id)})
refresh_token_record = RefreshToken(
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
user_id=user_id,
token=refresh_token_value,
expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+ timedelta(days=settings.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS),
)
db.add(refresh_token_record)
return refresh_token_value
# --- Endpoints ---
@router.post("/register", response_model=TokenResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED,
dependencies=[Depends(auth_rate_limit)])
async def register(req: RegisterRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
"""Register a new user and return access + refresh tokens.
Requires a date of birth; the server computes age and rejects anyone
under MIN_AGE (18). See docs/architecture/content_moderation.md for the
verification design and its self-attestation limitation.
"""
age = calculate_age(req.date_of_birth)
if age < 0 or req.date_of_birth > date.today():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Invalid date of birth",
)
if age < MIN_AGE:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"You must be at least {MIN_AGE} to use this platform",
)
# Check if username already exists
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.username == req.username))
if result.scalar_one_or_none():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
detail="Username already registered",
)
# Check if email already exists
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == req.email))
if result.scalar_one_or_none():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
detail="Email already registered",
)
user = User(
username=req.username,
email=req.email,
hashed_password=hash_password(req.password),
date_of_birth=req.date_of_birth,
)
db.add(user)
await db.flush() # flush to get user.id before creating refresh token
await db.refresh(user)
# Create access token
access_token = _create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
# Create and persist refresh token
refresh_token_value = _issue_refresh_token(user.id, db)
await db.commit()
return TokenResponse(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=refresh_token_value,
access_token_expires_minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES,
)
@router.post("/login", response_model=TokenResponse, dependencies=[Depends(auth_rate_limit)])
async def login(form: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends(), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
"""Authenticate user and return access + refresh tokens.
Accepts form-encoded credentials (username/password) as expected by
OAuth2PasswordBearer, so the Swagger UI "Authorize" flow works correctly.
"""
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.username == form.username))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user or not verify_password(form.password, user.hashed_password):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Incorrect username or password",
)
if not user.is_active:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="User account is inactive",
)
# Create access token
access_token = _create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
# Create and persist refresh token
refresh_token_value = _issue_refresh_token(user.id, db)
await db.commit()
return TokenResponse(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=refresh_token_value,
access_token_expires_minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES,
)
@router.post("/refresh", response_model=TokenResponse)
async def refresh(req: RefreshRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
"""Exchange a valid refresh token for a new access token.
Validates the refresh token against the database:
- Must exist in the refresh_tokens table
- Must not be expired (expires_at > now)
- Must be active (is_active == true)
On success, returns a new access token. The refresh token itself is
NOT rotated (the client keeps using the same refresh token).
"""
credentials_exception = HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Invalid or expired refresh token",
)
# Step 1: Decode and validate the JWT signature/claims
try:
payload = jwt.decode(
req.refresh_token,
settings.public_pem,
algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
)
except JWTError:
raise credentials_exception
user_id_str: str | None = payload.get("sub")
if user_id_str is None:
raise credentials_exception
try:
user_id = int(user_id_str)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
raise credentials_exception
# Step 2: Look up the refresh token in the database
result = await db.execute(
select(RefreshToken).where(
RefreshToken.token == req.refresh_token,
RefreshToken.user_id == user_id,
)
)
stored_token = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if stored_token is None:
raise credentials_exception
# Step 3: Check if the token is expired
if datetime.now(timezone.utc) >= stored_token.expires_at:
raise credentials_exception
# Step 4: Check if the token is active
if not stored_token.is_active:
raise credentials_exception
# Step 5: Issue a new access token
access_token = _create_access_token({"sub": str(user_id)})
return TokenResponse(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=req.refresh_token, # Return the same refresh token
access_token_expires_minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES,
)
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)
async def get_current_user(current_user: CurrentUser):
"""Get current user profile from the JWT token."""
return current_user
-78
View File
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
"""Avatar router - the current user's persisted avatar loadout.
The loadout is a single JSON document matching the client's
``AvatarLoadout.to_json()`` shape. The server has no copy of the asset
catalog, so it only validates the envelope (JSON object, non-empty
``base_body``); which assets are valid for which slot is the client's job.
"""
from typing import Annotated, Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.database import get_db
from app.dependencies import CurrentUser
from app.models.avatar_loadout import AvatarLoadout, DEFAULT_LOADOUT
router = APIRouter()
DbDep = Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)]
# A loadout document is small; reject anything absurd outright.
MAX_LOADOUT_BYTES = 16 * 1024
class LoadoutResponse(BaseModel):
data: dict[str, Any]
is_default: bool = Field(
description="True when the user has never saved a loadout and this is "
"the server default."
)
class LoadoutUpdate(BaseModel):
data: dict[str, Any]
def _validate_envelope(data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
base_body = data.get("base_body")
if not isinstance(base_body, str) or not base_body.strip():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=422,
detail="loadout.data must have a non-empty string 'base_body'",
)
slots = data.get("slots", {})
if not isinstance(slots, dict):
raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail="loadout.data.slots must be an object")
if len(str(data)) > MAX_LOADOUT_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="loadout document too large")
@router.get("/loadout", response_model=LoadoutResponse)
async def get_loadout(current_user: CurrentUser, db: DbDep):
"""Return the current user's saved loadout, or the server default if they
have never saved one."""
row = await db.get(AvatarLoadout, current_user.id)
if row is None:
return LoadoutResponse(data=dict(DEFAULT_LOADOUT), is_default=True)
return LoadoutResponse(data=row.data, is_default=False)
@router.put("/loadout", response_model=LoadoutResponse)
async def put_loadout(payload: LoadoutUpdate, current_user: CurrentUser, db: DbDep):
"""Replace the current user's loadout."""
_validate_envelope(payload.data)
row = await db.get(AvatarLoadout, current_user.id)
if row is None:
row = AvatarLoadout(user_id=current_user.id, data=payload.data)
db.add(row)
else:
row.data = payload.data
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(row)
return LoadoutResponse(data=row.data, is_default=False)
-106
View File
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
"""User management router."""
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status
from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.database import get_db
from app.dependencies import CurrentUser
from app.models.user import User
router = APIRouter()
# ─── Pydantic schemas ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class UserResponse(BaseModel):
id: int
username: str
email: str
is_active: bool
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
class UserUpdate(BaseModel):
email: EmailStr | None = None
is_active: bool | None = None
# ─── Endpoints ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)
async def get_current_user_profile(
current_user: CurrentUser,
):
"""Get the currently authenticated user's profile."""
return current_user
@router.get("/{user_id}", response_model=UserResponse)
async def get_user(
user_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
):
"""Get a user by ID. Only the owner can view their own profile."""
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Only the owner may view their own profile.
if user.id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not authorized to view this user")
return user
@router.patch("/{user_id}", response_model=UserResponse)
async def update_user(
user_id: int,
user_update: UserUpdate,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
):
"""Update a user. Only the owner can update their own account."""
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Only the owner may update their own account.
if user.id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not authorized to update this user")
if user_update.email is not None:
user.email = user_update.email
if user_update.is_active is not None:
user.is_active = user_update.is_active
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(user)
return user
@router.delete("/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def delete_user(
user_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
):
"""Delete a user. Only the owner can delete their own account."""
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Only the owner may delete their own account.
if user.id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not authorized to delete this user")
await db.delete(user)
await db.commit()
-204
View File
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
"""Worlds router - CRUD for game worlds."""
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
from app.database import get_db
from app.dependencies import CurrentUser
from app.models.world import World, WorldVisibility
from app.services.game_servers import supervisor
router = APIRouter()
DbDep = Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)]
# --- Pydantic schemas ---
class WorldCreate(BaseModel):
"""Schema for creating a world."""
name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=255)
description: str | None = None
visibility: WorldVisibility = WorldVisibility.PUBLIC
class WorldUpdate(BaseModel):
"""Schema for updating a world."""
name: str | None = Field(None, min_length=1, max_length=255)
description: str | None = None
visibility: WorldVisibility | None = None
class WorldResponse(BaseModel):
"""Schema for world responses."""
id: int
name: str
description: str | None
visibility: WorldVisibility
owner_id: int
created_at: datetime | None = None
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
# --- Endpoints ---
@router.get("/", response_model=list[WorldResponse])
async def list_worlds(
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: DbDep,
skip: int = Query(0, ge=0),
limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=100),
visibility: WorldVisibility | None = None,
):
"""List worlds visible to the current user.
PUBLIC worlds are visible to everyone.
PRIVATE/FRIENDS_ONLY worlds are visible to their owner.
"""
query = select(World).options(selectinload(World.owner))
# Filter by visibility if specified
if visibility:
query = query.where(World.visibility == visibility)
if visibility != WorldVisibility.PUBLIC:
# Requesting a non-public visibility explicitly must not bypass
# ownership — otherwise any authenticated user could list every
# PRIVATE/FRIENDS_ONLY world in the system just by passing the
# filter, defeating the point of the check below.
query = query.where(World.owner_id == current_user.id)
else:
# Show PUBLIC worlds + owner's own worlds
query = query.where(
(World.visibility == WorldVisibility.PUBLIC)
| (World.owner_id == current_user.id)
)
query = query.offset(skip).limit(limit).order_by(World.created_at.desc())
result = await db.execute(query)
worlds = result.scalars().all()
return worlds
@router.get("/{world_id}", response_model=WorldResponse)
async def get_world(
world_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: DbDep,
):
"""Get a single world by ID, respecting visibility."""
result = await db.execute(
select(World).where(World.id == world_id).options(selectinload(World.owner))
)
world = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not world:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="World not found")
# Allow access if world is PUBLIC or owned by current user
if world.visibility != WorldVisibility.PUBLIC and world.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="World not found")
return world
class JoinResponse(BaseModel):
"""Address of the dedicated server hosting this world."""
world_id: int
host: str
port: int
@router.post("/{world_id}/join", response_model=JoinResponse)
async def join_world(
world_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: DbDep,
):
"""Ensure a dedicated game server is running for this world and return its
ENet address for the client to connect to.
503 if game-server orchestration isn't enabled on this backend (e.g. a
plain dev/test instance with no Godot binary).
"""
result = await db.execute(select(World).where(World.id == world_id))
world = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not world:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="World not found")
if world.visibility != WorldVisibility.PUBLIC and world.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="World not found")
try:
info = await supervisor.ensure_server(str(world_id))
except RuntimeError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail=str(exc))
return JoinResponse(world_id=world_id, host=info["host"], port=info["port"])
@router.post("/", response_model=WorldResponse, status_code=201)
async def create_world(
world_data: WorldCreate,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: DbDep,
):
"""Create a new world."""
world = World(
name=world_data.name,
description=world_data.description,
owner_id=current_user.id,
visibility=world_data.visibility,
)
db.add(world)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(world)
return world
@router.put("/{world_id}", response_model=WorldResponse)
async def update_world(
world_id: int,
world_data: WorldUpdate,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: DbDep,
):
"""Update an existing world."""
result = await db.execute(select(World).where(World.id == world_id))
world = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not world:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="World not found")
if world.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not owner of this world")
update_data = world_data.model_dump(exclude_unset=True)
for field, value in update_data.items():
setattr(world, field, value)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(world)
return world
@router.delete("/{world_id}", status_code=204)
async def delete_world(
world_id: int,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: DbDep,
):
"""Delete a world."""
result = await db.execute(select(World).where(World.id == world_id))
world = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not world:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="World not found")
if world.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not owner of this world")
await db.delete(world)
await db.commit()
View File
-182
View File
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
"""Game-server orchestration.
On ``POST /api/worlds/{id}/join`` the backend ensures a headless Godot
dedicated-server process is running for that world and returns its address.
One process per world, keyed by ``world_id``. A background reaper kills a
world's server once its status file reports zero players for
``GAME_SERVER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS``.
This lives in-process (a module-level singleton) rather than as a separate
service, so the backend MUST run single-worker -- which it does
(``uvicorn app.main:app`` with no ``--workers``). The Godot binary and
project are on the host (see ``settings.GODOT_BIN`` / ``GAME_PROJECT_DIR``);
the backend spawns them as subprocesses.
Design notes / limits (PC3):
- All worlds currently load the same test level (per-world content is M2/M7).
``world_id`` still scopes a distinct server process + session.
- Port allocation is a linear scan of the configured range.
- No crash-restart: if a server process dies, the next join respawns it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import socket
import subprocess
import tempfile
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from app.config import settings
@dataclass
class _WorldServer:
world_id: str
port: int
proc: subprocess.Popen
status_path: Path
started_at: float = field(default_factory=time.time)
last_join: float = field(default_factory=time.time)
def status(self) -> dict:
try:
return json.loads(self.status_path.read_text())
except (OSError, ValueError):
return {}
def player_count(self) -> int:
return int(self.status().get("players", 0))
def alive(self) -> bool:
return self.proc.poll() is None
def stop(self) -> None:
if self.alive():
self.proc.terminate()
try:
self.proc.wait(timeout=10)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
self.proc.kill()
self.status_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
class GameServerSupervisor:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._servers: dict[str, _WorldServer] = {}
self._lock = asyncio.Lock()
self._reaper: asyncio.Task | None = None
self._runtime_dir = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "agp-game-servers"
self._runtime_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# ── lifecycle ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def start(self) -> None:
if not settings.GAME_SERVERS_ENABLED:
return
if self._reaper is None or self._reaper.done():
self._reaper = asyncio.create_task(self._reap_loop())
async def shutdown(self) -> None:
if self._reaper:
self._reaper.cancel()
async with self._lock:
for srv in list(self._servers.values()):
srv.stop()
self._servers.clear()
# ── join ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def ensure_server(self, world_id: str) -> dict:
"""Return ``{"host", "port", "world_id"}`` for the world's dedicated
server, spawning it if needed. Raises RuntimeError if orchestration
is disabled or no port/engine is available."""
if not settings.GAME_SERVERS_ENABLED:
raise RuntimeError("game servers are not enabled on this backend")
async with self._lock:
srv = self._servers.get(world_id)
if srv is not None and not srv.alive():
srv.stop()
srv = None
del self._servers[world_id]
if srv is None:
srv = self._spawn(world_id)
self._servers[world_id] = srv
# Give the engine a moment to bind the ENet port before we
# hand the address to a client.
await self._await_port(srv.port)
srv.last_join = time.time()
return {"host": settings.GAME_SERVER_HOST, "port": srv.port, "world_id": world_id}
# ── internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _spawn(self, world_id: str) -> _WorldServer:
port = self._free_port()
status_path = self._runtime_dir / f"world_{world_id}_{port}.json"
status_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
cmd = [
settings.GODOT_BIN, "--headless",
"--path", settings.GAME_PROJECT_DIR,
"res://scenes/server.tscn", "--",
"--port", str(port),
"--world", str(world_id),
"--status-file", str(status_path),
]
proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
return _WorldServer(world_id=world_id, port=port, proc=proc, status_path=status_path)
def _free_port(self) -> int:
used = {s.port for s in self._servers.values()}
for p in range(settings.GAME_SERVER_PORT_MIN, settings.GAME_SERVER_PORT_MAX + 1):
if p in used:
continue
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) as s:
try:
s.bind(("0.0.0.0", p))
return p
except OSError:
continue
raise RuntimeError("no free game-server port in the configured range")
async def _await_port(self, port: int, timeout: float = 8.0) -> None:
deadline = time.time() + timeout
while time.time() < deadline:
# ENet is UDP; a bind failure means something (our server) has it.
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) as s:
try:
s.bind(("0.0.0.0", port))
except OSError:
return
await asyncio.sleep(0.25)
async def _reap_loop(self) -> None:
try:
while True:
await asyncio.sleep(30)
async with self._lock:
now = time.time()
for wid, srv in list(self._servers.items()):
if not srv.alive():
srv.stop()
del self._servers[wid]
continue
idle_for = now - srv.last_join
if idle_for > settings.GAME_SERVER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS and srv.player_count() == 0:
srv.stop()
del self._servers[wid]
except asyncio.CancelledError:
pass
def debug_state(self) -> list[dict]:
return [
{
"world_id": s.world_id, "port": s.port, "alive": s.alive(),
"players": s.player_count(), "uptime_s": round(time.time() - s.started_at),
}
for s in self._servers.values()
]
supervisor = GameServerSupervisor()
-197
View File
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
"""Lightweight glTF / GLB metadata extraction.
This module intentionally avoids heavyweight dependencies such as trimesh or
pygltflib. For the metadata fields the asset upload pipeline needs (mesh and
vertex counts, animation presence, texture references, and the bounding box)
a small amount of glTF-specific parsing is sufficient and keeps the backend
dependency-free.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import struct
from typing import Any, Optional
# GLB binary header magic bytes ("glTF").
_GLB_MAGIC = b"glTF"
_GLB_MAGIC_INT = 0x46546C67 # b"glTF" interpreted as little-endian uint32
_GLB_JSON_CHUNK_TYPE = 0x4E4F534A # "JSON"
_GLB_BIN_CHUNK_TYPE = 0x004E4942 # "BIN\0"
# Whitespace allowed around a GLB JSON chunk. The spec pads with spaces (0x20),
# but be lenient with null bytes and other whitespace that real exporters emit.
_JSON_CHUNK_TRIM = b" \t\r\n\x00"
def looks_like_gltf(content: bytes, filename: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
"""Return True when the bytes or filename indicate a glTF/GLB asset."""
if content.startswith(_GLB_MAGIC):
return True
if filename:
lowered = filename.lower()
if lowered.endswith(".gltf") or lowered.endswith(".glb"):
return True
# A bare JSON buffer (e.g. uploaded without an extension) that has the
# glTF asset marker is also a glTF file.
stripped = content.lstrip()
if stripped.startswith(b"{"):
try:
payload = json.loads(stripped.decode("utf-8"))
except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError):
return False
return isinstance(payload, dict) and "asset" in payload and "version" in payload.get("asset", {})
return False
def _parse_glb(content: bytes) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Parse the JSON chunk of a GLB binary container."""
if len(content) < 12:
raise ValueError("GLB file is too short")
magic, _version, _length = struct.unpack_from("<III", content, 0)
if magic != _GLB_MAGIC_INT:
raise ValueError("invalid GLB magic")
offset = 12
json_chunk: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None
while offset + 8 <= len(content):
chunk_length, chunk_type = struct.unpack_from("<II", content, offset)
offset += 8
chunk_end = offset + chunk_length
if chunk_end > len(content):
raise ValueError("GLB chunk overruns file boundary")
chunk_data = content[offset:chunk_end]
if chunk_type == _GLB_JSON_CHUNK_TYPE:
try:
json_chunk = json.loads(chunk_data.strip(_JSON_CHUNK_TRIM).decode("utf-8"))
except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
raise ValueError(f"invalid GLB JSON chunk: {exc}") from exc
offset = chunk_end
if json_chunk is None:
raise ValueError("GLB file does not contain a JSON chunk")
return json_chunk
def _parse_gltf_json(content: bytes) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Parse a plain .gltf JSON file."""
stripped = content.lstrip()
try:
payload = json.loads(stripped.decode("utf-8"))
except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
raise ValueError(f"invalid glTF JSON: {exc}") from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError("glTF JSON root must be an object")
return payload
def _position_accessor_counts(gltf: dict[str, Any]) -> list[int]:
"""Return POSITION accessor counts for every mesh primitive."""
counts: list[int] = []
accessors = gltf.get("accessors", [])
for mesh in gltf.get("meshes", []):
for primitive in mesh.get("primitives", []):
attributes = primitive.get("attributes", {})
position_index = attributes.get("POSITION")
if position_index is None:
continue
try:
accessor = accessors[int(position_index)]
except (IndexError, TypeError, ValueError):
continue
count = accessor.get("count")
if isinstance(count, int):
counts.append(count)
return counts
def _position_bounds(gltf: dict[str, Any]) -> list[list[float]]:
"""Return min/max bounds for every POSITION accessor that declares them."""
bounds: list[list[float]] = []
accessors = gltf.get("accessors", [])
for mesh in gltf.get("meshes", []):
for primitive in mesh.get("primitives", []):
attributes = primitive.get("attributes", {})
position_index = attributes.get("POSITION")
if position_index is None:
continue
try:
accessor = accessors[int(position_index)]
except (IndexError, TypeError, ValueError):
continue
minimum = accessor.get("min")
maximum = accessor.get("max")
if isinstance(minimum, list) and isinstance(maximum, list):
bounds.append([float(x) for x in minimum])
bounds.append([float(x) for x in maximum])
return bounds
def _texture_refs(gltf: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
"""Collect external texture source references from the image array."""
refs: list[str] = []
for index, image in enumerate(gltf.get("images", [])):
uri = image.get("uri")
if isinstance(uri, str) and not uri.startswith("data:"):
refs.append(uri)
continue
name = image.get("name")
if isinstance(name, str) and name:
refs.append(name)
continue
if isinstance(uri, str):
# Embedded data URI; keep a stable, non-huge reference.
refs.append(f"data:{index}")
continue
buffer_view = image.get("bufferView")
if buffer_view is not None:
refs.append(f"bufferView:{buffer_view}")
continue
refs.append(f"image:{index}")
return refs
def extract_gltf_metadata(content: bytes) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Extract upload-relevant metadata from glTF/GLB bytes.
Raises ValueError for malformed glTF content. The returned dict contains:
mesh_count, vertex_count, has_animation, texture_refs,
bounding_box_min, bounding_box_max.
"""
if content.startswith(_GLB_MAGIC):
gltf = _parse_glb(content)
else:
gltf = _parse_gltf_json(content)
position_counts = _position_accessor_counts(gltf)
bounds = _position_bounds(gltf)
if bounds:
bounding_box_min = [min(axis) for axis in zip(*bounds[::2])]
bounding_box_max = [max(axis) for axis in zip(*bounds[1::2])]
else:
bounding_box_min = [0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
bounding_box_max = [0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
return {
"mesh_count": len(gltf.get("meshes", [])),
"vertex_count": sum(position_counts),
"has_animation": bool(gltf.get("animations")),
"texture_refs": _texture_refs(gltf),
"bounding_box_min": bounding_box_min,
"bounding_box_max": bounding_box_max,
}
-34
View File
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: agp_user
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: agp_password
POSTGRES_DB: agp_db
ports:
- "${POSTGRES_HOST_PORT:-5432}:5432"
volumes:
- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U agp_user -d agp_db"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
ports:
- "${REDIS_HOST_PORT:-6379}:6379"
volumes:
- redis_data:/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
volumes:
postgres_data:
redis_data:
-3
View File
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
[pytest]
asyncio_mode = auto
testpaths = tests
-9
View File
@@ -3,20 +3,11 @@ uvicorn[standard]==0.34.0
sqlalchemy==2.0.36 sqlalchemy==2.0.36
alembic==1.14.0 alembic==1.14.0
psycopg2-binary==2.9.10 psycopg2-binary==2.9.10
asyncpg==0.31.0
redis==5.2.1 redis==5.2.1
pydantic==2.10.3 pydantic==2.10.3
pydantic-settings==2.7.0 pydantic-settings==2.7.0
python-jose[cryptography]==3.3.0 python-jose[cryptography]==3.3.0
passlib[bcrypt]==1.7.4 passlib[bcrypt]==1.7.4
# passlib 1.7.4 (last release, unmaintained since ~2020) detects its bcrypt
# backend via bcrypt.__about__.__version__, which bcrypt>=4.1 removed --
# hashing/verifying a password then raises "password cannot be longer than
# 72 bytes" (a misleading downstream symptom of the real AttributeError:
# module 'bcrypt' has no attribute '__about__') on every call. Without this
# pin, `pip install -r requirements.txt` silently grabs whatever the latest
# bcrypt is and breaks register/login outright. Pin below 4.1 explicitly.
bcrypt==4.0.1
python-multipart==0.0.20 python-multipart==0.0.20
email-validator==2.2.0 email-validator==2.2.0
httpx==0.28.1 httpx==0.28.1
View File
-174
View File
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
"""Shared pytest fixtures + hermetic-DB bootstrap.
The integration tests hit a real Postgres (Postgres-specific types: JSONB,
native ENUMs). To make ``cd backend && pytest`` work from a clean checkout
with no manual setup, ``pytest_configure`` below brings up an ephemeral
Postgres via docker compose and runs the migrations IF ``DATABASE_URL`` is
not already pointing at a reachable database. When it is (dev loop, or the
checkpoint runner which stands the DB up itself), that path is skipped and
the existing database is reused.
If Docker isn't available and no DB is reachable, the whole DB-backed suite
is skipped with a clear message rather than erroring out 60+ times.
"""
import asyncio
import os
import socket
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
import pytest
from sqlalchemy import text
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
from app.config import settings
from app.database import get_db
from app.main import app
TEST_TABLES = ("avatar_loadouts", "assets", "worlds", "sessions", "refresh_tokens", "users")
BACKEND_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
_COMPOSE_PROJECT = "agp-pytest"
_EPHEMERAL_PG_PORT = 25432
# Set by _ensure_database() when it starts a container it owns; torn down in
# pytest_unconfigure.
_started_container = False
_db_unavailable_reason: str | None = None
def _port_open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 1.0) -> bool:
try:
with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):
return True
except OSError:
return False
def _db_reachable(url: str) -> bool:
parts = urlsplit(url)
return _port_open(parts.hostname or "localhost", parts.port or 5432)
def _run(cmd: list[str], **kw) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
return subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=BACKEND_DIR, capture_output=True, text=True, **kw)
def pytest_configure(config):
global _started_container, _db_unavailable_reason
if _db_reachable(settings.DATABASE_URL):
return # dev loop / checkpoint runner already provided one
if not _run(["docker", "--version"]).returncode == 0:
_db_unavailable_reason = (
"no reachable DATABASE_URL and docker is unavailable -- run the "
"checkpoint suite (scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py) or start Postgres "
"manually"
)
return
env = os.environ.copy()
env["COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME"] = _COMPOSE_PROJECT
env["POSTGRES_HOST_PORT"] = str(_EPHEMERAL_PG_PORT)
env["POSTGRES_PORT"] = str(_EPHEMERAL_PG_PORT)
up = _run(["docker", "compose", "up", "-d", "postgres"], env=env)
if up.returncode != 0:
_db_unavailable_reason = f"docker compose up postgres failed:\n{up.stderr[-800:]}"
return
_started_container = True
for _ in range(30):
r = _run(
["docker", "compose", "exec", "-T", "postgres",
"pg_isready", "-U", "agp_user", "-d", "agp_db"],
env=env,
)
if r.returncode == 0:
break
time.sleep(1)
else:
_db_unavailable_reason = "ephemeral Postgres never became ready"
return
url = f"postgresql+asyncpg://agp_user:agp_password@localhost:{_EPHEMERAL_PG_PORT}/agp_db"
os.environ["DATABASE_URL"] = url
settings.DATABASE_URL = url
mig = _run([sys.executable, "-m", "alembic", "upgrade", "head"],
env={**os.environ, "DATABASE_URL": url})
if mig.returncode != 0:
_db_unavailable_reason = f"alembic upgrade head failed:\n{mig.stderr[-800:]}"
def pytest_unconfigure(config):
if not _started_container:
return
env = os.environ.copy()
env["COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME"] = _COMPOSE_PROJECT
env["POSTGRES_HOST_PORT"] = str(_EPHEMERAL_PG_PORT)
env["POSTGRES_PORT"] = str(_EPHEMERAL_PG_PORT)
_run(["docker", "compose", "down", "-v"], env=env)
@pytest.fixture(scope="session", autouse=True)
def _reset_database():
"""Truncate all application tables once per test session."""
if _db_unavailable_reason:
pytest.skip(_db_unavailable_reason, allow_module_level=True)
async def _truncate() -> None:
engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL)
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.execute(text(f"TRUNCATE TABLE {', '.join(TEST_TABLES)} CASCADE"))
await engine.dispose()
asyncio.run(_truncate())
yield
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _reset_rate_limiter():
"""Every TestClient request looks like the same client IP, so the
per-IP auth limiter would trip mid-suite. Clear it between tests; the
dedicated rate-limit test disables this to exercise the real behaviour.
"""
from app import rate_limit
rate_limit.reset_all()
yield
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _override_db():
"""Override get_db so the app uses a fresh session per test.
Deliberately does NOT reuse app.database's shared engine: FastAPI's
(sync) TestClient runs each request through anyio's blocking-portal
machinery, which can hand different requests different event loops.
asyncpg connections are bound to the loop they were created on, so
reusing one from the shared pool across requests raises "attached to a
different loop" the moment a test makes more than one request. NullPool
sidesteps it: every checkout is a brand-new connection.
"""
test_engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, poolclass=NullPool)
test_session_factory = async_sessionmaker(test_engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async def _get_db():
async_session = test_session_factory()
try:
yield async_session
await async_session.commit()
except Exception:
await async_session.rollback()
raise
finally:
await async_session.close()
app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = _get_db
yield
app.dependency_overrides.clear()
-104
View File
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for the 18+ age gate on user registration."""
from datetime import date, timedelta
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app.main import app
from app.routers.auth import calculate_age, MIN_AGE, RegisterRequest
class TestCalculateAge:
"""Unit tests for the calculate_age helper."""
def test_exactly_18(self):
today = date(2026, 6, 15)
dob = today.replace(year=today.year - 18)
assert calculate_age(dob, today=today) == 18
def test_just_turned_18(self):
today = date(2026, 6, 15)
dob = today.replace(year=today.year - 18) - timedelta(days=1)
assert calculate_age(dob, today=today) == 18
def test_one_day_short_of_18(self):
today = date(2026, 6, 15)
dob = today.replace(year=today.year - 18) + timedelta(days=1)
assert calculate_age(dob, today=today) == 17
def test_leap_day_birthday_before(self):
assert calculate_age(date(2000, 2, 29), today=date(2024, 2, 28)) == 23
def test_leap_day_birthday_after(self):
assert calculate_age(date(2000, 2, 29), today=date(2024, 3, 1)) == 24
class TestRegisterRequestDob:
def test_dob_parsed_from_iso_string(self):
req = RegisterRequest(username="u", email="u@example.com", password="p",
date_of_birth="1990-01-01")
assert req.date_of_birth == date(1990, 1, 1)
def test_dob_required(self):
with pytest.raises(Exception):
RegisterRequest(username="u", email="u@example.com", password="p")
def test_bad_dob_string_rejected(self):
with pytest.raises(Exception):
RegisterRequest(username="u", email="u@example.com", password="p",
date_of_birth="not-a-date")
class TestRegisterAgeGate:
"""End-to-end: the /register endpoint computes age from the DOB."""
def _dob_for_age(self, years: int) -> str:
return (date.today().replace(year=date.today().year - years)).isoformat()
def test_adult_accepted(self):
client = TestClient(app)
r = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
"username": "gate_adult", "email": "gate_adult@e.com",
"password": "secret123", "date_of_birth": self._dob_for_age(25),
})
assert r.status_code == 201, r.text
def test_minor_rejected(self):
client = TestClient(app)
r = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
"username": "gate_minor", "email": "gate_minor@e.com",
"password": "secret123", "date_of_birth": self._dob_for_age(15),
})
assert r.status_code == 403
assert str(MIN_AGE) in r.json()["detail"]
def test_exactly_18_accepted(self):
client = TestClient(app)
r = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
"username": "gate_18", "email": "gate_18@e.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": (date.today().replace(year=date.today().year - 18) - timedelta(days=1)).isoformat(),
})
assert r.status_code == 201, r.text
def test_future_dob_rejected(self):
client = TestClient(app)
r = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
"username": "gate_future", "email": "gate_future@e.com",
"password": "secret123", "date_of_birth": "2999-01-01",
})
assert r.status_code == 400
def test_dob_is_stored(self):
client = TestClient(app)
dob = self._dob_for_age(30)
reg = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
"username": "gate_stored", "email": "gate_stored@e.com",
"password": "secret123", "date_of_birth": dob,
})
assert reg.status_code == 201
me = client.get("/api/auth/me", headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {reg.json()['access_token']}"
})
assert me.json()["date_of_birth"] == dob
-251
View File
@@ -1,251 +0,0 @@
"""Integration tests for the auth endpoints (register + login).
These tests hit the real FastAPI app against the real configured database
(DATABASE_URL -- Postgres via Alembic migrations in CI/dev, not an isolated
in-memory DB), so they exercise the full stack: Pydantic validation → DB →
JWT → response. Requires migrations already applied (alembic upgrade head)
before running.
"""
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
from app.config import settings
from app.main import app
from app.database import get_db
from app.routers.auth import pwd_context
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Test fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _override_db():
"""Override get_db so the app uses a fresh session per test.
Deliberately does NOT reuse app.database's shared engine: FastAPI's
(sync) TestClient runs each request through anyio's blocking-portal
machinery, which can hand different requests different event loops.
asyncpg connections are bound to the loop they were created on, so
reusing one from the shared engine's connection pool across requests
raises "cannot perform operation: another operation is in progress" the
moment a test makes more than one request (register-then-login,
register-twice, etc.) -- confirmed this is the actual cause, not a bug
in the endpoints themselves. NullPool sidesteps it: every checkout is a
brand-new connection, never handed to a different loop than the one
that opened it.
"""
test_engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, poolclass=NullPool)
test_session_factory = async_sessionmaker(test_engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async def _get_db():
async_session = test_session_factory()
try:
yield async_session
await async_session.commit()
except Exception:
await async_session.rollback()
raise
finally:
await async_session.close()
app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = _get_db
yield
app.dependency_overrides.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Register endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestRegister:
"""Tests for POST /api/auth/register."""
def test_register_success(self):
"""A valid registration returns 201 with a token."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "newuser",
"email": "new@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 201
data = resp.json()
assert "access_token" in data
assert data["token_type"] == "bearer"
def test_register_rejects_under_18(self):
"""A DOB that computes to under 18 gets a 403 (see test_auth_age_gate
for the age-math coverage)."""
from datetime import date
client = TestClient(app)
minor_dob = date.today().replace(year=date.today().year - 14).isoformat()
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "kid",
"email": "kid@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": minor_dob,
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 403
assert "at least 18" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_register_rejects_duplicate_username(self):
"""Registering the same username twice returns 409."""
client = TestClient(app)
# First registration
client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "duplicate",
"email": "dup1@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
# Second registration with same username, different email
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "duplicate",
"email": "dup2@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 409
assert "Username already registered" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_register_rejects_duplicate_email(self):
"""Registering the same email twice returns 409."""
client = TestClient(app)
client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "user1",
"email": "same@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "user2",
"email": "same@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 409
assert "Email already registered" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_register_missing_dob(self):
"""Missing the required date_of_birth field returns 422."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "user",
"email": "user@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 422
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Login endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLogin:
"""Tests for POST /api/auth/login."""
def _create_user(self, username: str, password: str, email: str = None):
"""Helper to create a user via register."""
client = TestClient(app)
if email is None:
email = f"{username}@example.com"
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": username,
"email": email,
"password": password,
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 201
return resp.json()["access_token"]
def test_login_success(self):
"""Correct credentials return a token."""
self._create_user("loginuser", "correctpass")
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/login",
data={"username": "loginuser", "password": "correctpass"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
assert "access_token" in data
assert data["token_type"] == "bearer"
def test_login_wrong_password(self):
"""Wrong password returns 401."""
# Distinct username from test_login_success -- there's no per-test
# DB rollback/isolation here (real Postgres via the app's own
# dependency-overridden session), so reusing "loginuser" collided
# with the user that test already created (409 on register instead
# of the intended 401-on-login assertion this test is actually for).
self._create_user("loginuser_wrongpass", "correctpass")
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/login",
data={"username": "loginuser_wrongpass", "password": "wrongpass"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Incorrect username or password" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_login_nonexistent_user(self):
"""Non-existent user returns 401 (not 404)."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/login",
data={"username": "nobody", "password": "any"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Incorrect username or password" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_login_accepts_form_encoded(self):
"""Login accepts application/x-www-form-urlencoded (OAuth2)."""
self._create_user("formuser", "formpass")
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/login",
data={"username": "formuser", "password": "formpass"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert "access_token" in resp.json()
def test_login_token_is_valid_jwt(self):
"""The returned token is a valid JWT that can be decoded."""
self._create_user("jwttoken", "jwt123")
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/login",
data={"username": "jwttoken", "password": "jwt123"},
)
token = resp.json()["access_token"]
# Verify it's a 3-part JWT
parts = token.split(".")
assert len(parts) == 3
-171
View File
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for expired-token rejection across auth endpoints.
Covers two distinct expiry paths:
1. An *access* JWT whose ``exp`` claim is in the past must be rejected
with 401 by ``GET /api/auth/me`` (jose's built-in ``exp`` validation).
2. A *refresh* token whose persisted ``expires_at`` is in the past must be
rejected with 401 by ``POST /api/auth/refresh`` even though its JWT
signature is still valid.
Requires migrations already applied (alembic upgrade head) before running.
"""
import asyncio
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from jose import jwt
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
from app.config import settings
from app.main import app
from app.database import get_db
from app.models.session import RefreshToken
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Test fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _override_db():
"""Override get_db so the app uses a fresh session per test."""
test_engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, poolclass=NullPool)
test_session_factory = async_sessionmaker(test_engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async def _get_db():
async_session = test_session_factory()
try:
yield async_session
await async_session.commit()
except Exception:
await async_session.rollback()
raise
finally:
await async_session.close()
app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = _get_db
yield
app.dependency_overrides.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _mint_access_token(exp: datetime) -> str:
"""Mint an RS256 access token with an explicit ``exp`` claim."""
return jwt.encode(
{"sub": "1", "exp": exp},
settings.private_pem,
algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
)
def _expire_refresh_token_in_db(token: str) -> None:
"""Set the persisted refresh token's ``expires_at`` into the past."""
async def _do():
engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, poolclass=NullPool)
session_factory = async_sessionmaker(engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async with session_factory() as session:
from sqlalchemy import update
await session.execute(
update(RefreshToken)
.where(RefreshToken.token == token)
.values(expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1))
)
await session.commit()
await engine.dispose()
asyncio.run(_do())
def _register_user(client: TestClient, username: str) -> str:
"""Register a user and return its refresh token."""
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": username,
"email": f"{username}@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 201
return resp.json()["refresh_token"]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Expired access token (GET /api/auth/me)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExpiredAccessToken:
def test_expired_access_token_is_rejected_by_me(self):
"""An access JWT with a past exp claim returns 401 on /me."""
client = TestClient(app)
expired_token = _mint_access_token(
datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=5)
)
resp = client.get(
"/api/auth/me",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {expired_token}"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Could not validate credentials" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_garbage_access_token_is_rejected_by_me(self):
"""A non-JWT bearer token returns 401 on /me."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/api/auth/me",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer not-a-real-jwt"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_missing_bearer_token_returns_401(self):
"""No Authorization header at all returns 401 on /me."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get("/api/auth/me")
assert resp.status_code == 401
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Expired refresh token (POST /api/auth/refresh)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExpiredRefreshToken:
def test_expired_refresh_token_is_rejected(self):
"""A refresh token whose DB expires_at is in the past returns 401."""
client = TestClient(app)
refresh_token = _register_user(client, "expired_rt_user")
# Force the persisted record to be expired while its JWT signature
# is still valid.
_expire_refresh_token_in_db(refresh_token)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Invalid or expired refresh token" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_expired_refresh_token_jwt_is_rejected(self):
"""A refresh JWT with a past exp claim is rejected before DB lookup."""
client = TestClient(app)
expired_jwt = jwt.encode(
{"sub": "1", "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=5)},
settings.private_pem,
algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": expired_jwt},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Invalid or expired refresh token" in resp.json()["detail"]
-91
View File
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
"""Integration tests for GET/PUT /api/avatar/loadout.
Hits the real app against the configured Postgres (same contract as the
other integration tests -- migrations applied first).
"""
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app.main import app
from app.models.avatar_loadout import DEFAULT_LOADOUT
def _auth_headers(client: TestClient, username: str) -> dict:
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": username,
"email": f"{username}@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {resp.json()['access_token']}"}
class TestGetLoadout:
def test_new_user_gets_the_default(self):
client = TestClient(app)
headers = _auth_headers(client, "av_default")
resp = client.get("/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers)
assert resp.status_code == 200
body = resp.json()
assert body["is_default"] is True
assert body["data"] == DEFAULT_LOADOUT
def test_requires_auth(self):
client = TestClient(app)
assert client.get("/api/avatar/loadout").status_code == 401
class TestPutLoadout:
def test_save_then_read_back(self):
client = TestClient(app)
headers = _auth_headers(client, "av_save")
loadout = {
"base_body": "base_human_male_01",
"slots": {"hair": "hair_mohawk_01", "accessory": ["accessory_belt_01"]},
"skin_tone": {"r": 0.8, "g": 0.6, "b": 0.5, "a": 1.0},
}
put = client.put("/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers, json={"data": loadout})
assert put.status_code == 200, put.text
assert put.json()["is_default"] is False
got = client.get("/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers)
assert got.status_code == 200
assert got.json()["is_default"] is False
assert got.json()["data"] == loadout
def test_put_is_idempotent_replace(self):
client = TestClient(app)
headers = _auth_headers(client, "av_replace")
client.put(
"/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers,
json={"data": {"base_body": "base_human_male_01", "slots": {"hair": "hair_mohawk_01"}}},
)
second = {"base_body": "base_human_male_01", "slots": {"chest": "chest_bandit_01"}}
client.put("/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers, json={"data": second})
got = client.get("/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers)
assert got.json()["data"] == second
def test_rejects_missing_base_body(self):
client = TestClient(app)
headers = _auth_headers(client, "av_nobase")
resp = client.put("/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers, json={"data": {"slots": {}}})
assert resp.status_code == 422
def test_rejects_non_object_slots(self):
client = TestClient(app)
headers = _auth_headers(client, "av_badslots")
resp = client.put(
"/api/avatar/loadout", headers=headers,
json={"data": {"base_body": "base_human_male_01", "slots": "nope"}},
)
assert resp.status_code == 422
def test_requires_auth(self):
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.put("/api/avatar/loadout", json={"data": {"base_body": "x", "slots": {}}})
assert resp.status_code == 401
-220
View File
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for the lightweight glTF metadata extraction service."""
import json
import struct
import pytest
from app.services.gltf import (
extract_gltf_metadata,
looks_like_gltf,
_parse_glb,
_parse_gltf_json,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Test data helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _make_gltf_json(
meshes: int = 1,
vertices_per_mesh: int = 24,
has_animations: bool = False,
images: list[dict] | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Build a minimal glTF JSON structure."""
accessors = []
meshes_data = []
for i in range(meshes):
acc_index = len(accessors)
accessors.append({
"bufferView": 0,
"componentType": 5126, # FLOAT
"count": vertices_per_mesh,
"type": "VEC3",
"max": [1.0, 1.0, 1.0],
"min": [-1.0, -1.0, -1.0],
})
meshes_data.append({
"primitives": [{
"attributes": {"POSITION": acc_index},
}],
})
gltf = {
"asset": {"version": "2.0"},
"accessors": accessors,
"meshes": meshes_data,
}
if has_animations:
gltf["animations"] = [{"name": "anim1", "channels": [], "samplers": []}]
if images:
gltf["images"] = images
return gltf
def _make_glb(gltf_json: dict) -> bytes:
"""Wrap *gltf_json* in a minimal GLB binary container."""
json_bytes = json.dumps(gltf_json).encode("utf-8")
json_length = len(json_bytes)
# Pad JSON chunk to 4-byte boundary.
json_padding = (4 - json_length % 4) % 4
json_chunk = json_bytes + b"\x00" * json_padding
json_chunk_type = 0x4E4F534A # "JSON"
# No BIN chunk.
bin_length = 0
bin_chunk_type = 0x004E4942
total_length = 12 + 8 + len(json_chunk) + 8 + bin_length
header = struct.pack("<III", 0x46546C67, 2, total_length) # magic, version, length
json_header = struct.pack("<II", len(json_chunk), json_chunk_type)
if bin_length > 0:
bin_header = struct.pack("<II", bin_length, bin_chunk_type)
else:
bin_header = b""
return header + json_header + json_chunk + bin_header
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# looks_like_gltf
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLooksLikeGltf:
def test_glb_magic(self):
assert looks_like_gltf(b"glTF\x00\x00\x00\x00") is True
def test_gltf_extension(self):
assert looks_like_gltf(b'{"asset":{"version":"2.0"}}', "model.gltf") is True
def test_glb_extension(self):
assert looks_like_gltf(b"some binary", "model.glb") is True
def test_json_with_asset_version(self):
payload = json.dumps({"asset": {"version": "2.0"}}).encode()
assert looks_like_gltf(payload) is True
def test_plain_json_no_asset(self):
payload = json.dumps({"foo": "bar"}).encode()
assert looks_like_gltf(payload) is False
def test_non_json_bytes(self):
assert looks_like_gltf(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n") is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _parse_glb
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestParseGlb:
def test_parses_valid_glb(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json()
glb = _make_glb(gltf_json)
result = _parse_glb(glb)
assert result["asset"]["version"] == "2.0"
assert len(result["meshes"]) == 1
def test_rejects_too_short(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too short"):
_parse_glb(b"glTF\x00\x00")
def test_rejects_invalid_magic(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="invalid GLB magic"):
_parse_glb(b"NOTglTF\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _parse_gltf_json
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestParseGltfJson:
def test_parses_valid_gltf(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json()
result = _parse_gltf_json(json.dumps(gltf_json).encode())
assert result["asset"]["version"] == "2.0"
def test_rejects_non_object(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="root must be an object"):
_parse_gltf_json(b"[1, 2, 3]")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# extract_gltf_metadata (GLB path)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExtractGltfMetadataGlb:
def test_basic_glb(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(meshes=1, vertices_per_mesh=24)
glb = _make_glb(gltf_json)
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(glb)
assert meta["mesh_count"] == 1
assert meta["vertex_count"] == 24
assert meta["has_animation"] is False
assert meta["bounding_box_min"] == [-1.0, -1.0, -1.0]
assert meta["bounding_box_max"] == [1.0, 1.0, 1.0]
assert meta["texture_refs"] == []
def test_multiple_meshes(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(meshes=3, vertices_per_mesh=12)
glb = _make_glb(gltf_json)
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(glb)
assert meta["mesh_count"] == 3
assert meta["vertex_count"] == 36
def test_with_animation(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(has_animations=True)
glb = _make_glb(gltf_json)
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(glb)
assert meta["has_animation"] is True
def test_with_external_texture(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(images=[{"uri": "textures/rock.png"}])
glb = _make_glb(gltf_json)
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(glb)
assert meta["texture_refs"] == ["textures/rock.png"]
def test_with_named_texture(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(images=[{"name": "my_texture"}])
glb = _make_glb(gltf_json)
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(glb)
assert meta["texture_refs"] == ["my_texture"]
def test_empty_meshes(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(meshes=0)
glb = _make_glb(gltf_json)
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(glb)
assert meta["mesh_count"] == 0
assert meta["vertex_count"] == 0
assert meta["bounding_box_min"] == [0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
assert meta["bounding_box_max"] == [0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# extract_gltf_metadata (plain .gltf JSON path)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExtractGltfMetadataGltfJson:
def test_plain_gltf(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(meshes=2, vertices_per_mesh=8)
raw = json.dumps(gltf_json).encode()
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(raw)
assert meta["mesh_count"] == 2
assert meta["vertex_count"] == 16
assert meta["has_animation"] is False
def test_plain_gltf_with_animation(self):
gltf_json = _make_gltf_json(has_animations=True)
raw = json.dumps(gltf_json).encode()
meta = extract_gltf_metadata(raw)
assert meta["has_animation"] is True
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Error handling
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExtractGltfMetadataErrors:
def test_invalid_glb(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
extract_gltf_metadata(b"not a glb")
def test_invalid_gltf_json(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
_parse_gltf_json(b"[1, 2, 3]")
-56
View File
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
"""The auth endpoints are rate-limited per client IP."""
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import rate_limit
from app.config import settings
from app.main import app
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _clean_limiter():
# This module tests the limiter itself: force it on (the checkpoint
# runner disables it suite-wide via RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED) and start each
# test from an empty window.
prev = settings.RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED
settings.RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED = True
rate_limit.reset_all()
yield
rate_limit.reset_all()
settings.RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED = prev
def test_login_is_limited_after_the_threshold():
client = TestClient(app)
codes = []
for i in range(15):
r = client.post("/api/auth/login", data={"username": f"nobody{i}", "password": "x"})
codes.append(r.status_code)
# First 10 get through to the (failing) auth check; the rest are 429.
assert codes[:10] == [401] * 10
assert 429 in codes[10:]
assert codes[-1] == 429
def test_register_shares_the_same_bucket():
client = TestClient(app)
# Burn the budget on login...
for i in range(10):
client.post("/api/auth/login", data={"username": f"x{i}", "password": "y"})
# ...register from the same IP is now blocked too.
r = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
"username": "rl_user", "email": "rl@e.com",
"password": "secret123", "date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
})
assert r.status_code == 429
assert "Retry-After" in r.headers
def test_limiter_window_is_per_key():
limiter = rate_limit.SlidingWindowLimiter(max_hits=2, window_seconds=60)
limiter.check("a")
limiter.check("a")
with pytest.raises(Exception):
limiter.check("a")
limiter.check("b") # different key, unaffected
-201
View File
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for the POST /api/auth/refresh endpoint.
These tests exercise the full stack: register → get refresh token →
refresh → new access token. Requires migrations already applied
(alembic upgrade head) before running.
"""
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
from app.config import settings
from app.main import app
from app.database import get_db
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Test fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _override_db():
"""Override get_db so the app uses a fresh session per test."""
test_engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, poolclass=NullPool)
test_session_factory = async_sessionmaker(test_engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async def _get_db():
async_session = test_session_factory()
try:
yield async_session
await async_session.commit()
except Exception:
await async_session.rollback()
raise
finally:
await async_session.close()
app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = _get_db
yield
app.dependency_overrides.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Refresh endpoint tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestRefresh:
"""Tests for POST /api/auth/refresh."""
def _register_user(self, username: str, password: str, email: str = None):
"""Helper to register a user and return the refresh token."""
client = TestClient(app)
if email is None:
email = f"{username}@example.com"
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": username,
"email": email,
"password": password,
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 201
return resp.json()["refresh_token"]
def test_refresh_success(self):
"""A valid refresh token returns a new access token."""
refresh_token = self._register_user("refep_refreshuser", "secret123")
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
assert "access_token" in data
assert data["token_type"] == "bearer"
# The refresh token in the response is the same one we sent
assert data["refresh_token"] == refresh_token
def test_refresh_returns_different_access_token(self):
"""Refreshing produces a new access token (different from any previous)."""
refresh_token = self._register_user("refep_refreshtoken", "secret123")
client = TestClient(app)
# First refresh
resp1 = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp1.status_code == 200
access_token_1 = resp1.json()["access_token"]
# Second refresh
resp2 = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp2.status_code == 200
access_token_2 = resp2.json()["access_token"]
# Each refresh should produce a new access token
assert access_token_1 != access_token_2
def test_refresh_invalid_token(self):
"""An invalid (garbage) refresh token returns 401."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": "not.a.jwt.token"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Invalid or expired refresh token" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_refresh_empty_body(self):
"""Missing refresh_token field returns 422 validation error."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={},
)
assert resp.status_code == 422
def test_refresh_missing_field(self):
"""No body at all returns 422."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
content="{}",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 422
def test_refresh_with_login_token(self):
"""A refresh token obtained from login also works for /refresh."""
client = TestClient(app)
# Register first
client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": "refep_loginrefuser",
"email": "loginref@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
},
)
# Login to get a refresh token
login_resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/login",
data={"username": "refep_loginrefuser", "password": "secret123"},
)
assert login_resp.status_code == 200
refresh_token = login_resp.json()["refresh_token"]
# Use it to refresh
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert "access_token" in resp.json()
def test_refresh_access_token_is_valid_jwt(self):
"""The access token returned by /refresh is a valid JWT."""
from jose import jwt
refresh_token = self._register_user("refep_jwttoken", "secret123")
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
access_token = resp.json()["access_token"]
# Verify it's a 3-part JWT
parts = access_token.split(".")
assert len(parts) == 3
# Verify it decodes with the public key
payload = jwt.decode(
access_token,
settings.public_pem,
algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
)
assert "sub" in payload
assert "exp" in payload
def test_refresh_expires_minutes_in_response(self):
"""The response includes access_token_expires_minutes."""
refresh_token = self._register_user("refep_expiretest", "secret123")
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert "access_token_expires_minutes" in resp.json()
assert resp.json()["access_token_expires_minutes"] == settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES
-79
View File
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for refresh token uniqueness (jti claim) and model column length."""
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import pytest
from jose import jwt
from app.config import settings
from app.routers.auth import _create_refresh_token
from app.models.session import RefreshToken
class TestRefreshTokenJtiUniqueness:
"""Verify that _create_refresh_token produces unique tokens even when
called with identical data in rapid succession (issue #1 from review)."""
def test_two_calls_produce_different_tokens(self):
"""Two calls with the same sub produce different JWTs because of jti."""
token_a = _create_refresh_token({"sub": "42"})
token_b = _create_refresh_token({"sub": "42"})
assert token_a != token_b
def test_jti_is_valid_uuid(self):
"""The jti claim inside the refresh token is a valid UUID."""
token = _create_refresh_token({"sub": "1"})
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
settings.public_pem,
algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
)
assert "jti" in payload
# Verify it parses as a UUID (raises ValueError if not)
uuid.UUID(payload["jti"])
def test_each_token_has_unique_jti(self):
"""Generate 100 tokens for the same user — all jtis must differ."""
jtis = set()
for _ in range(100):
token = _create_refresh_token({"sub": "999"})
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
settings.public_pem,
algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
)
jtis.add(payload["jti"])
assert len(jtis) == 100
def test_jti_survives_decode(self):
"""The jti claim is present and correct after decode."""
token = _create_refresh_token({"sub": "7"})
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
settings.public_pem,
algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
)
assert payload["sub"] == "7"
assert "jti" in payload
assert "exp" in payload
class TestRefreshTokenModelColumnLength:
"""Verify the model's token column length matches the migration (issue #2)."""
def test_token_column_has_length_512(self):
"""RefreshToken.token column should be String(512), not unbounded."""
from sqlalchemy import inspect
# Get the column definition from the model's table
column = RefreshToken.__table__.columns["token"]
# The type should be String with length 512
assert column.type.length == 512
def test_token_column_type_is_string(self):
"""The token column should be a String type."""
from sqlalchemy import String as SAString
column = RefreshToken.__table__.columns["token"]
assert isinstance(column.type, SAString)
-54
View File
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for POST /api/worlds/{id}/join.
The happy path spawns a real Godot process, so it's covered by a manual /
checkpoint integration test, not here. These cover the envelope: auth,
visibility, and the 503 when orchestration is disabled (the default).
"""
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app.main import app
def _auth(client: TestClient, name: str) -> tuple[dict, int]:
r = client.post("/api/auth/register", json={
"username": name, "email": f"{name}@e.com", "password": "secret123", "date_of_birth": "1990-01-01",
})
assert r.status_code == 201, r.text
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {r.json()['access_token']}"}
me = client.get("/api/users/me", headers=headers)
return headers, me.json()["id"]
def _make_world(client: TestClient, headers: dict, visibility: str = "public") -> int:
r = client.post("/api/worlds/", headers=headers, json={"name": "W", "visibility": visibility})
assert r.status_code == 201, r.text
return r.json()["id"]
class TestJoinWorld:
def test_requires_auth(self):
client = TestClient(app)
assert client.post("/api/worlds/1/join").status_code == 401
def test_unknown_world_is_404(self):
client = TestClient(app)
headers, _ = _auth(client, "join_404")
assert client.post("/api/worlds/999999/join", headers=headers).status_code == 404
def test_private_world_of_another_user_is_404(self):
client = TestClient(app)
owner_headers, _ = _auth(client, "join_owner")
wid = _make_world(client, owner_headers, "private")
other_headers, _ = _auth(client, "join_other")
assert client.post(f"/api/worlds/{wid}/join", headers=other_headers).status_code == 404
def test_disabled_orchestration_returns_503(self):
# GAME_SERVERS_ENABLED defaults to False in tests.
client = TestClient(app)
headers, _ = _auth(client, "join_503")
wid = _make_world(client, headers, "public")
r = client.post(f"/api/worlds/{wid}/join", headers=headers)
assert r.status_code == 503
assert "not enabled" in r.json()["detail"]
-493
View File
@@ -1,493 +0,0 @@
# Avatar Component System & glTF Attachment Spec
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** Server authority + client prediction, world chunk data format
## 1. Overview
This document specifies the **avatar component system** for **agp-game**, a
Godot-based multiplayer game. It defines:
- How an avatar is decomposed into **body parts** and **attachment slots**.
- How **cosmetic attachments** (clothing, accessories, gear) mount onto the
base body.
- The **glTF/GLB format requirements** that all avatar assets must satisfy so
they can be loaded, skinned, and networked consistently.
The goal is a **modular, data-driven avatar pipeline**: a single base body rig
plus swappable attachments, all authored in glTF and consumed by a shared Godot
runtime. This enables player customization, cosmetic monetization, and
server-authoritative validation of what a player is wearing.
### 1.1 Design Goals
- **Modularity:** Body parts and attachments are independent assets that can be
combined at runtime without re-exporting.
- **Consistency:** A single, well-defined skeleton and slot convention so any
attachment fits any base body.
- **Networkability:** The avatar's composition is expressed as a compact,
serializable **loadout** that the server can validate and replicate.
- **Performance:** Attachments are skinned to the same skeleton and share
materials where possible to minimize draw calls and skinning cost.
- **Tooling-friendly:** Assets are authored in standard glTF 2.0 and validated
by a build-time checker.
---
## 2. Avatar Decomposition
### 2.1 The Base Body
Every avatar is built on a **base body** — a single glTF asset containing:
- A **skeleton** (the canonical rig, see §3).
- A **base mesh** for the skin/body (head, torso, arms, legs).
- **Attachment points** (empty nodes) that define where accessories mount.
The base body is the only asset that carries the skeleton. Attachments reference
the skeleton by **bone name** and are skinned to it; they never carry their own
rig.
### 2.2 Body Parts vs. Attachments
Two distinct concepts:
| Concept | Definition | Example |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| **Body part** | A mesh that replaces part of the base body's skin (e.g., a different head, a tail, wings). | Alternate head, cybernetic arm |
| **Attachment** | A mesh that mounts *on top of* the body without replacing it (clothing, accessories). | Shirt, hat, glasses, backpack |
The distinction matters for **slot exclusivity** and **layering**:
- **Body parts** are *exclusive* per slot — only one head can be equipped.
- **Attachments** are *layered* — a hat and glasses can coexist, and both sit
above the head mesh.
---
## 3. Skeleton & Slot Convention
### 3.1 Canonical Skeleton
All avatars share a **canonical skeleton** with a fixed set of bone names. This
is the contract that lets any attachment fit any body. The skeleton follows a
humanoid convention (Godot's `Humanoid` profile / glTF VRM-style naming).
Required bones (subset of the full rig):
```
Root
├── Hips
│ ├── Spine
│ │ ├── Chest
│ │ │ ├── Neck
│ │ │ │ └── Head
│ │ │ │ ├── HeadTop # hat / hair mount
│ │ │ │ ├── Jaw # face accessories
│ │ │ │ └── LeftEye / RightEye
│ │ │ ├── LeftShoulder
│ │ │ │ └── LeftUpperArm
│ │ │ │ └── LeftLowerArm
│ │ │ │ └── LeftHand
│ │ │ └── RightShoulder
│ │ │ └── RightUpperArm
│ │ │ └── RightLowerArm
│ │ │ └── RightHand
│ │ └── (Chest children for torso attachments)
│ ├── LeftUpperLeg
│ │ └── LeftLowerLeg
│ │ └── LeftFoot
│ └── RightUpperLeg
│ └── RightLowerLeg
│ └── RightFoot
```
**Rules:**
- Bone names are **case-sensitive** and must match exactly.
- The skeleton is **T-pose** at rest for consistent skinning.
- Attachments must be skinned to **at least** the bones they deform; static
accessories may be parented to a single bone (e.g., a hat parented to `Head`).
### 3.2 Attachment Slots
Slots are the **logical mount points** for body parts and attachments. Each slot
maps to one or more bones and defines what can be equipped there.
| Slot ID | Category | Mount bone(s) | Exclusivity | Example assets |
|----------------|--------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|
| `head` | body part | `Head` | exclusive | alternate head, face |
| `hair` | attachment | `HeadTop` | exclusive | hairstyles, hats |
| `face` | attachment | `Jaw` | exclusive | glasses, masks, beards |
| `torso` | body part | `Chest` | exclusive | alternate torso |
| `chest` | attachment | `Chest` | exclusive | shirts, armor, chest gear |
| `back` | attachment | `Chest` (back) | exclusive | backpacks, wings, capes |
| `left_arm` | body part | `LeftUpperArm` | exclusive | alternate arm |
| `right_arm` | body part | `RightUpperArm` | exclusive | alternate arm |
| `left_hand` | attachment | `LeftHand` | exclusive | gloves, weapons (held) |
| `right_hand` | attachment | `RightHand` | exclusive | gloves, weapons (held) |
| `legs` | body part | `Hips` | exclusive | alternate legs |
| `pants` | attachment | `Hips` | exclusive | pants, skirts |
| `left_foot` | attachment | `LeftFoot` | exclusive | shoes |
| `right_foot` | attachment | `RightFoot` | exclusive | shoes |
| `accessory` | attachment | `Root` (free) | multiple | belts, jewelry, floating items|
**Slot semantics:**
- **`exclusive`** slots allow at most one equipped item at a time.
- The **`accessory`** slot is *multi-slot* — multiple accessories may be equipped
simultaneously (bounded by a configurable limit, e.g., 8).
- **Body-part slots** (`head`, `torso`, `legs`, `left_arm`, `right_arm`) replace
the corresponding base mesh. When a body part is equipped, the base mesh for
that region is hidden.
- **Attachment slots** layer on top of the base mesh and never hide it.
### 3.3 Slot → Bone Mapping
Each slot declares a **primary mount bone** and an optional **secondary bone
list** for skinning. The runtime uses this to:
1. Parent static accessories to the mount bone.
2. Skin skinned attachments to the union of the slot's bones.
---
## 4. glTF/GLB Format Requirements
All avatar assets (base bodies, body parts, attachments) are distributed as
**glTF 2.0** (`.gltf` + external buffers/textures) or **GLB** (`.glb`, binary
container). GLB is the preferred distribution format for runtime loading.
### 4.1 Required Conventions
| Concern | Requirement |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Format** | glTF 2.0 (`.gltf` or `.glb`). GLB preferred for runtime. |
| **Coordinate system** | glTF standard: **+Y up, +Z forward, right-handed**. Godot converts to its own convention on import. |
| **Units** | Meters. Avatar height ~1.8 m at the `Root` bone. |
| **Skeleton** | Single skeleton per asset; bone names per §3.1. |
| **Skinning** | `skins` + `nodes` with `JOINTS_0` / `WEIGHTS_0` accessors. |
| **Pose** | T-pose at rest. |
| **Materials** | PBR metallic-roughness. Use `KHR_materials_unlit` for emissive/UI-only items. |
| **Textures** | Max 2048×2048; power-of-two preferred. Use `KHR_texture_basisu` (BasisU) for runtime. |
| **Animation** | Optional. If present, must not rename or remove canonical bones. |
### 4.2 Asset Metadata (extras)
Each asset **must** declare its slot and identity in the glTF `asset.extras`
object. This is the machine-readable contract consumed by the build pipeline and
runtime.
```json
{
"asset": {
"version": "2.0",
"extras": {
"agp": {
"type": "attachment", // "base_body" | "body_part" | "attachment"
"slot": "chest", // slot ID from §3.2
"id": "shirt_bandit_01", // globally unique asset id
"display_name": "Bandit Shirt",
"version": "1.0.0",
"mount_bone": "Chest", // primary mount bone
"skin_bones": ["Chest", "Spine", "LeftUpperArm", "RightUpperArm"],
"exclusive": true, // matches slot exclusivity
"tags": ["cloth", "common"],
"author": "platform-team"
}
}
}
}
```
**Validation rules for `extras.agp`:**
- `type` must be one of `base_body`, `body_part`, `attachment`.
- `slot` must be a known slot ID (§3.2).
- `mount_bone` must exist in the canonical skeleton.
- `skin_bones` must all exist in the canonical skeleton.
- `exclusive` must match the slot's declared exclusivity.
- `id` must be unique across the asset catalog.
### 4.3 Node Naming Convention
To make assets self-describing and mergeable, nodes follow a convention:
- **Base body:** the mesh node is named `Body`; the skeleton root is `Root`.
- **Body part:** the mesh node is named `<SlotID>_Mesh` (e.g., `head_Mesh`).
- **Attachment:** the mesh node is named `<SlotID>_<AssetID>` (e.g.,
`chest_shirt_bandit_01`).
- **Attachment points** (empty nodes) on the base body are named
`attach_<slot>` (e.g., `attach_head`, `attach_left_hand`).
### 4.4 Material & Texture Requirements
- All materials use the **metallic-roughness** PBR model.
- Textures are embedded in the GLB or referenced as external files; external
references must be relative paths within the asset package.
- **Color customization** is supported via a `baseColorFactor` tint applied at
runtime (multiplied over the albedo). Assets should use a neutral albedo
(white/gray) where tinting is intended.
- **Masked/transparent** materials must set the correct alpha mode
(`MASK` or `BLEND`) and `alphaCutoff`.
### 4.5 Skeleton Merging at Runtime
When an attachment is loaded, the runtime **merges** it onto the base body:
1. Load the base body (skeleton + base meshes).
2. Load each equipped attachment.
3. For each attachment, **re-target its skin** to the base body's skeleton by
bone name (no re-export needed).
4. Parent static accessories to their `mount_bone`.
5. Hide base meshes for any equipped body-part slots.
6. Apply material tints and merge into the render tree.
The merge is **name-based** — bone names must match exactly (§3.1). This is the
core reason for the strict naming contract.
---
## 5. Loadout Model (Network & Persistence)
The avatar's composition is serialized as a **loadout** — a compact, ordered
list of equipped asset IDs. This is what the server validates, persists, and
replicates.
### 5.1 Loadout JSON
```json
{
"base_body": "base_human_male_01",
"slots": {
"head": "head_cyber_01",
"hair": "hair_mohawk_01",
"face": null,
"torso": null,
"chest": "chest_bandit_01",
"back": "backpack_01",
"left_arm": null,
"right_arm": null,
"left_hand": "glove_leather_01",
"right_hand": "glove_leather_01",
"legs": null,
"pants": "pants_cargo_01",
"left_foot": "shoe_boot_01",
"right_foot": "shoe_boot_01",
"accessory": ["belt_01", "necklace_01"]
}
}
```
**Rules:**
- `base_body` is required and must reference a valid `base_body` asset.
- Each exclusive slot holds **at most one** asset id (or `null`).
- `accessory` is an array (0..N, bounded).
- The server validates that every id exists in the catalog and that slot
exclusivity is respected.
### 5.2 Network Replication
The loadout is replicated as part of the player's spawn/state data:
```
spawn_entity:
entity_id: uint32
type: player
transform: { x, y, rot }
props:
loadout_hash: uint32 # hash of the loadout for change detection
loadout: { ... } # full loadout on spawn / on change
```
- The **full loadout** is sent on spawn and whenever it changes (reliable).
- A **`loadout_hash`** lets clients skip re-resolving assets if unchanged.
- The server is the **authority** on the loadout; clients send *requests* to
change equipment, and the server validates and broadcasts the result.
### 5.3 Server-Side Validation
The server rejects a loadout if:
- `base_body` is missing or unknown.
- Any slot references an unknown asset id.
- An exclusive slot has more than one item.
- An asset's declared `slot` does not match the slot it is placed in.
- The accessory list exceeds the configured limit.
- The asset is not owned/unlocked by the player (for gated cosmetics).
---
## 6. Godot Runtime Architecture
### 6.1 Node Structure
```
Avatar (Node3D)
├── Skeleton3D # canonical skeleton (from base body)
├── BodyMeshes # base body meshes (skinned to Skeleton3D)
│ ├── head_Mesh
│ ├── torso_Mesh
│ └── ...
├── Attachments # equipped attachments
│ ├── chest_shirt_bandit_01
│ ├── hair_mohawk_01
│ └── ...
└── AttachmentPoints # empty nodes for dynamic mounting
├── attach_head
├── attach_left_hand
└── ...
```
### 6.2 Core Classes
| Class | Responsibility |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| `AvatarSystem` | Loads base body + attachments, resolves loadouts, owns the avatar node. |
| `AvatarLoader` | glTF/GLB import, skeleton merge, skin re-targeting. |
| `AvatarSlotRegistry` | Static registry of slot definitions (id, bones, exclusivity).|
| `AvatarLoadout` | Serializable loadout model + validation. |
| `AvatarCatalog` | Asset catalog (id → asset metadata + resource path). |
| `AvatarVisualizer` | Builds the render tree from a loadout. |
### 6.3 Loading Pipeline
```
loadout JSON
│
▼
AvatarCatalog.resolve(loadout) # id → asset metadata + GLB path
│
▼
AvatarLoader.load_base_body() # import GLB, extract skeleton + base meshes
│
▼
for each equipped slot:
AvatarLoader.load_attachment()# import GLB, re-target skin to skeleton
│
▼
AvatarVisualizer.assemble() # parent, hide replaced parts, apply tints
│
▼
Avatar node ready for render
```
### 6.4 Performance Considerations
- **Shared skeleton:** All meshes skin to one `Skeleton3D`, so skinning is
computed once per frame.
- **Material batching:** Attachments that share a material are merged into a
single mesh where possible (static accessories).
- **LOD:** Optional LOD variants per asset; the runtime selects based on
distance.
- **Caching:** Resolved loadouts and imported GLB resources are cached by
`AvatarCatalog` to avoid re-importing on respawn or re-join.
---
## 7. Asset Pipeline & Validation
### 7.1 Build-Time Validation
A build-time checker validates every asset before it enters the catalog:
1. **Format check:** valid glTF 2.0 / GLB.
2. **Metadata check:** `extras.agp` present and valid (§4.2).
3. **Skeleton check:** all `skin_bones` exist in the canonical skeleton.
4. **Slot check:** `slot` is known and `exclusive` matches.
5. **Mesh check:** meshes are skinned (or static accessories parented to a bone).
6. **Texture check:** sizes, formats, and alpha modes are valid.
7. **Uniqueness check:** `id` is unique.
### 7.2 Catalog Manifest
The catalog is a JSON manifest mapping asset ids to metadata and resource paths:
```json
{
"assets": {
"base_human_male_01": {
"type": "base_body",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/base_human_male_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0"
},
"chest_bandit_01": {
"type": "attachment",
"slot": "chest",
"path": "res://assets/avatars/chest_bandit_01.glb",
"version": "1.0.0"
}
}
}
```
---
## 8. Security & Anti-Cheat
- **Server-authoritative loadouts:** Clients only *request* equipment changes;
the server validates against the catalog and the player's owned items.
- **No client asset injection:** Clients cannot send arbitrary GLB data; they
reference catalog ids only.
- **Rate limiting:** Equipment-change requests are rate-limited per peer.
- **Hash verification:** The `loadout_hash` lets the server detect tampered or
stale loadout state.
---
## 9. Open Questions / Future Work
- **Morph targets / blendshapes:** Support for facial expressions and body
morphs (e.g., height, muscle) via glTF morph targets.
- **Physics attachments:** Cloth simulation for capes/skirts (Godot cloth).
- **Dynamic tinting UI:** A color-picker that writes `baseColorFactor` tints.
- **VRM compatibility:** Consider supporting VRM (a glTF extension for
humanoid avatars) as an import source.
- **Attachment LOD streaming:** Streaming high-res attachments on demand.
---
## 9a. Loadout Persistence (implemented, PC3 Phase 1)
**Storage.** One row per user in `avatar_loadouts` (`user_id` PK/FK,
`data` JSONB, timestamps). The entire loadout is stored as a single JSON
document in the exact shape the client's `AvatarLoadout.to_json()` emits
(`{"base_body": str, "slots": {...}, "skin_tone"?: {r,g,b,a}}`) rather than
exploded into columns.
**Why one JSON blob, not columns.** The server has no copy of the asset
catalog (`assets/avatars/catalog.json` ships with the client). It therefore
cannot meaningfully validate *which* asset belongs in *which* slot, whether
an asset exists, or slot-exclusivity rules — that validation stays on the
client (`AvatarLoadout.validate()` against the loaded `AvatarCatalog`). The
server enforces only the envelope: a JSON object with a non-empty string
`base_body`, an object `slots`, and a sane size cap. Keeping the schema
opaque to the server also means catalog/loadout-shape changes don't need a
migration.
**Endpoints** (`/api/avatar`, bearer auth):
| Method | Path | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| `GET` | `/loadout` | The user's saved loadout, or the server default (`{"base_body": "base_human_male_01", "slots": {}}`, `is_default: true`) if they have never saved one. |
| `PUT` | `/loadout` | Replace the user's loadout (full document, not a patch). |
**Defaults.** A brand-new account has no row; `GET` returns
`models.avatar_loadout.DEFAULT_LOADOUT` with `is_default: true` so the client
can distinguish "never customised" from "customised back to the base look".
---
## 10. Summary
| Concern | Decision |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Format | glTF 2.0 / GLB (GLB preferred for runtime) |
| Skeleton | Single canonical humanoid skeleton, name-based merge |
| Slots | Fixed slot registry; exclusive body parts + layered attachments |
| Loadout | Compact JSON; server-authoritative and validated |
| Replication | Full loadout on spawn/change + `loadout_hash` |
| Runtime | Godot `Skeleton3D` + name-based skin re-targeting |
| Validation | Build-time asset checker + runtime catalog validation |
-441
View File
@@ -1,441 +0,0 @@
# Content Moderation & Age Verification Architecture
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** Server authority + client prediction, avatar component system, backend auth (JWT)
## 1. Overview
This document specifies the **content moderation** and **age verification**
architecture for **agp-game**, a Godot-based multiplayer game built by
autonomous agents. It defines:
- How **content flags** propagate through the system across the three primary
content types: **assets**, **rooms**, and **scripts**.
- How flags are **evaluated, aggregated, and enforced** at load time, at
runtime, and at the network boundary.
- The **age verification flow**, combining a lightweight **self-declaration**
with an optional **ID check hook** for higher-assurance verification.
The goal is a **single, consistent moderation pipeline** that applies the same
rules to user-generated content (UGC) regardless of whether it is a 3D asset, a
room definition, or a script, and that gates access to mature content behind a
verifiable age gate.
### 1.1 Design Goals
- **Uniformity:** One flag vocabulary and one propagation mechanism across
assets, rooms, and scripts.
- **Composability:** Flags on a room aggregate the flags of the assets and
scripts it contains; flags on a world aggregate the flags of its rooms.
- **Enforcement at the boundary:** The server is authoritative for what content
a client may load or receive, mirroring the server-authoritative networking
model.
- **Privacy-preserving age checks:** Self-declaration requires no PII; the ID
check hook is optional, pluggable, and never stores raw identity documents.
- **Auditability:** Every flag decision is logged with a reason, an actor, and
a timestamp so moderation actions are reviewable.
---
## 2. Content Flag Vocabulary
All content carries a set of **content flags**. A flag is a typed, immutable
label with a **severity** and a **scope**. Flags are the atomic unit of
moderation; everything else (aggregation, enforcement, gating) operates on
flags.
### 2.1 Flag Definition
A flag is a structured record:
| Field | Type | Description |
|------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `id` | `string` | Stable machine-readable identifier, e.g. `violence.gore`. |
| `label` | `string` | Human-readable name, e.g. "Graphic Gore". |
| `category` | `enum` | One of `violence`, `sexual`, `language`, `substance`, `gambling`, `horror`, `hate`, `custom`. |
| `severity` | `enum` | One of `none`, `mild`, `moderate`, `severe`. |
| `scope` | `enum` | One of `visual`, `audio`, `text`, `behavior`, `interaction`. |
| `mature` | `bool` | Whether this flag triggers the age gate (see §5). |
| `reason` | `string` | Free-text justification supplied by the flagger. |
| `source` | `enum` | One of `author`, `moderator`, `automated`, `community`. |
### 2.2 Canonical Flag Set
The platform defines a **canonical registry** of flags so that different
content types and different flaggers use the same vocabulary. Examples:
| id | category | severity | scope | mature |
|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|--------------|--------|
| `violence.none` | violence | none | visual | false |
| `violence.mild` | violence | mild | visual | false |
| `violence.gore` | violence | severe | visual | true |
| `sexual.suggestive` | sexual | mild | visual | true |
| `sexual.explicit` | sexual | severe | visual | true |
| `language.mild` | language | mild | text | false |
| `language.profanity` | language | moderate | text | false |
| `substance.references` | substance | mild | text | false |
| `gambling.simulated` | gambling | moderate | behavior | true |
| `horror.jumpscare` | horror | mild | audio/visual | false |
| `hate.hateful` | hate | severe | text | true |
The registry is **data-driven** (a JSON/YAML manifest shipped with the server)
so new flags can be added without code changes.
---
## 3. Flag Propagation Model
Flags propagate through the system along the **content dependency graph**. The
three content types form a hierarchy:
```
World
└── Room
├── Asset (mesh, texture, audio, animation, material)
└── Script (behavior, dialogue, event logic)
```
### 3.1 Propagation Rules
1. **Explicit flags** are set directly on a content item by its author or a
moderator.
2. **Inherited flags** flow upward: a room's effective flag set is the **union**
of its own explicit flags and the flags of every asset and script it
references.
3. **Aggregation** uses the **maximum severity** per category across all
contributing items. A room containing one `violence.gore` asset and one
`violence.none` asset is `violence.severe`.
4. **Maturity is monotonic:** if any contributing item is `mature`, the
containing room and world are `mature`.
5. **Cycles are impossible** by construction: content references form a DAG
(an asset cannot contain a room; a room cannot contain itself).
### 3.2 Propagation Through the Pipeline
Flags are attached at **authoring time** and carried through every stage:
```
Authoring ──► Upload ──► Validation ──► Storage ──► Distribution ──► Runtime
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ flag │ flag │ automated │ flag │ flag │ flag
│ declared │ preserved │ scan adds │ indexed │ re-checked │ enforced
│ │ │ flags │ │ │
```
| Stage | Responsibility |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Authoring**| Author declares flags in the editor/upload UI. |
| **Upload** | Flags are validated against the canonical registry; unknown flags rejected. |
| **Validation**| Automated scanner (hash-based + heuristic) adds flags for detected content. |
| **Storage** | Flags are stored alongside the content record and indexed for queries. |
| **Distribution**| Flags are re-checked against the current registry before serving. |
| **Runtime** | The client enforces flags before loading content (see §4). |
### 3.3 Data Model
Flags are stored as a **normalized join table** so they can be queried and
aggregated efficiently:
```
content_item (id, type, owner_id, ...)
content_flag (content_id, flag_id, source, reason, created_at, actor_id)
flag_registry (id, category, severity, scope, mature, ...)
```
Aggregation is computed by a SQL view / query that joins a content item's
transitive dependencies. Because the graph is a DAG, this is a bounded
recursive query (PostgreSQL `WITH RECURSIVE`).
---
## 4. Enforcement
Enforcement happens at three layers, in order:
### 4.1 Load-Time Enforcement (Server)
Before a client is allowed to **request** content, the server evaluates the
content's effective flag set against the requesting account's **content
preferences** and **age verification status**:
- If the content is `mature` and the account is **not age-verified**, the
request is **rejected** with a `403 MATURE_CONTENT_REQUIRES_VERIFICATION`.
- If the content's flags exceed the account's **content filter** (a per-account
severity threshold per category), the request is rejected or the offending
content is **stripped** (e.g., audio muted, mesh hidden, script not loaded).
### 4.2 Runtime Enforcement (Client)
The client receives a **manifest** of allowed content from the server. It never
loads content that is not in the manifest. This prevents a malicious or buggy
client from bypassing the server's filter by loading content directly.
- Assets not in the manifest are **not instantiated**.
- Scripts not in the manifest are **not executed**.
- Rooms not in the manifest are **not entered**.
### 4.3 Network Boundary Enforcement
The server **filters replication** based on flags:
- Mature or filtered content is **not replicated** to clients that cannot
receive it.
- A room's flag set is broadcast in the room metadata so clients can show a
warning before entry.
### 4.4 Enforcement Decision Flow
```
Client requests content C for account A
│
▼
Compute effective flags F(C) [union + max-severity aggregation]
│
▼
Is A age-verified? ──no──► Is F(C).mature? ──yes──► REJECT (403)
│ yes │ no
▼ ▼
Does F(C) exceed A's filter? ──► yes ──► REJECT or STRIP
│ no
▼
Serve content + manifest
```
---
## 5. Age Verification Flow
Age verification is a **two-tier** system:
- **Tier 1 — Self-declaration:** The user asserts their date of birth. This is
fast, requires no PII beyond a birthdate, and is sufficient for most content.
- **Tier 2 — ID check (optional hook):** A pluggable identity-verification
provider confirms the user is an adult. This raises the account's assurance
level and unlocks the highest maturity tier.
### 5.1 Verification States
An account has an **age verification status**:
| Status | Meaning |
|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `unverified` | No declaration on file. |
| `self_declared` | User declared a birthdate; **not** independently confirmed. |
| `id_verified` | User passed the ID check hook; independently confirmed adult. |
| `rejected` | ID check failed or declaration was inconsistent. |
### 5.2 Tier 1 — Self-Declaration Flow
> **Implemented, PC3 Phase 3.** `POST /api/auth/register` now takes a real
> `date_of_birth` (ISO `YYYY-MM-DD`), not the throwaway `over_18` boolean it
> had before. The server computes age (`auth.calculate_age`) and rejects
> anyone under `auth.MIN_AGE` (18) with a **403** — this platform is
> adults-only, so there is no "minor, restricted" tier here (the 13+ rows
> below are the general design, not the current gate). A future-in-the-past
> or nonsensical date is a **400**. The DOB is stored on the user row and
> surfaced only back to that user (`/api/auth/me`), never to other players.
>
> **Limitation, stated plainly:** this is still self-attested — a determined
> user can enter a false DOB. It is a concrete, stored, legally-meaningful
> data point (matching how most platforms gate before adding hard checks)
> and the seam for Tier 2. Encryption-at-rest for the DOB column and the
> Tier 2 ID-check hook below are **not yet implemented**.
```
User submits { date_of_birth }
│
▼
Server validates format & plausibility (real date, not in future)
│
▼
Compute age from DOB
│
▼
age >= 18 ──► status = self_declared (adult) ← the current gate
age >= 13 ──► status = self_declared (minor, restricted) ← design only
age < 13 ──► status = rejected (below minimum platform age)
```
- The DOB is stored **encrypted at rest** and is **never exposed** to other
players.
- A user may **upgrade** from `self_declared` to `id_verified` at any time via
Tier 2.
### 5.3 Tier 2 — ID Check Hook
The ID check is an **optional, pluggable hook**. The platform defines an
interface; concrete providers (e.g., a third-party KYC service) implement it.
```
User requests ID verification
│
▼
Server creates a verification session (idempotent, expiring)
│
▼
Server calls provider hook: verify(identity_token) -> { adult: bool, ref: string }
│
▼
adult == true ──► status = id_verified, store provider ref (not raw doc)
adult == false ─► status = rejected
provider error ──► status unchanged, retry allowed
```
**Privacy guarantees:**
- The platform **never stores** the raw identity document or image.
- Only the provider's **opaque reference** and the boolean `adult` result are
persisted.
- The hook is **asynchronous and idempotent**; a session can be retried without
double-charging or double-verifying.
### 5.4 Hook Interface
The ID check hook is defined as a backend interface (FastAPI dependency /
abstract service):
```python
class IdentityVerificationProvider(Protocol):
def create_session(self, user_id: str) -> VerificationSession: ...
def verify(self, session_id: str, identity_token: str) -> VerificationResult: ...
class VerificationResult:
adult: bool
provider_ref: str | None
error: str | None
```
A default **no-op provider** returns `adult=False` with a clear error, so the
system runs without any third-party integration until one is configured.
### 5.5 Age Gate Enforcement
The age gate is enforced at **load time** (see §4.1):
| Verification status | Can access `mature` content? |
|---------------------|------------------------------|
| `unverified` | No |
| `self_declared` | Yes (adult) / No (minor) |
| `id_verified` | Yes |
| `rejected` | No |
---
## 6. Moderation Workflow
### 6.1 Flagging Sources
Content can be flagged by:
- **Author** (self-declared at upload).
- **Automated scanner** (hash-based detection, heuristic analysis).
- **Community** (players report content; reports become flags after review).
- **Moderator** (manual review and override).
### 6.2 Review Queue
Community and automated flags enter a **review queue**. A moderator either:
- **Approves** the flag (it becomes authoritative), or
- **Rejects** the flag (it is discarded), or
- **Escalates** to a senior moderator for severe/hate flags.
### 6.3 Actions
Once a flag is authoritative, a moderator can take actions:
| Action | Effect |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| `warn` | Notify the author; content remains. |
| `restrict` | Content hidden from users below a filter threshold. |
| `age_gate` | Content marked `mature`; requires age verification. |
| `remove` | Content taken down; not served. |
| `ban_author` | Author's upload privileges suspended. |
### 6.4 Audit Log
Every flag and action is written to an **audit log**:
```
audit_event (id, content_id, actor_id, action, flag_id, reason, created_at)
```
This log is append-only and used for transparency and dispute resolution.
---
## 7. Client-Side Integration (Godot)
### 7.1 Content Manifest
The server sends each client a **content manifest** — the set of content the
client is permitted to load, derived from the account's verification status and
filter. The Godot client:
- Loads only manifest-listed assets.
- Executes only manifest-listed scripts.
- Shows a **maturity warning** dialog before entering a room whose effective
flags include `mature` content.
### 7.2 Flag Metadata on Content
Each content resource carries a `content_flags` metadata field (a Godot
`Dictionary` or custom `Resource`). The client uses this for local UI decisions
(e.g., showing a warning icon) but **never** as the authority for whether to
load — the server manifest is authoritative.
### 7.3 Age Verification UI
The client exposes an **age verification screen**:
- Tier 1: a date-of-birth picker.
- Tier 2: a button that opens the ID check provider flow (deep link / webview).
The client calls the backend endpoints (§8) and reflects the resulting status.
---
## 8. Backend API Surface
| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| `POST` | `/v1/age/declare` | Submit self-declared DOB (Tier 1). |
| `POST` | `/v1/age/verify/session` | Create an ID-check session (Tier 2). |
| `POST` | `/v1/age/verify/confirm` | Confirm an ID-check session with a token. |
| `GET` | `/v1/age/status` | Return the account's verification status. |
| `GET` | `/v1/content/{id}/flags` | Return a content item's effective flags. |
| `POST` | `/v1/content/{id}/flags` | Add a flag (author/community). |
| `POST` | `/v1/moderation/review/{flag_id}` | Moderator approve/reject/escalate. |
| `POST` | `/v1/moderation/action` | Apply a moderation action. |
| `GET` | `/v1/manifest` | Return the client's permitted content manifest.|
All endpoints require a valid **JWT** (matching the existing auth stack). The
age endpoints additionally require the account to be in a non-`rejected` state.
---
## 9. Security & Privacy Considerations
- **DOB encryption:** Self-declared birthdates are encrypted at rest; only the
derived age and verification status are used in authorization decisions.
- **No raw identity storage:** The ID check hook persists only a provider
reference and a boolean result.
- **Server authority:** The client manifest prevents bypass; the client never
trusts its own flag metadata for access decisions.
- **Rate limiting:** Age-declaration and ID-check endpoints are rate-limited to
prevent abuse and enumeration.
- **Auditability:** All flag and verification events are logged append-only.
---
## 10. Open Questions / Future Work
- **Regional age thresholds:** Different jurisdictions may require different
minimum ages; the threshold should be configurable per region.
- **Parental controls:** A future feature may let a parent set a content filter
on a minor's account.
- **Automated scanner accuracy:** The heuristic scanner may produce false
positives; a confidence score should be attached to automated flags.
- **Offline / local content:** How flags apply to locally-authored content that
is never uploaded remains to be defined.
-369
View File
@@ -1,369 +0,0 @@
# Editor Architecture: Godot Editor Plugin vs. In-Game Editor
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** World chunk data format & persistence, server authority + client
> prediction, content moderation & age verification, avatar component system
> **Godot version:** 4.6.2 stable
## 1. Overview
This document evaluates the two primary ways to build the **world/level
authoring tool** for **agp-game**:
- **(a) Godot editor plugin** — extend the Godot editor itself with custom
panels, dock widgets, and tools that operate on the project's scenes and
resources.
- **(b) In-game editor** — a fully custom editor built as game UI (Godot
`Control` nodes) that runs inside the running game, editing the game's own
world data.
The goal is to pick the approach that best fits the platform's constraints:
a **server-authoritative** multiplayer game where the **world is stored as
versioned chunks** (see `world.md`), content is **moderation-flagged** (see
`content_moderation.md`), and the client is a **shipped binary** that players
run (not a dev tool).
This document is a **decision record**: it lays out the trade-offs, gives a
clear recommendation, and defines the resulting architecture boundaries.
---
## 2. Context & Constraints
Before comparing the two approaches, we must fix the constraints that drive the
decision. These come from the existing architecture docs.
### 2.1 The World Is Data, Not Scenes
`world.md` defines the world as **chunk data** (JSON for authoring, binary for
runtime/network), persisted in SQLite on the server. A chunk is the atomic unit
of load, save, and stream. The **server is the only writer** to the store;
clients submit **deltas** against a `base_revision` and the server validates and
applies them.
**Implication:** The editor's output is **chunk payloads**, not `.tscn` scene
files. Whatever editor we build must serialize to the chunk contract, not to
Godot scene resources.
### 2.2 Server-Authoritative & Moderation-Aware
- The server validates every edit (schema, bounds, moderation) before
persisting (`world.md` §5.4).
- Content carries **content flags** aggregated from referenced assets/scripts
(`content_moderation.md` §3). Mature content is gated behind age verification.
- The client receives a **content manifest** and never loads content not in it.
**Implication:** An editor that runs on a **player's machine** cannot be the
authority on what gets published. Editing must go through the server's
validation pipeline, and the editor must surface moderation flags.
### 2.3 The Client Is a Shipped Binary
The game is a multiplayer product. Players run a **release build**. The Godot
editor is a **development tool** that players do not have.
**Implication:** If authoring is a first-class *player* feature (user-generated
content), the editor must ship inside the game binary. If authoring is a
*developer/platform* feature, it can live in the editor.
### 2.4 Two Distinct Audiences
The evaluation must separate two audiences, because they have opposite needs:
| Audience | Who | Where they run | What they build |
|----------|-----|----------------|-----------------|
| **Platform/dev** | The team building the game | Godot editor (dev machines) | Base worlds, rooms, templates, test levels |
| **Players (UGC)** | End users | The shipped game | Their own rooms/worlds, published to the server |
The two approaches map cleanly onto these audiences, and the right answer is
likely **both** — but with a clear primary recommendation.
---
## 3. Approach (a): Godot Editor Plugin
### 3.1 What It Is
A Godot editor plugin is a set of scripts (and optionally scenes) that extend
the editor via the `EditorPlugin` API. It can add:
- **Dock panels** (`add_control_to_dock`) — e.g., a chunk/tile palette panel.
- **Toolbar buttons** (`add_control_to_container`).
- **Inspector plugins** (`EditorInspectorPlugin`) — custom property editors.
- **Import plugins** (`EditorImportPlugin`) — custom asset importers.
- **Scene/Node plugins** (`EditorNode3DGizmoPlugin`) — custom gizmos.
- **Menu entries** (`add_tool_menu_item`).
Plugins are enabled per-project via `project.godot` (`[editor_plugins]`).
### 3.2 Pros
- **Full editor power for free:** You get the scene tree, inspector, viewport
navigation, undo/redo, gizmos, and asset pipeline — all battle-tested.
- **Native Godot editing:** Editing `.tscn` scenes, materials, and nodes is
exactly what the editor is built for. Great for authoring **base content**
(rooms, templates, avatar base bodies).
- **Fast iteration for devs:** The platform team can build and test levels
directly in the tool they already use.
- **Undo/redo, selection, snapping** come from the editor's `EditorUndoRedoManager`.
- **No runtime footprint:** Editor-only code is stripped from export builds
(`@tool` scripts and editor plugins are not shipped to players).
### 3.3 Cons
- **Not available to players.** Players don't run the Godot editor. Any
player-facing UGC authoring cannot use this approach.
- **Tied to the editor's UX.** You inherit the editor's look and interaction
model; deep customization is limited by what the editor API exposes.
- **Editor API churn.** `EditorPlugin` APIs change between Godot versions;
plugins are more brittle across upgrades than game code.
- **Scene-centric, not data-centric.** The editor is optimized for scenes and
resources. Our world is **chunk data** (`world.md`). We'd have to build a
translation layer (scene ↔ chunk) and keep it in sync — a real source of
drift.
- **Single-user, local.** The editor edits local files. It does not natively
talk to our server-authoritative chunk store or the moderation pipeline.
- **Headless/CI friction.** Validating plugin behavior in CI requires running
the editor headless, which is heavier than testing game code.
### 3.4 Fit for Our Constraints
- **Platform/dev authoring:** Excellent. This is the natural home for building
base worlds, rooms, and templates.
- **Player UGC:** Not applicable. Players cannot run the editor.
- **Server-authoritative chunk store:** Poor fit natively. The editor edits
local scenes; we'd bolt on a chunk export/import and a server sync layer.
---
## 4. Approach (b): In-Game Editor
### 4.1 What It Is
A fully custom editor built as **game UI** — Godot `Control` nodes (panels,
buttons, toolbars) that run inside the running game. It edits the game's own
world data model (chunks) and submits edits through the normal server pipeline.
### 4.2 Pros
- **Ships to players.** The editor is part of the game binary, so **player UGC
authoring is possible** — the core requirement for a user-generated-content
platform.
- **Data-native.** The editor operates directly on the **chunk model**
(`world.md`), so there is no scene↔chunk translation layer and no drift.
- **Server-authoritative by construction.** Edits go through the same
`request_chunk_edit` RPCs as gameplay, so validation, revisioning, and
moderation apply uniformly. The editor cannot bypass the server.
- **Moderation-aware.** Because edits flow through the server, content flags are
computed and enforced at the boundary (`content_moderation.md` §4). The editor
can surface flags and gate mature content.
- **One codebase, one UX.** The editor uses the same UI toolkit and art style as
the game; no separate editor theme to maintain.
- **Testable in CI.** The editor is ordinary game code; it can be exercised
headlessly and unit-tested like any other system.
### 4.3 Cons
- **We build everything.** No free scene tree, inspector, gizmos, or undo/redo.
We must implement selection, snapping, undo/redo, viewport navigation, and
property editing ourselves.
- **Runtime footprint.** Editor UI ships in the binary (though it can be gated
behind a feature flag / separate scene that is only instantiated on demand).
- **More upfront work.** A usable in-game editor is a large feature; it needs
its own architecture (tool modes, gizmos, palette, inspector).
- **Not ideal for deep asset authoring.** Modeling a mesh or authoring a
material is better done in the Godot editor / DCC tools. The in-game editor
should focus on **world composition** (placing tiles and objects), not asset
creation.
### 4.4 Fit for Our Constraints
- **Platform/dev authoring:** Workable but not ideal for deep asset work.
- **Player UGC:** The **only** viable approach. Players can only author through
the shipped game.
- **Server-authoritative chunk store:** Excellent fit. The editor is a client
that submits validated deltas.
---
## 5. Comparison Matrix
| Criterion | (a) Editor plugin | (b) In-game editor |
|-----------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Ships to players | ❌ No | ✅ Yes |
| Player UGC authoring | ❌ Impossible | ✅ Core capability |
| World data model fit | ⚠️ Scene-centric; needs translation layer | ✅ Chunk-native |
| Server-authoritative edits | ⚠️ Bolted on | ✅ Native (same RPCs) |
| Moderation enforcement | ⚠️ Manual | ✅ At the boundary |
| Free editor features (undo, gizmos, inspector) | ✅ Rich | ❌ Build ourselves |
| Runtime footprint | ✅ None (stripped from export) | ⚠️ Ships in binary (gated) |
| Dev iteration speed | ✅ Fast | ⚠️ Slower to build |
| Deep asset authoring (mesh/material) | ✅ Native | ❌ Out of scope |
| CI testability | ⚠️ Heavier (headless editor) | ✅ Ordinary game code |
| Editor API churn risk | ⚠️ Higher | ✅ None (game code) |
---
## 6. Recommendation
**Primary recommendation: build the in-game editor (b) as the platform's
authoring surface, and use a lightweight Godot editor plugin (a) only as an
internal dev convenience.**
### 6.1 Rationale
1. **Player UGC is the deciding factor.** The platform's value proposition is
user-generated content (rooms, worlds, avatars). Players cannot run the Godot
editor, so **only an in-game editor can deliver player authoring**. This is a
hard requirement that the editor-plugin approach cannot meet.
2. **The world is data, and the in-game editor is data-native.** `world.md`
defines chunks as the atomic unit. An in-game editor edits chunks directly
and submits them through the server pipeline. An editor plugin would force a
scene↔chunk translation layer that is a constant source of drift and bugs.
3. **Server authority and moderation fall out naturally.** Because in-game
edits use the same `request_chunk_edit` RPCs as gameplay, validation,
revisioning, optimistic concurrency, and content-flag enforcement
(`content_moderation.md`) apply uniformly. The editor cannot bypass the
server — which is exactly what a moderation-aware UGC platform needs.
4. **The editor-plugin's strengths are not what we need.** Its free features
(scene tree, inspector, gizmos) are for editing Godot scenes and resources.
Our authoring is world composition against a chunk contract, not scene
editing. The plugin's main win — deep asset authoring — is better served by
DCC tools and the Godot editor for the *platform team*, not by a plugin we
must maintain.
### 6.2 The Role of the Editor Plugin (Dev Convenience Only)
We still recommend a **small, optional** editor plugin for the **platform team**
to author **base content** (base rooms, templates, avatar base bodies, test
levels) directly in the Godot editor. This is a dev-time convenience, not a
product feature:
- It can export a scene/resource as a **chunk** (reusing the same encoder as the
in-game editor) so dev-authored content flows into the same pipeline.
- It is **not shipped** to players and is **not** the authoring surface for UGC.
- It should be kept thin to minimize editor-API churn risk.
### 6.3 Scope Boundary
To keep the in-game editor tractable, define its scope clearly:
- **In scope (world composition):** placing tiles, placing static/dynamic
objects, setting transforms, editing object properties, saving/loading chunks,
submitting edits to the server, showing moderation flags.
- **Out of scope (asset creation):** modeling meshes, authoring materials,
rigging avatars. These are done in DCC tools / the Godot editor and imported
as catalog assets (see `avatar.md` §7). The in-game editor **references**
catalog assets by id; it does not create them.
---
## 7. Resulting Architecture
### 7.1 Shared Editor Core
Both the in-game editor and the (optional) dev plugin should share a single
**editor core** that operates on the chunk model. This avoids two divergent
implementations.
```
EditorCore (shared, data-native)
├── ChunkEditorModel # in-memory chunk being edited (tiles, objects, flags)
├── ChunkEncoder # JSON/binary encode/decode (world.md §3)
├── EditSession # base_revision tracking, delta generation
├── EditSubmitter # request_chunk_edit RPC wrapper + conflict handling
├── UndoRedoStack # command pattern over chunk mutations
├── SelectionManager # selected tiles/objects
├── ToolRegistry # brush, object-place, select, erase, etc.
└── ModerationView # surfaces content flags; gates mature content
```
### 7.2 In-Game Editor (Primary)
```
InGameEditor (Control-based UI, shipped in binary, gated by feature flag)
├── EditorViewport # custom 2D/3D viewport with camera navigation
├── Toolbar # tool mode switcher
├── PalettePanel # tile/object palette (from catalog)
├── InspectorPanel # property editor for selected object
├── ChunkBrowser # load/save chunks, list rooms
└── EditorCore # shared core (above)
```
- Instantiated only when the player enters "build mode" (a separate scene /
feature flag), so the runtime footprint is negligible during normal play.
- Submits edits via `request_chunk_edit`; handles `chunk_edit_result` conflicts
by re-fetching and re-applying (`world.md` §5.4).
### 7.3 Dev Editor Plugin (Optional, Thin)
```
DevChunkPlugin (EditorPlugin, dev-only, not shipped)
├── Dock panel: "Chunk Export"
├── Reads the current scene / selected nodes
├── Maps scene content → chunk model (via EditorCore.ChunkEncoder)
└── Exports a .chunk.json / submits to a dev server
```
Kept thin to minimize editor-API churn. Its only job is to let the platform team
author base content in the editor and push it into the same chunk pipeline.
### 7.4 Data Flow
```
[In-game editor] --request_chunk_edit(delta, base_revision)--> [Server]
^ | validate
| | apply
+--chunk_edit_result(ok/new_revision | conflict)-----------| persist
v
SQLite (world.db)
[Dev plugin] --export chunk JSON--> [EditorCore.ChunkEncoder] --> [Server]
```
Both paths converge on the **same server validation pipeline**, so moderation
and revisioning are uniform regardless of authoring surface.
---
## 8. Risks & Mitigations
| Risk | Mitigation |
|------|------------|
| In-game editor is a large build | Scope it to world composition (§6.3); reuse EditorCore; ship behind a feature flag |
| Custom viewport/gizmos are hard | Start with a 2D tile editor (matches `CHUNK_SIZE_Z=1` default); add 3D later |
| Undo/redo complexity | Use a command pattern over chunk mutations; test headlessly |
| Editor-plugin API churn | Keep the plugin thin; treat it as dev-only convenience, not a product surface |
| Drift between dev plugin and in-game editor | Both use the same `EditorCore`/`ChunkEncoder` |
| Players bypass moderation | Impossible by construction: edits go through server validation |
---
## 9. Open Questions / Future Work
- **3D editing:** The default world is flat (`CHUNK_SIZE_Z=1`). A 3D in-game
editor (volumetric chunks) is future work (`world.md` §8).
- **Collaborative editing:** Multiple players editing the same chunk concurrently
— the optimistic-concurrency model already supports it, but the UX (live
cursors, conflict resolution) is unspecified.
- **Template library:** A curated set of room templates players can start from.
- **Publish/review flow:** How a player's authored room enters the moderation
review queue (`content_moderation.md` §6) and becomes publicly joinable.
---
## 10. Summary
| Concern | Decision |
|---------|----------|
| Primary authoring surface | **In-game editor** (ships to players, enables UGC) |
| Dev authoring convenience | Thin, optional **editor plugin** (not shipped) |
| World data model | Both operate on the **chunk model** via a shared `EditorCore` |
| Server authority | Edits go through `request_chunk_edit`; server validates |
| Moderation | Enforced at the server boundary for both paths |
| In-game editor scope | World composition only; asset creation is out of scope |
| Runtime footprint | Editor gated behind a feature flag / separate scene |
-342
View File
@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
# Multiplayer Networking Architecture
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** Server authority + client prediction
## 1. Overview
This document specifies the multiplayer networking architecture for **agp-game**,
a Godot-based game built by autonomous agents. The architecture follows a
**server-authoritative model with client-side prediction and reconciliation**,
which is the industry standard for fast-paced, competitive multiplayer games.
The goals of this architecture are:
- **Fairness & anti-cheat:** The server is the single source of truth for all
gameplay state. Clients never directly mutate world state.
- **Responsiveness:** Client-side prediction hides network latency so local input
feels immediate.
- **Determinism:** The server runs a fixed-timestep simulation so that state is
reproducible and testable.
- **Scalability:** A clear separation between transport, simulation, and
replication layers allows the server to be tuned independently.
---
## 2. Transport Choice: ENet over WebSocket
### 2.1 Decision
We choose **ENet** as the primary transport for gameplay traffic.
### 2.2 Justification
| Criterion | ENet | WebSocket (TCP) |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| **Reliability model**| Reliable + unreliable channels | Reliable only (TCP) |
| **Latency** | Low; unreliable packets skip retransmit| Head-of-line blocking on loss |
| **Packet ordering** | Per-channel ordering | Global strict ordering |
| **Congestion control**| Lightweight, game-oriented | TCP-style (slow start, backoff) |
| **Godot support** | First-class (`ENetConnection`, `MultiplayerPeerENet`) | Supported but TCP-based |
| **Use case fit** | Real-time action game | Chat, lobby, HTTP-style messaging |
**Rationale:**
- **Movement & state replication** are latency-sensitive and tolerate occasional
packet loss. ENet's *unreliable* channel lets us send position snapshots at high
frequency without head-of-line blocking.
- **RPCs that must be delivered** (e.g., interactions, spawns) use ENet's
*reliable* channel, giving us exactly the semantics we need without TCP's
retransmission stalls.
- Godot's `MultiplayerPeerENet` is mature and integrates directly with the
high-level multiplayer API (`MultiplayerAPI`, `rpc()`).
### 2.3 WebSocket as a Secondary Transport
WebSocket remains available as a **secondary transport** for:
- **Lobby / matchmaking** messaging (low-frequency, must-be-reliable).
- **Browser builds** where raw UDP/ENet is unavailable.
- **Admin / telemetry** channels.
The transport layer is abstracted behind an interface so gameplay code does not
depend on the underlying protocol.
---
## 3. Server-Side Game Loop
### 3.1 Tick Rate
- **Simulation tick rate:** **30 Hz** (33.33 ms per tick).
- **Replication / snapshot rate:** **30 Hz**, aligned with the simulation tick.
**Justification:**
- 30 Hz is sufficient for smooth movement and interaction in a top-down / 2D
action game while keeping CPU and bandwidth costs predictable.
- A fixed timestep (rather than delta-time) makes the simulation deterministic
and testable.
- The tick rate is a **configuration constant** so it can be raised (e.g., to
60 Hz) for competitive modes without architectural changes.
### 3.2 Authority Model
- **Server is authoritative** for:
- Player position, velocity, and physics state.
- Health, damage, and death.
- Item pickups, inventory, and world-object state.
- Spawning and despawning of entities.
- Game rules, scoring, and win/lose conditions.
- **Client is authoritative** for:
- Its own *input* (which keys/buttons are pressed).
- Local camera and UI.
- Cosmetic / non-gameplay presentation.
### 3.3 Server Loop Pseudocode
```
while server_running:
process_network_inbound() # read client inputs & RPCs
for _ in range(ticks_to_advance):
simulate_tick() # fixed 30 Hz step
broadcast_snapshots() # replicate authoritative state
process_network_outbound() # flush reliable/unreliable channels
```
The server accumulates real elapsed time and advances the simulation in fixed
`TICK_DURATION` increments, decoupling simulation from frame rate.
---
## 4. RPC Call Patterns
RPCs are grouped by direction and reliability. All gameplay RPCs are routed
through the high-level `MultiplayerAPI` with explicit `rpc_id` targeting.
### 4.1 Client → Server (Input & Requests)
| RPC | Channel | Payload | Notes |
|------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------------|-------|
| `request_move_input` | unreliable| `{ seq, input_state, timestamp }` | Batched per tick; drives prediction |
| `request_interact` | reliable | `{ target_id }` | Open door, pick up item, use object |
| `request_attack` | reliable | `{ target_id, aim_dir }` | Combat action |
| `request_join` | reliable | `{ player_name, profile }` | Session setup |
| `request_respawn` | reliable | `{}` | After death |
**Design notes:**
- **Input is batched** per client tick and sent with a monotonically increasing
`seq` so the server can detect gaps and the client can reconcile.
- **Interactions are reliable** because they are discrete, must-happen events
(opening a door, picking up an item). Losing them would corrupt world state.
### 4.2 Server → Client (State & Events)
| RPC | Channel | Payload | Notes |
|------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------------|-------|
| `snapshot_state` | unreliable| `{ tick, entities[], player_states[] }` | Periodic authoritative state |
| `spawn_entity` | reliable | `{ entity_id, type, transform, props }` | New entity enters world |
| `despawn_entity` | reliable | `{ entity_id, reason }` | Entity removed |
| `interact_result` | reliable | `{ request_seq, success, result }` | Acknowledges interaction |
| `damage_event` | reliable | `{ target_id, amount, source_id }` | Combat feedback |
| `game_event` | reliable | `{ type, payload }` | Score, win, round start/end |
### 4.3 Broadcast vs. Targeted
- **Broadcast (all clients):** `snapshot_state`, `spawn_entity`,
`despawn_entity`, `game_event`.
- **Targeted (single client):** `interact_result`, `damage_event` (to affected
players), and any player-private data.
---
## 5. Client-Side Prediction & Reconciliation
### 5.1 Prediction
- The client runs a **local copy of the movement simulation** using the same
physics constants as the server.
- When the player provides input, the client:
1. Applies the input to its local player immediately.
2. Renders the predicted position.
3. Sends the input to the server (batched, with `seq`).
### 5.2 Reconciliation
- The server sends authoritative `snapshot_state` at 30 Hz containing the
server's tick number and authoritative player positions.
- The client keeps a **ring buffer of predicted states** keyed by input `seq`.
- On receiving a snapshot:
1. Find the last predicted state that matches the server's tick.
2. Compute the **error** between predicted and authoritative position.
3. If error exceeds a threshold, **snap or smoothly interpolate** the local
player to the authoritative position (error correction).
4. Re-simulate any inputs that occurred after the server's tick (rollback).
### 5.3 Interpolation of Remote Entities
- **Local player:** predicted + reconciled (see above).
- **Remote players / entities:** rendered with **interpolation delay** of
`2 × TICK_DURATION` (≈ 66 ms) to smooth out snapshot jitter.
- The client buffers the last N snapshots and interpolates between them.
### 5.4 Prediction Buffer Sizing
- Buffer size is adaptive based on measured RTT.
- Default: hold up to `ceil(RTT / TICK_DURATION) + 2` predicted states.
---
## 6. Entity & World State Replication
### 6.1 Entity Model
Every networked entity has:
- A globally unique `entity_id` (server-assigned).
- An `EntityType` (player, enemy, item, projectile, door, ...).
- A `Transform` (position, rotation).
- A typed `props` dictionary of gameplay state (health, state machine, etc.).
### 6.2 Snapshot Format
```
snapshot_state:
tick: uint32
entities:
- entity_id: uint32
type: uint8
transform: { x, y, rot }
props: { ... } # delta-encoded where possible
player_states:
- peer_id: int
entity_id: uint32
health: int
state: uint8
```
### 6.3 Delta Compression
- Only **changed** entity fields are sent per snapshot (dirty-flag per entity).
- Static or unchanged entities are omitted from the snapshot.
- This keeps bandwidth proportional to *activity*, not world size.
---
## 7. Connection & Session Lifecycle
1. **Connect:** Client opens an ENet connection to the server.
2. **Authenticate / Join:** Client sends `request_join`; server validates and
assigns a `peer_id` and spawns the player entity.
3. **Spawn:** Server broadcasts `spawn_entity` for the new player to all clients.
4. **Play:** Input → prediction → server simulation → snapshot → reconciliation.
5. **Disconnect:** Server removes the player entity, broadcasts `despawn_entity`,
and cleans up session state.
---
## 7a. Server Orchestration (implemented, PC3 Phase 2)
**One dedicated server process per world**, spawned on demand.
```
client backend (single worker) host
│ POST /api/worlds/{id}/join (bearer JWT) │
│ ───────────────────────────▶ GameServerSupervisor │
│ ensure_server(world_id): │
│ if none running for world ─── spawn:
│ godot --headless
│ res://scenes/server.tscn --
│ --port <p> --world <id>
│ --status-file <path>
│ ◀─────────────────────────── { host, port, world_id } │
│ │
│ ENet connect host:port ───────────────────────────────────▶ dedicated server
```
- **Supervisor** (`backend/app/services/game_servers.py`): in-process singleton,
so the backend MUST run single-worker. Keys servers by `world_id`. Allocates
ports from `GAME_SERVER_PORT_MIN..MAX`. A background reaper kills a world's
server once its **status file** (`{players, tick, updated}`, rewritten by the
server ~1×/s) reports `players == 0` for `GAME_SERVER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`.
No crash-restart — the next join respawns.
- **Enable flag:** `GAME_SERVERS_ENABLED` (default off). The checkpoint/playtest
launcher (`pm/checkpoint_ops.py`) turns it on, passes `GODOT_BIN`,
`GAME_PROJECT_DIR`, and `GAME_SERVER_HOST` (the LAN IP baked into the `.exe`).
A backend with it off returns **503** from `/join`, and the client falls back
to local single-player.
- **Per-world content:** all worlds currently load the same test level (M2/M7
work). `world_id` still scopes a distinct process + session.
### 7b. Client play path
`world_list.gd` → `POST /join` → `Session.begin(world_id, host, port)` →
load `game.tscn`. `game.gd` sees `Session.active` and connects a
`NetworkClient`:
- **Local player** keeps predicting with its own collision-aware
`CharacterBody3D` (`player.gd`) — that *is* the prediction. Its input frame
(`player.net_input`) is forwarded to the server every physics tick.
- **Correction backstop:** if the local position drifts from the server's by
more than `CORRECTION_THRESHOLD` (1.5 m — generous; catches teleport / a wall
walked through / real desync, not prediction noise) it snaps.
- **Remote players:** rendered from snapshots, position lerped. *Appearance sync
is a follow-up* — remotes currently show as labelled capsules; the server
does not yet replicate avatar loadouts.
- **Disconnect** → status message → back to the world list.
The `NetworkClient`'s own flat-plane prediction + input-replay reconciliation
(§5) is exercised by `smoke_test_network_client.gd`; the collision-aware game
path above uses the lighter `send_input()` + drift-snap instead.
---
## 8. Security & Anti-Cheat
- **No client-authoritative gameplay values.** Clients only send *inputs* and
*requests*; the server computes all outcomes.
- **Input validation:** Server clamps movement speed, rejects out-of-bounds
positions, and validates interaction targets.
- **Rate limiting:** Per-peer input and RPC rate limits prevent flooding.
- **Sequence validation:** Gaps or replays in input `seq` are detected and
rejected.
---
## 9. Testing & Determinism
- The simulation is a **pure function of (state, inputs, tick)** so it can be
unit-tested headlessly.
- A **replay system** records inputs and can re-simulate to verify server and
client produce identical results.
- Network code is tested with a **mock transport** that can inject latency,
jitter, and packet loss.
---
## 10. Open Questions / Future Work
- **Interest management / spatial partitioning:** For large worlds, restrict
snapshots to entities near each client (AOI culling).
- **Server-side physics:** Decide whether to use Godot's physics server on the
host or a custom deterministic physics step.
- **Dedicated server vs. listen server:** The architecture supports both; a
dedicated headless server is the target for production.
- **WebSocket fallback:** Implement the transport abstraction for browser builds.
---
## 11. Summary
| Concern | Decision |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Transport | ENet (primary), WebSocket (secondary) |
| Tick rate | 30 Hz fixed timestep |
| Authority | Server-authoritative; client sends input only |
| Prediction | Client-side prediction + reconciliation |
| Remote interpolation | 2-tick interpolation delay |
| Replication | Delta-compressed snapshots at 30 Hz |
| Interaction RPCs | Reliable channel |
| Movement input | Unreliable channel, batched with sequence |
-194
View File
@@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
# PC2 Test Level & Player Spawn — Design Note
> **Status:** Decided (PC2)
> **Owner:** Architecture
> **Consumers:** the two PC2 implementation tasks — (1) build the test level,
> (2) build the player & spawn it. Both must be able to follow this note
> without further design decisions.
## 1. Decision: static scene, not chunk streaming
**The PC2 playable test level is a single, hand-authored, static Godot 3D
scene.** It is **not** built through the chunk streaming system
(`scripts/chunk_stream_manager.gd`, `chunk_scene.gd`, `chunk.gd`,
`chunk_data_decoder.gd`).
This is a deliberate decision, not a default:
- **The streaming system has never been exercised with real content.** It is a
faithful port of the `docs/architecture/world.md` format spec, but nothing in
the project produces or serves chunk payloads for it to consume. `scenes/main.tscn`
wires `chunk_stream_manager.gd` onto a bare `Node3D` with no `player` reference
and no `_server_rpc`, so at runtime it does nothing. There is no server-side
chunk authoring/streaming endpoint to integrate against.
- **PC2 scope is single-player, local-only, no networking.** The value of chunk
streaming is server-authoritative streaming around a moving player across a
network boundary. None of those preconditions exist in PC2, so exercising the
pipeline here would mean building a chunk *authoring + serving* path first —
clearly out of checkpoint scope.
- **A static scene is the lowest-risk way to get "spawn a player in a real 3D
level and walk around" working**, which is the actual PC2 outcome being tested.
Chunk streaming is **not removed and not broken by this decision** — it stays as
an optional, later milestone. The static level is the PC2 proof of the *player*
and *camera/physics* half of the problem; chunk streaming remains the later proof
of the *world data* half.
## 2. Where things live
| Artifact | Path | Owned by |
|---|---|---|
| Test level scene | `scenes/worlds/test_level.tscn` | level task |
| Player scene | `scenes/player.tscn` | player task |
| Player controller script | `scripts/player.gd` | player task |
| Game composition scene | `scenes/game.tscn` | player task |
- **`scenes/worlds/`** is the convention for all level scenes (it does not exist
yet; the level task creates it). Future levels follow `scenes/worlds/<name>.tscn`.
- `scenes/player.tscn` is **reusable** across levels — it must not hard-code any
reference to `test_level`; it discovers the spawn point at runtime (see §3).
## 3. Player spawn convention
The level scene **must** contain a `Marker3D` named exactly **`PlayerSpawn`**.
That node's world transform is the spawn point.
- `Marker3D` is a plain `Node3D` that shows a cross gizmo in the editor and
carries no gameplay behavior — it is the established Godot idiom for "position
hint." (Confirmed present in Godot 4.6.2.)
- The marker's **position** is authoritative; its rotation is ignored by the
player (spawn yaw is the player's concern, default forward is fine).
- Coordinate system: **Y-up, units = meters, 1 unit = 1 m.** The marker must sit
at least **1.0 m above the ground's top surface** (recommended `y = 1.0` where
the ground top is `y = 0`) so the player capsule does not spawn intersecting
the floor and get popped out by the physics solver.
- There is exactly **one** `PlayerSpawn` per level. (If a level ever needs
multiple spawns, that is a later convention — not PC2.)
**Lookup rule (implemented by `player.gd`, not by the level):**
```
# in player.gd _ready()
var spawn := get_tree().current_scene.find_child("PlayerSpawn", true, false)
if spawn is Node3D:
global_position = spawn.global_position
else:
push_warning("player.gd: no PlayerSpawn marker found; spawning at origin")
global_position = Vector3(0, 1.0, 0) # fallback, do not crash
```
The lookup runs from the current scene root so it finds the marker whether it is
a direct child of the level instance or nested under a `Level` wrapper. The
fallback keeps the player runnable in a scene that forgot its marker, but a
**missing `PlayerSpawn` is a level bug** and the level task's smoke test must fail
on it (see §6).
## 4. Composition (who puts level + player together)
`scenes/game.tscn` is the PC2 playable entry point:
```
Game (Node3D)
├── Level (instance of res://scenes/worlds/test_level.tscn)
└── Player (instance of res://scenes/player.tscn)
```
- `Game` is a plain `Node3D` with **no script** — composition is done by scene
instantiation, not code, so there is nothing to keep in sync.
- The **level scene is self-contained and has zero dependency on the player** —
it loads and is smoke-testable on its own. The level task does not instance or
reference `player.tscn`.
- The **player scene is self-contained and has zero dependency on any specific
level** — it only requires that the *current scene* contains a `PlayerSpawn`.
- Ownership of `game.tscn` goes to the **player task**, which depends on the
level task having landed `test_level.tscn` first (chain with `depends_on`).
## 5. Level content requirements (level task)
`scenes/worlds/test_level.tscn`, root node `TestLevel` (`Node3D`). Required
children:
| Node | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `Ground` | `StaticBody3D` | `BoxShape3D` (e.g. `40 × 1 × 40`) centered at `(0, -0.5, 0)` so the **top face is `y = 0`**; matching `MeshInstance3D` (`BoxMesh`) so it is visible and collidable. Use a `StaticBody3D` rather than a bare `PlaneMesh` so collision is explicit and reliable. |
| `Props` | `Node3D` | 3–5 simple props as `StaticBody3D` + `MeshInstance3D` using built-in primitives only (`BoxMesh`, `CylinderMesh`, `SphereMesh`). `assets/` is empty and PC2 must not require imported content. Positioned on the ground surface; scale freely. |
| `Sun` | `DirectionalLight3D` | Pitch it downward (~ -45°), enable shadows if the compatibility renderer allows; shadows are optional. |
| `WorldEnvironment` | `WorldEnvironment` | Ambient light and/or a simple background color. Keep it plain — the project uses `gl_compatibility`. |
| `PlayerSpawn` | `Marker3D` | Per §3. Recommended `(0, 1.0, 0)`. |
Notes:
- **Do not** add any `script` to the level. It is pure content. Any per-level
behavior belongs to the player (or a future game-mode script), not the level.
- Keep the whole level on the XZ plane around the origin; nothing off at extreme
coordinates, no thin walls the capsule can tunnel through.
## 6. Player contract (player task)
`scenes/player.tscn`, root `Player` (`CharacterBody3D`) + `scripts/player.gd`.
Minimum for PC2:
- **Body:** `CharacterBody3D` with a `CollisionShape3D` using `CapsuleShape3D`
(~`radius 0.3`, ~`height 1.8`) and a matching `CapsuleMesh` for visibility.
- **Camera:** a `Camera3D` child. First-person (camera at capsule head height) is
the lowest-risk choice; third-person is fine too but is more work.
- **Spawn:** per §3 — read `PlayerSpawn` from the current scene, fall back
gracefully.
- **Movement:** gravity + `move_and_slide()` so the player stands on `Ground`.
WASD/arrow locomotion is the hard requirement. Mouse-look is recommended but
may be split into its own task if the controller grows.
- **No networking, no avatar UI, no chunk code** — PC2 is local-only. Do not add
`MultiplayerAPI`, `ChunkStreamManager`, or any avatar customization here.
The player must work when instanced under `Game` alongside a level; it must not
assume it is the only node in the scene.
## 7. Entry point / how a human plays it
- `scenes/game.tscn` is the PC2 playable scene. For playtesting, load it directly
(e.g. `godot --path . scenes/game.tscn`), or temporarily set
`application/run/main_scene` to it.
- **Wiring "Play → Join a world" in the existing `world_list` UI is out of scope
for this note** and out of scope for the level/player tasks. The current menu
flow ends at browse-worlds (PC1). If a checkpoint wants a clickable path into
the test level, that navigation wiring is its own small task — do not fold it
into level or player.
## 8. Validation (both tasks must run this before "done")
```sh
# one-time, first checkout only — builds the class/import cache
godot --headless --path . --import
# then, to catch parse/load errors:
godot --headless --path . --quit
```
- **Level task:** additionally load `test_level.tscn` headlessly and assert it
(a) loads without error and (b) contains a `Marker3D` named `PlayerSpawn`
positioned ≥ 1.0 m above the ground top. A smoke script following the existing
`scripts/smoke_test_*.gd` pattern is the right vehicle.
- **Player task:** a smoke test that instantiates `game.tscn`, waits a frame,
and asserts the player's global position equals the `PlayerSpawn` position
(within a small epsilon). This is the check that proves the spawn convention
actually wired through — not just "the scene loads."
## 9. Explicitly out of scope for PC2
- Networking / multiplayer / prediction (single-player, local-only).
- Chunk streaming integration and server-side chunk authoring/serving.
- Avatar customization UI and glTF avatar loading.
- Join-a-world navigation from the world list.
- Any content moderation / age-gating logic in the level.
## 10. Summary
| Concern | Decision |
|---|---|
| Level construction | Static hand-authored Godot 3D scene (chunk streaming deferred, not removed) |
| Level location | `scenes/worlds/test_level.tscn` |
| Spawn convention | `Marker3D` named `PlayerSpawn`, ≥ 1.0 m above ground, looked up by the player |
| Player | `scenes/player.tscn` (`CharacterBody3D`) + `scripts/player.gd`, reusable across levels |
| Composition | `scenes/game.tscn` instances `Level` + `Player`; no script |
| Entry point | Load `scenes/game.tscn` directly; UI join-wiring deferred |
-159
View File
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
# GDScript Sandboxing for User-Written Scripts
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** Content moderation & age verification (scripts are one of the
> three moderated content types), avatar component system
## 1. Overview
This document evaluates how to safely run **user-written scripts** as part of
UGC (user-generated content) in **agp-game**, and recommends an approach.
**Bottom line: Godot 4 has no built-in security sandbox for GDScript, and
none of the three options named in the original task hold up under testing.**
A script running anywhere inside the Godot process — however it's loaded,
parented, or wrapped — runs with full engine privileges: arbitrary process
execution, full filesystem read/write, and raw network access. Sandboxing
has to happen *outside* the scripting language, not through an in-engine
restriction mechanism, because no such mechanism exists.
This was verified directly against Godot 4.6.2 (`godot --headless`, evidence
in `sandbox_probe/` on this branch) rather than assumed from documentation,
some of which (see §2.1) describes APIs that don't actually exist in this
version.
## 2. Options Evaluated
### 2.1 Godot's built-in "ScriptServer" restrictions — does not exist
There is no `ScriptServer` class in Godot 4.6.2:
```
ClassDB.class_exists("ScriptServer") → false
```
There's also no project setting to disable engine subsystems for scripts —
none of `application/run/disable_os`, `disable_file_access`, or
`disable_network` exist as settings, and `ProjectSettings.get_property_list()`
returns nothing matching "sandbox", "restrict", or "security". Any plan that
assumes a flag like this exists needs to be dropped; it was likely conflated
with sandboxing features from a different engine/scripting ecosystem, or
with **export template stripping** (which controls what ships in a build,
not what a script can call at runtime).
Directly probed capabilities of an ordinary GDScript running as a normal
node script, no special setup:
| Capability | Available to any script? |
|---|---|
| `OS.execute(...)` — run arbitrary processes | ✅ Yes |
| `FileAccess.open(...)` — read/write any path the OS user can reach | ✅ Yes (read `/etc/hostname`, write `/tmp/...` both succeeded) |
| `TCPServer` / `HTTPClient` / `HTTPRequest` / `PacketPeerUDP` / `WebSocketPeer` | ✅ All instantiate and work |
| `ClassDB.instantiate(...)` — construct any engine class by name | ✅ Yes |
| Loading and running a second script from source text at runtime (`GDScript.new()` + `.reload()`) | ✅ Yes |
**Verdict: rejected.** There is nothing to configure here — the restriction
surface this option assumed doesn't exist in the engine.
### 2.2 Isolated SubViewport with a limited API — doesn't isolate scripts
`SubViewport` is a **rendering and input isolation** primitive (it gives a
scene subtree its own render target and can gate input propagation) — it is
not a security or scripting boundary. A script attached to any node inside a
`SubViewport` still runs in the same process, on the same GDScript VM, with
the exact same access to `OS`, `FileAccess`, networking classes, and
`ClassDB` as a script anywhere else in the tree. Nothing about being
"inside" a SubViewport changes what API calls are reachable from a script.
**Verdict: rejected.** This solves a rendering/UI-composition problem, not
the security problem the task is asking about. Worth keeping in mind for
other purposes (e.g. isolated preview rendering of user avatars), but it
provides zero script sandboxing.
### 2.3 Custom GDScript interpreter with an allowlist — right idea, wrong layer for "custom interpreter"
Two ways to read this option, tested separately:
**(a) Write/embed a separate GDScript parser+interpreter.** Not
practical — this means re-implementing (and then indefinitely maintaining,
in lockstep with every Godot release) a full language interpreter outside
the engine. Far more engineering than the problem justifies.
**(b) Use Godot's built-in `Expression` class as a restricted subset.**
`Expression` *looks* like a natural allowlist mechanism — it only evaluates
a single expression, no control flow, no arbitrary statements. But it isn't
safe by default: it can still reach through to unsafe engine methods if you
aren't careful about what object you hand it as a base instance:
```gdscript
var expr = Expression.new()
expr.parse("get_environment('HOME')", ["OS"])
expr.execute([], OS) # → "/home/daddy" (successfully called OS.get_environment)
```
So `Expression` is a viable building block only if the host **never passes
a base instance (or arguments) that exposes anything sensitive** — i.e. the
allowlisting work still has to happen at the call site, `Expression` itself
enforces none of it.
**Static text pattern-matching (blocklisting dangerous substrings like
`"OS.execute"` before parsing) was also probed and is not a real
defense** — it's trivially defeated by string concatenation, `call()`,
`Callable`, or any other indirection, and produces false confidence.
**Verdict: partially viable, but only as a foundation, not a solution on
its own.** A hand-built, narrow, data-driven DSL (not full GDScript, not
raw `Expression`) with an explicit allowlist of safe operations and *no
ability to reference engine singletons or arbitrary objects* is the only
version of "custom interpreter" that's actually safe. This is real
engineering effort, not a config flag.
## 3. Recommendation
**Don't run untrusted GDScript in-process at all.** Given none of the three
in-engine options provide a real boundary, the two approaches actually worth
building are, in order of recommended priority:
1. **Primary: a narrow, non-Turing-complete content DSL**, not general
scripting. Most UGC scripting needs in a game like this (custom
interactions, simple triggers, item behaviors) don't need a general
programming language — they need a small set of declarative
verbs/conditions (e.g. `on_interact: give_item("torch")`,
`on_enter: play_sound("chime")`). Expressed as data (JSON/Resource, not
code) and interpreted by trusted, hand-written GDScript on the engine
side. This has *zero* attack surface by construction — there's no
interpreter to escape because there's no general execution, just a
fixed, reviewed set of verbs. This is almost certainly sufficient for
the actual UGC use cases in this game and should be scoped against real
feature requirements before assuming more is needed.
2. **If genuinely general scripting becomes a hard requirement**, isolate it
at the OS level, not the engine level: run untrusted scripts in a
**separate process** (a stripped-down Godot instance or a dedicated
interpreter) under OS sandboxing (a restricted user account, a
container, or `firejail`/`bwrap`/seccomp), communicating with the main
game over a narrow IPC/RPC boundary that only exposes intentionally-safe
operations. This is the only approach that provides a real security
boundary for arbitrary code, because it doesn't depend on the scripting
language cooperating — the OS enforces it. Substantially more
infrastructure than option 1; only worth it if option 1's DSL genuinely
can't express what's needed.
**Do not** attempt in-process GDScript sandboxing via SubViewport,
ScriptServer, or ad hoc blocklisting — all three were directly tested and
none provide a real boundary (§2).
## 4. Open Questions
- What do actual planned UGC scripts need to *do*? (Trigger conditions,
simple item/state effects, dialogue branching?) This determines whether
the DSL in §3.1 is sufficient or whether §3.2's process isolation is
needed. Needs a concrete feature list before implementation starts.
- If §3.2 is needed later, does it run per-user-session or shared/pooled?
Affects resource cost and isolation guarantees.
- Interaction with the content moderation pipeline (`content_moderation.md`):
scripts as a moderated content type still need a moderation flag path
regardless of which execution model is chosen — a DSL makes static
analysis of *what a script can possibly do* far easier than it would be
for general code, which is an additional point in its favor.
-737
View File
@@ -1,737 +0,0 @@
# World Chunk Data Format & Persistence Architecture
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** Server authority + client prediction, avatar component system, content moderation & age verification, backend auth (JWT)
## 1. Overview
This document specifies the **world chunk data format** and **persistence
schema** for **agp-game**, a Godot-based multiplayer game built by autonomous
agents. It defines:
- The **chunk data format** — both a human-readable **JSON** form (for
authoring, tooling, and debugging) and a compact **binary** form (for
runtime loading and network transfer).
- The **SQLite schema** that persists world state on the server, including
chunk metadata, chunk payloads, and the world/room hierarchy.
- The **read/write API** that the server and client use to load, save, and
stream chunks.
The goal is a **single, versioned chunk contract** that is shared across the
Godot client, the Python backend, and the persistence layer. A chunk is the
atomic unit of world geometry, gameplay objects, and persistence — the server
loads and saves whole chunks, and clients stream the chunks around them.
### 1.1 Design Goals
- **Versioned & forward-compatible:** Every chunk carries a format version so
the loader can migrate old data and reject unknown future data gracefully.
- **Dual representation:** JSON for authoring/debugging, binary for
runtime/network. Both encode the *same* logical model so there is exactly one
source of truth for the schema.
- **Server-authoritative persistence:** The server is the only writer to the
SQLite store. Clients submit *edits* (deltas) and the server applies and
persists them, mirroring the server-authoritative networking model.
- **Chunk-granular persistence:** Persistence happens at chunk granularity so
the server can save a dirty chunk without rewriting the whole world, and can
stream only the chunks a client needs.
- **Deterministic & testable:** The binary format is byte-stable for a given
logical payload, enabling checksums, caching, and reproducible tests.
- **Moderation-aware:** Chunks reference content (assets, scripts) that carry
content flags (see `content_moderation.md`); the persistence layer stores the
moderation state alongside chunk data so enforcement can happen at load time.
---
## 2. World Model & Chunking
### 2.1 World Hierarchy
The world is organized as a hierarchy that matches the moderation content graph:
```
World
└── Room
└── Chunk (the atomic persistence & streaming unit)
├── Tiles / Terrain
├── Static objects (props, geometry)
├── Dynamic objects (spawnable entities, interactables)
└── Metadata (flags, version, timestamps)
```
- A **World** is the top-level container (a named, versioned space).
- A **Room** is a bounded region within a world (a level, a building, a zone).
- A **Chunk** is a fixed-size, axis-aligned region of a room. It is the unit of
load, save, and stream.
### 2.2 Chunk Dimensions
Chunks are **fixed-size, axis-aligned boxes** in world space. The default
dimensions are a configuration constant so they can be tuned per world:
| Constant | Default | Description |
|---------------------|---------|----------------------------------------------------|
| `CHUNK_SIZE_X` | 32 | Chunk width in world units (tiles). |
| `CHUNK_SIZE_Y` | 32 | Chunk height in world units (tiles). |
| `CHUNK_SIZE_Z` | 1 | Chunk depth (1 = flat 2D world; >1 = volumetric). |
| `CHUNK_ORIGIN` | `(0,0)` | World-space origin of chunk coordinate `(0,0)`. |
A chunk is identified by its **integer chunk coordinate** `(cx, cy, cz)`,
computed from a world-space position `p` as:
```
cx = floor((p.x - CHUNK_ORIGIN.x) / CHUNK_SIZE_X)
cy = floor((p.y - CHUNK_ORIGIN.y) / CHUNK_SIZE_Y)
cz = floor((p.z - CHUNK_ORIGIN.z) / CHUNK_SIZE_Z)
```
The chunk's world-space bounding box is therefore:
```
min = (CHUNK_ORIGIN.x + cx*CHUNK_SIZE_X, ...)
max = min + (CHUNK_SIZE_X, CHUNK_SIZE_Y, CHUNK_SIZE_Z)
```
### 2.3 Chunk Coordinate Key
For storage and lookup, a chunk is addressed by a **canonical string key**:
```
"{world_id}:{room_id}:{cx}:{cy}:{cz}"
```
Example: `"w_0001:r_0001:12:-4:0"`. This key is the primary lookup key in the
SQLite `chunks` table and is used in the read/write API.
---
## 3. Chunk Data Format
### 3.1 Logical Model
Both the JSON and binary encodings serialize the same logical chunk model. The
logical model is defined here once; the two encodings are projections of it.
```
Chunk
├── version : uint (format version, currently 1)
├── key : string (canonical chunk key, see §2.3)
├── world_id : string
├── room_id : string
├── coord : { cx, cy, cz } (int)
├── bounds : { min_x, min_y, min_z, max_x, max_y, max_z } (float)
├── tiles : TileLayer[] (terrain / tile data)
├── objects : WorldObject[] (static + dynamic objects)
├── flags : ContentFlags (moderation flags, see §3.5)
├── meta : { created_at, updated_at, revision, author }
└── checksum : string (SHA-256 of canonical payload)
```
### 3.2 Tile Layer
A chunk's terrain is stored as one or more **tile layers**. Each layer is a
dense grid of tile IDs of size `CHUNK_SIZE_X × CHUNK_SIZE_Y` (× `CHUNK_SIZE_Z`
for volumetric worlds).
```
TileLayer
├── name : string (e.g. "ground", "walls", "decor")
├── layer_id : uint
├── width : uint (= CHUNK_SIZE_X)
├── height : uint (= CHUNK_SIZE_Y)
├── depth : uint (= CHUNK_SIZE_Z)
├── tiles : uint[] (flattened tile IDs, row-major, length = w*h*d)
└── palette : TileDef[] (tile ID → tile definition, shared per layer)
```
**Tile encoding:** A tile ID is a `uint16` index into the layer's `palette`.
`0` is reserved for "empty/air". The palette maps each tile ID to a `TileDef`:
```
TileDef
├── id : uint16
├── asset_id : string (reference to a tile/terrain asset)
├── solid : bool (collision)
├── flags : uint32 (bitmask: walkable, climbable, liquid, ...)
└── variants : uint8 (number of visual variants for this tile)
```
**Rationale for palette + indices:** Storing dense `uint16` indices rather than
full asset strings per cell keeps the binary payload small (2 bytes/cell) while
the palette (shared across the layer) carries the rich per-tile metadata.
### 3.3 World Objects
Objects are the non-tile entities in a chunk: static props, interactables,
spawn points, and dynamic-object templates.
```
WorldObject
├── id : string (stable object id, unique within the chunk)
├── type : string (e.g. "prop", "interactable", "spawn_point", "door")
├── asset_id : string (reference to the object's mesh/glTF asset)
├── transform : { pos: [x,y,z], rot: [x,y,z,w], scale: [x,y,z] }
├── properties : object (type-specific key/value map, JSON-typed)
├── dynamic : bool (true if this is a spawnable dynamic entity)
└── flags : ContentFlags (per-object moderation flags)
```
**Dynamic objects** are stored as *templates* in the chunk. Their *runtime
state* (position, health, inventory) is **not** stored in the chunk; it lives
in the runtime entity store and is persisted separately (see §4.4). This keeps
chunks stable and diffable — a chunk only changes when its *static* content
changes.
### 3.4 Content Flags
Each chunk (and each object) carries a **content flag set** that is the
aggregate of the moderation flags of the assets and scripts it references. This
mirrors the aggregation rules in `content_moderation.md`:
```
ContentFlags
├── categories : { violence, sexual, language, substance, gambling, horror, hate, custom }
│ (each → severity: none|mild|moderate|severe)
├── mature : bool (true if any contributing item is mature)
└── sources : string[] (flag ids that contributed, for audit)
```
The server computes and persists these flags at write time so that enforcement
(age gating, content filtering) can happen at load time without re-scanning
assets.
### 3.5 JSON Encoding
The JSON encoding is the **authoring and debugging** representation. It is
human-readable, diffable, and used by tools and tests. It is the canonical
logical model serialized directly.
```json
{
"version": 1,
"key": "w_0001:r_0001:12:-4:0",
"world_id": "w_0001",
"room_id": "r_0001",
"coord": { "cx": 12, "cy": -4, "cz": 0 },
"bounds": { "min_x": 384.0, "min_y": -128.0, "min_z": 0.0,
"max_x": 416.0, "max_y": -96.0, "max_z": 1.0 },
"tiles": [
{
"name": "ground",
"layer_id": 0,
"width": 32,
"height": 32,
"depth": 1,
"palette": [
{ "id": 0, "asset_id": "", "solid": false, "flags": 0, "variants": 1 },
{ "id": 1, "asset_id": "tiles/grass", "solid": false, "flags": 1, "variants": 4 }
],
"tiles": [0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1]
}
],
"objects": [
{
"id": "obj_0001",
"type": "interactable",
"asset_id": "props/chest",
"transform": { "pos": [400.0, -110.0, 0.0],
"rot": [0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0],
"scale": [1.0, 1.0, 1.0] },
"properties": { "loot_table": "chest_basic", "locked": false },
"dynamic": false,
"flags": { "categories": { "violence": "none" }, "mature": false, "sources": [] }
}
],
"flags": { "categories": { "violence": "none" }, "mature": false, "sources": [] },
"meta": { "created_at": "2026-08-17T00:00:00Z",
"updated_at": "2026-08-17T00:00:00Z",
"revision": 3,
"author": "agent-bot" },
"checksum": "9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08"
}
```
> **Note on the example checksum:** The value shown above is illustrative only.
> In practice the `checksum` field is the SHA-256 of the canonical binary
> payload body (see §3.6.3), not of the JSON text. The value here is a
> placeholder for documentation purposes.
### 3.6 Binary Encoding
The binary encoding is the **runtime and network** representation. It is compact
and byte-stable. It uses a simple, explicitly-specified layout (no external
serialization library) so it can be produced and consumed identically by the
Godot client (GDScript) and the Python backend.
#### 3.6.1 Header
| Offset | Size | Field | Type / Encoding |
|--------|------|--------------|------------------------------------------|
| 0 | 4 | magic | ASCII `"AGPC"` (0x41 0x47 0x50 0x43) |
| 4 | 2 | version | `uint16` LE (currently `1`) |
| 6 | 2 | header_len | `uint16` LE (bytes of header after this) |
| 8 | 4 | flags | `uint32` LE (bitmask, reserved) |
| 12 | 4 | payload_len | `uint32` LE (bytes of payload body) |
| 16 | 32 | checksum | SHA-256 of payload body (hex, 32 bytes) |
Total header size: **48 bytes**.
#### 3.6.2 Payload Body
The payload body is a sequence of typed sections. Each section has a small
header:
| Offset | Size | Field | Type / Encoding |
|--------|------|------------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 1 | section_id | `uint8` (see table below) |
| 1 | 4 | section_len| `uint32` LE (bytes of section data) |
| 5 | ... | data | section-specific |
Section IDs:
| section_id | Section | Data layout |
|------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `0x01` | metadata | world_id, room_id (length-prefixed strings), coord (3×int32), bounds (6×float32) |
| `0x02` | tile layer | name, layer_id, dims (3×uint16), palette, dense tile indices |
| `0x03` | object | one `WorldObject` (repeated; one section per object) |
| `0x04` | content flags | category severities (8×uint8), mature (uint8), sources (string list) |
| `0x05` | meta | created_at, updated_at (int64 unix), revision (uint32), author (string) |
**String encoding:** length-prefixed UTF-8 — `uint16` LE byte length followed by
the UTF-8 bytes.
**Tile layer data layout (section `0x02`):**
```
name : string
layer_id : uint16 LE
width : uint16 LE
height : uint16 LE
depth : uint16 LE
palette_count : uint16 LE
palette : palette_count × TileDef
tile_count : uint32 LE
tiles : tile_count × uint16 LE (dense, row-major)
```
```
TileDef:
id : uint16 LE
asset_id : string
solid : uint8
flags : uint32 LE
variants : uint8
```
**Object data layout (section `0x03`):**
```
id : string
type : string
asset_id : string
pos : 3 × float32
rot : 4 × float32
scale : 3 × float32
dynamic : uint8
properties : JSON string (length-prefixed)
flags : ContentFlags (see 0x04 layout)
```
**Content flags layout (section `0x04`):**
```
violence, sexual, language, substance, gambling, horror, hate, custom
: 8 × uint8 (severity enum: 0=none,1=mild,2=moderate,3=severe)
mature : uint8
source_count: uint16 LE
sources : source_count × string
```
#### 3.6.3 Byte-Stability
For a given logical payload, the binary encoding is **deterministic**:
- All integers are little-endian.
- All strings are UTF-8, length-prefixed, and never null-terminated.
- Maps (e.g. `properties`) are serialized as a **canonical JSON string** with
keys sorted lexicographically.
- The `checksum` is the SHA-256 of the payload body bytes.
This guarantees that two encoders produce identical bytes, enabling content
addressing, caching, and reproducible tests.
---
## 4. SQLite Persistence Schema
The server persists world state in a **SQLite** database. SQLite is chosen for
its zero-configuration, single-file, transactional, and embedded nature — ideal
for a server that owns the world store and needs ACID guarantees without a
separate database process.
### 4.1 Database Layout
The database file is `world.db` (path configurable). It contains the following
tables:
```
worlds
rooms
chunks
chunk_objects
content_flags
revisions
```
### 4.2 `worlds`
Top-level world containers.
```sql
CREATE TABLE worlds (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- e.g. 'w_0001'
name TEXT NOT NULL,
description TEXT,
chunk_size_x INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 32,
chunk_size_y INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 32,
chunk_size_z INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
origin_x REAL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
origin_y REAL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
origin_z REAL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL, -- ISO-8601 UTC
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
```
### 4.3 `rooms`
Rooms within a world.
```sql
CREATE TABLE rooms (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- e.g. 'r_0001'
world_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES worlds(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
bounds_min_x REAL NOT NULL,
bounds_min_y REAL NOT NULL,
bounds_min_z REAL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
bounds_max_x REAL NOT NULL,
bounds_max_y REAL NOT NULL,
bounds_max_z REAL NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
UNIQUE (world_id, name)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_rooms_world ON rooms(world_id);
```
### 4.4 `chunks`
The core persistence table. One row per chunk. The **payload** is stored as a
BLOB in the **binary format** (§3.6); the JSON form is derived on demand for
authoring/debugging and is not stored (to avoid dual-write drift).
```sql
CREATE TABLE chunks (
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- canonical key 'world:room:cx:cy:cz'
world_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES worlds(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
room_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES rooms(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
cx INTEGER NOT NULL,
cy INTEGER NOT NULL,
cz INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
format_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
payload BLOB NOT NULL, -- binary chunk encoding (§3.6)
payload_len INTEGER NOT NULL,
checksum TEXT NOT NULL, -- SHA-256 of payload
revision INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
dirty INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- 1 = needs flush to disk
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
UNIQUE (world_id, room_id, cx, cy, cz)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_chunks_world_room ON chunks(world_id, room_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_chunks_coord ON chunks(cx, cy, cz);
```
**Design notes:**
- The `payload` BLOB is the single source of truth for chunk content. The
`checksum` guards against corruption and enables content addressing.
- `revision` increments on every write; it is used for optimistic concurrency
and change detection (see §5.4).
- `dirty` marks chunks that have been modified in memory but not yet flushed,
enabling a write-behind persistence strategy (see §5.5).
### 4.5 `chunk_objects`
A denormalized, queryable index of the objects inside each chunk. This is
**derived** from the chunk payload and kept in sync by the write path. It exists
so the server can answer queries like "which chunks contain a door?" without
parsing every payload BLOB.
```sql
CREATE TABLE chunk_objects (
id TEXT NOT NULL, -- object id (unique within chunk)
chunk_key TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES chunks(key) ON DELETE CASCADE,
type TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'prop', 'interactable', ...
asset_id TEXT,
dynamic INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
pos_x REAL NOT NULL,
pos_y REAL NOT NULL,
pos_z REAL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
PRIMARY KEY (chunk_key, id)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_chunk_objects_type ON chunk_objects(type);
CREATE INDEX idx_chunk_objects_asset ON chunk_objects(asset_id);
```
**Sync mechanism:** `chunk_objects` is maintained **explicitly by the write
path** — it is not a SQL trigger. Whenever `put_chunk` (or `delete_chunk`)
commits a chunk, the service layer performs a **delete-and-reinsert** of that
chunk's object rows in the same transaction: it deletes all rows for
`chunk_key`, then inserts fresh rows parsed from the new payload. This keeps the
index transactionally consistent with the payload and avoids the complexity and
fragility of SQL triggers over a binary BLOB. Because the index is derived, it
can always be rebuilt from `chunks.payload` if it ever drifts (a `rebuild_index`
utility is provided for this).
### 4.6 `content_flags`
Persists the aggregated moderation flags per chunk (and optionally per object).
This lets the server enforce age/content gates at load time without parsing
payloads.
```sql
CREATE TABLE content_flags (
chunk_key TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES chunks(key) ON DELETE CASCADE,
object_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', -- '' = chunk-level flag (sentinel)
violence INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
sexual INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
language INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
substance INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
gambling INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
horror INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
hate INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
custom INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
mature INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
sources TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]', -- JSON array of flag ids
PRIMARY KEY (chunk_key, object_id)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_content_flags_mature ON content_flags(mature);
```
Severity is stored as `0=none, 1=mild, 2=moderate, 3=severe`.
**Chunk-level vs. object-level flags:** Chunk-level flags use the **sentinel
value `''` (empty string)** in `object_id` rather than `NULL`. This is
deliberate: in SQLite, `NULL` values in a composite primary key are **not**
unique-constrained, so two rows with the same `chunk_key` and `object_id = NULL`
could be inserted accidentally. Using `''` as the sentinel means the composite
`PRIMARY KEY (chunk_key, object_id)` enforces that there is **exactly one**
chunk-level flag row per chunk. Object-level flags use the object's actual `id`
(which is never empty). The application layer treats `object_id = ''` as
"chunk-level" and any non-empty value as "object-level".
### 4.7 `revisions`
An append-only audit log of chunk writes. Enables rollback, auditing, and
replication of changes.
```sql
CREATE TABLE revisions (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
chunk_key TEXT NOT NULL, -- NOT a FK: survives chunk deletion
revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
actor TEXT NOT NULL, -- user / agent id
action TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'create' | 'update' | 'delete'
checksum TEXT NOT NULL, -- SHA-256 of payload
payload BLOB, -- full binary payload at this revision
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX idx_revisions_chunk ON revisions(chunk_key);
```
**Rollback support:** The `payload` BLOB stores the **full binary chunk payload**
at each revision. This is what makes rollback possible: to restore a chunk to a
previous revision, the server reads the `payload` of the target revision and
writes it back to `chunks.payload` (incrementing `revision` and appending a new
`revisions` row). Without the payload, only the checksum would be available,
which is insufficient to reconstruct the chunk.
**Audit trail preservation:** `chunk_key` is **not** a foreign key to `chunks`.
This means deleting a chunk does **not** cascade-delete its revision history —
the audit trail is preserved even after a chunk is removed. (The `chunk_key`
string is still stored so the history can be correlated to a chunk that existed
at that time.) If a chunk is later recreated with the same key, its history is
still intact.
### 4.8 Schema Versioning & Migrations
The database carries a schema version in a `meta` table:
```sql
CREATE TABLE meta (
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
value TEXT NOT NULL
);
-- seed: INSERT INTO meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', '1');
```
Migrations are applied in order at startup. Each migration is a numbered SQL
script; the server tracks the applied version in `meta` and applies any pending
migrations transactionally. This keeps the schema forward-compatible as the
chunk format evolves.
---
## 5. Read/Write API
The API is exposed as a **Python service layer** on the backend (the same
process that owns the SQLite store) and consumed by the Godot client over the
network transport (see `networking.md`). The service layer is the **only**
writer to the database; clients never touch SQLite directly.
### 5.1 Service Interface (Python)
```python
class WorldStore:
"""Owns the SQLite connection and chunk read/write operations."""
def get_chunk(self, key: str) -> Chunk | None: ...
def get_chunk_binary(self, key: str) -> bytes | None: ...
def put_chunk(self, chunk: Chunk, actor: str) -> Chunk: ...
def delete_chunk(self, key: str, actor: str) -> None: ...
def list_chunks(self, world_id: str, room_id: str | None = None,
bounds: Bounds | None = None) -> list[str]: ...
def get_chunk_flags(self, key: str) -> ContentFlags: ...
def flush_dirty(self) -> int: ...
def rollback_chunk(self, key: str, revision: int, actor: str) -> Chunk: ...
def rebuild_index(self, chunk_key: str | None = None) -> int: ...
def migrate(self) -> None: ...
```
### 5.2 Encoding Helpers
The service layer provides symmetric encode/decode functions shared by the
client and server:
```python
def encode_binary(chunk: Chunk) -> bytes: ...
def decode_binary(data: bytes) -> Chunk: ...
def encode_json(chunk: Chunk) -> str: ...
def decode_json(text: str) -> Chunk: ...
def checksum(payload: bytes) -> str: ...
```
These are the single implementation of the format spec (§3), so the Godot
client and Python backend never drift.
### 5.3 Network RPCs
The chunk API is exposed to the client via RPCs (matching the networking
architecture). All chunk traffic is **reliable** (chunks are discrete,
must-arrive data).
| RPC | Direction | Payload | Notes |
|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------------|-------|
| `request_chunk` | C → S | `{ key }` | Client asks for a chunk |
| `chunk_data` | S → C | `{ key, binary_payload, checksum }` | Server streams a chunk |
| `request_chunk_edit` | C → S | `{ key, base_revision, delta }` | Client submits an edit |
| `chunk_edit_result` | S → C | `{ key, success, new_revision, error? }` | Acknowledges an edit |
| `chunk_invalidated` | S → C | `{ key, new_revision }` | Server pushes a change |
| `request_chunk_flags` | C → S | `{ key }` | Age/content gate check |
### 5.4 Edit & Concurrency Model
- **Read:** Client requests a chunk; server returns the binary payload and its
`revision`.
- **Edit:** Client submits a **delta** against a known `base_revision`. The
server applies the delta, increments `revision`, persists, and returns the new
revision.
- **Optimistic concurrency:** If the chunk's current revision differs from the
client's `base_revision`, the server rejects the edit with a conflict error
and the client re-fetches and re-applies. This prevents lost updates when two
clients edit the same chunk.
- **Deltas:** A delta is a JSON patch (RFC 6902 style) applied to the chunk's
logical model. The server validates the patched chunk (schema, bounds,
moderation) before persisting.
### 5.5 Write-Behind Persistence
To amortize disk I/O, the server keeps a **dirty set** of chunks modified in
memory and flushes them to SQLite in batches:
1. `put_chunk` updates the in-memory chunk and marks it `dirty`.
2. A background flusher periodically calls `flush_dirty()`, which writes all
dirty chunks in a single transaction and clears the `dirty` flag.
3. On graceful shutdown, `flush_dirty()` is called to ensure durability.
This keeps the hot path (in-memory chunk access) fast while guaranteeing
durability at shutdown and on a configurable interval.
**Recovery after unclean shutdown:** The `dirty` column in the `chunks` table
exists specifically to support recovery if the process crashes before a flush
completes. On startup, the server scans for rows where `dirty = 1` and treats
them as **unflushed in-memory state that was lost** — it re-reads the last
persisted payload from `chunks.payload` (the last durable state) and clears the
`dirty` flag. In other words, `dirty = 1` at startup means "the last write was
not durable; discard the in-memory delta and fall back to the persisted
payload." This guarantees that the on-disk state is always a consistent,
previously-committed snapshot, never a partially-written chunk. (The in-memory
dirty set is authoritative during normal operation; the `dirty` column is only a
recovery marker.)
### 5.6 Streaming & Caching
- The server streams only the chunks a client needs (those within the client's
view radius), using `list_chunks` with a bounds query.
- Chunks are cached in memory (LRU) keyed by `key`; the cache is invalidated on
write.
- The binary payload is content-addressed by `checksum`, so unchanged chunks can
be served from cache without re-reading SQLite.
---
## 6. Format Versioning & Migration
- The chunk format `version` field (currently `1`) is checked on decode. A
decoder that encounters a higher version than it supports **rejects** the
chunk with a clear error rather than misreading it.
- The SQLite `schema_version` in `meta` drives database migrations (§4.8).
- Chunk payloads are migrated **lazily**: when a chunk is read and its
`format_version` is older than the current one, the server migrates it to the
current version in memory and marks it dirty so it is rewritten on the next
flush. This avoids a costly full-world migration at startup.
---
## 7. Security & Integrity
- **Server-authoritative writes:** Only the `WorldStore` writes to SQLite;
clients submit deltas that are validated before application.
- **Checksum verification:** Every chunk payload is checksummed (SHA-256) on
write and verified on read. Corruption is detected and the chunk is re-fetched
or flagged.
- **Bounds validation:** Chunk coordinates and object positions are validated
against the world's chunk dimensions and room bounds before persistence.
- **Moderation enforcement:** `content_flags` are checked at load time; mature
chunks are gated behind the age-verification flow (see `content_moderation.md`).
- **Input validation:** All string fields are length-limited and validated
against allowed character sets to prevent injection and oversized payloads.
---
## 8. Open Questions / Future Work
- **Volumetric worlds:** The schema and format already support `CHUNK_SIZE_Z >
1`, but the tooling and streaming for 3D chunks are not yet specified.
- **Chunk compression:** For very large worlds, the binary payload could be
compressed (e.g. zstd) before storage/transfer. The header reserves a `flags`
bitmask for a compression flag.
- **Multi-server sharding:** If a single SQLite file becomes a bottleneck, the
`chunks` table could be sharded by `world_id` across multiple databases. The
key design already supports this (world_id is a leading key component).
- **Delta compression for streaming:** Instead of sending full chunks, the
server could send only the delta between revisions to reduce bandwidth for
frequently-updated chunks.
-72
View File
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
# Package Checkpoint 1 (PC1)
Validated 2026-08-20 against `main` commit `927f9bd`, from a genuinely fresh
clone (not a reused agent workspace).
## Automated validation
Run with `scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py` — see
`docs/testing/test_inventory.md` for exactly what each suite covers.
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Alembic migrations, fresh DB | PASS |
| Backend pytest | 68/68 PASS |
| Godot smoke tests (4 files) | ALL PASS |
| Linux export (`agp-game.x86_64`) | Builds, verified as a real ELF64 binary |
| Windows export (`agp-game.exe`) | Builds, verified as a real PE32+ binary |
## Problems found during this checkpoint (fixed, tracked as tasks)
- Roadmap showed the Godot Engine Scaffold feature amber despite 6/6 tasks
done — a historical data gap (a review-feedback follow-up task's
supersession link was never recorded, predating when that field started
being tracked). Backfilled in the PM database; confirmed green.
- `docs/testing/test_inventory.md` was stale (said 38 backend tests,
actually 68; said no integration tests existed, 4 real ones had landed).
Fixed via task `398bf1a22a2d` / PR #40.
## What's actually testable right now
Login/register/browse-worlds only — there's no joinable gameplay yet. That's
the real scope of PC1; don't expect more when playtesting.
- Register a new account (18+ only, rejected otherwise)
- Log out, log back in with the same credentials
- Play → Browse Worlds — loads a (currently empty) world list with no errors
## Manual playtest: backend on cloudbison, client on pinkbison
As of 2026-08-20 this is dashboard-controlled — no terminal commands, no
env vars, no editing files. Foolproof enough to hand to someone else.
### 1. On cloudbison — the AGP dashboard
Open the dashboard (`http://cloudbison:7070`, or its Tailscale address) and
go to **PC1** in the nav bar (`/checkpoint/PC1`). Click **Start Backend** —
it pulls the latest `main`, stands up Postgres, runs migrations, and starts
the API server, all in one step. The page shows the LAN address it's
reachable at once it's up (under a minute).
When you're done playtesting, click **Stop & Clean Up** on the same page —
it tears down everything that step started (API server, Postgres
container, its volume and network). Nothing is left running or lying
around afterward, even if the dashboard itself gets restarted in between.
### 2. On pinkbison — download and run the .exe
Same dashboard page: click **Build .exe** the first time (or **Rebuild** to
pick up newer changes) — this pulls the latest `main` and exports a Windows
binary with cloudbison's backend address already baked in. Click
**Download agp-game.exe**, copy it to pinkbison, and just run it. No
environment variable, no config file, no build step on pinkbison at all.
### 3. Tear down when done
**Stop & Clean Up** on the dashboard page. That's it.
## Status
`config/checkpoint_focus_feature_ids` in the AGP framework (`~/agp`) still
restricts agent claiming to the 5 PC1-scope features. Agents will not move
on to post-PC1 work until that's widened.
-97
View File
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
# Package Checkpoint 3 (PC3)
> **Status: partial.** PC3's planned scope was M4-avatars + M5-multiplayer +
> Foundation Hardening + M6–M10 (see `docs/build-plan-v1.md`). As of
> 2026-09-05, **M4, M5, and most of Foundation Hardening are done and
> checkpoint-verified**; M6–M10 have not been started. This doc records what
> is real. Whether to call this "PC3" (redefined scope, M6–M10 → PC4) or keep
> PC3 open is a user decision.
Built by Claude directly (fleet offline), branch `pc3` → `main`.
## What's real and verified (`scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py`, all green)
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Alembic migrations, fresh DB | PASS |
| Backend `pytest` | 77/77 PASS (hermetic — auto-starts an ephemeral Postgres) |
| Godot smoke tests (~16 files) | ALL PASS |
| `smoke_test_network_client` (real dedicated server) | 4/4 PASS |
| 2-player multiplayer (`run_multiplayer_2p_test.sh`) | PASS |
| Fresh-clone boot (`verify_fresh_clone.sh`) | PASS |
| Linux + Windows exports | Build as real ELF64 / PE32+ binaries |
### M4 — Avatars in the game
- Placeholder avatar pack (14 GLBs, rigged 24-bone base body + attachments)
generated by `scripts/tools/gen_placeholder_avatars.gd`. Real art is a
content swap — catalog paths are stable.
- The avatar **loader was fixed** — it had never run against a real skeleton
(`Skeleton3D.has_bone()` isn't a Godot 4 method; the bone-copy dropped the
skin binding; attachments were parsed then discarded).
- `avatar_visualizer.gd` **rewritten** — the old one referenced a loader API
that never existed and didn't compile.
- Persistence: `avatar_loadouts` table + `GET/PUT /api/avatar/loadout`
(loadout stored as one JSON doc; server validates the envelope only).
- Wired into gameplay: the in-world player renders as the assembled avatar
(not a capsule); the loadout is fetched at login; "Customize Avatar" from
the main menu saves through to the backend.
- **Follow-up:** camera is still first-person, so the local player doesn't
see their own avatar much (third-person is a polish item); remote players'
avatar appearance is not replicated yet (they show as labelled capsules).
### M5 — Real multiplayer
- `server.gd` **actually runs a sim now** — loads the world level, spawns a
server player per peer, processes each peer's input queue in seq order at a
fixed 30 Hz, broadcasts full snapshots with a per-peer `last_seq`. (The
input queue was a no-op before.)
- `network_client.gd` reconciliation **replays in-flight inputs** from the
authoritative state (drops acked ones), snaps only on real drift.
- **Server orchestration** (`backend/app/services/game_servers.py`): one
headless Godot dedicated-server process per world, spawned on demand by
`POST /api/worlds/{id}/join`, port-allocated, with a status-file idle
reaper. Off by default; the playtest launcher (`checkpoint_ops.py`)
enables it.
- **Client play path**: world browser → `/join` → `Session` → `game.tscn`
connects → local player predicts with collision, input forwarded, server
position is a drift backstop, remote players render from snapshots,
disconnect returns to the world list. Falls back to local single-player
when the backend has no orchestration.
- **Verified**: two real client processes each `register → /join → play`,
hosted on an orchestrated server, see and move relative to each other
(`run_game_multiplayer_test.sh`).
### Foundation Hardening
- **Hermetic backend tests** — `cd backend && pytest` works from a clean
checkout (auto ephemeral Postgres + migrations, torn down after); skips
cleanly with a message if there's no Docker.
- **Fresh-clone boot check** — `verify_fresh_clone.sh` exports a pristine
tree, imports from scratch, boots headless, fails on any script error.
Also fixed the root cause: a stale `.godot/global_script_class_cache.cfg`
was committed to the repo.
- **Real age verification** — `/register` takes a date of birth (not a
checkbox), server computes age, 403 under 18. Still self-attested; the
limitation and the ID-check hook are documented
(`content_moderation.md` 5.2).
- **Auth rate limiting** — 10 attempts / min / IP on `/register` + `/login`.
- **CI workflow** — `.forgejo/workflows/checkpoint.yml` written, **not
running yet**: needs the operator to enable Forgejo Actions + register a
`host` runner (one-time; see `docs/ci.md`). Interim gate is
`run_checkpoint_tests.py` by hand / the dashboard.
## Not in PC3 (planned but not started)
- **M2** server-side world persistence
- **M6** scripting sandbox
- **M7** in-game editor
- **M8** social / chat
- **M9** economy
- **M10** discovery
## Playtest
Same as PC2 — grab the exe from the dashboard's `/checkpoints`, backend
pointed at it. New: with multiple people in the same world you now actually
see each other move.
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
# CI
`.gitea/workflows/checkpoint.yml` runs the full checkpoint suite
(`scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py`: migrations on a fresh DB, backend
`pytest`, all Godot smoke tests, the 2-player multiplayer test, and the
fresh-clone boot check) on **every push to `main` and every PR**.
## Status: live
Set up 2026-09-05:
- Gitea Actions enabled (`[actions] ENABLED = true` in
`/DATA/AppData/forgejo/gitea/conf/app.ini`, container restarted; a
timestamped `.bak` is next to it).
- `act_runner` v0.2.13 registered as **`agp-host`** with label **`host`**
(host execution mode — jobs run directly on the AGP box, which already
has Docker, `~/godot/godot`, and Python). Lives in `~/act-runner/`.
- Green on the first successful run (`d76bf4d`).
The workflow uses **no JavaScript actions** (no `actions/checkout`), so the
host needs no Node: checkout is a shallow `git fetch` from the local Gitea
using the injected `${{ github.token }}`, and the suite runs in a venv the
job builds (host Python is PEP-668 externally-managed).
## Make the runner permanent (one command, needs sudo)
The runner currently runs as a plain background process — it won't survive a
reboot. A unit file is ready at `~/act-runner/act-runner.service`:
```bash
sudo cp ~/act-runner/act-runner.service /etc/systemd/system/
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
pkill -f 'act_runner daemon' # stop the temporary background one
sudo systemctl enable --now act-runner
```
## Interim / local
```bash
python scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py
```
— also what `/checkpoint/<PC>` on the dashboard runs before a playtest build.
## Security note
A host-mode runner executes whatever a workflow says, directly on the box,
as `daddy` (in the `docker` group). Fine for a single-maintainer private
repo; revisit if the repo gets outside contributors (switch to a
docker-mode runner or an isolated VM).
-41
View File
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
# MVP Vertical Slice: Client-Server Wiring — Plan
## Goal
Prove the real Godot client and the real backend can talk: **a user can register/log in
and see a list of worlds from the game client**. Nothing more. Gameplay, join-a-world,
chat, avatar, Discovery search/tags/trending, Social/Economy/Trust & Safety are all
explicitly out of scope.
## Verified backend contract (as of this writing)
- `POST /api/auth/register` — JSON body `{username, email, password, date_of_birth}`.
`date_of_birth` is a `YYYY-MM-DD` string. Returns `201 {access_token, token_type}`.
Rejects under-18 with `400`.
- `POST /api/auth/login` — OAuth2 **form-encoded** (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`)
`username` + `password` (this is NOT a JSON endpoint). Returns `{access_token, token_type}`.
- `GET /api/worlds` — **requires auth** (`CurrentUser`), returns a JSON array of
`{id, name, description, visibility, owner_id, created_at}`. There is no unauthenticated
public-worlds path, so the worlds list screen can only be shown after login/register.
- `GET /api/health` — unauthenticated, `{status, app}`.
- Base URL: uvicorn default `http://127.0.0.1:8000` (must be configurable in the client).
- CORS is irrelevant to the native Godot `HTTPRequest` client (no browser origin).
## Task breakdown
| # | Type | Task | Depends on |
|---|------|------|-----------|
| 1 | architecture | `ApiClient` autoload: HTTP + JWT storage + error contract | — |
| 2 | implementation | Main-menu **login + register** UI built & wired (form-encoded + JSON/age gate) | 1 |
| 3 | implementation | **World list** screen consuming `GET /api/worlds` | 1 |
| 4 | testing | End-to-end headless smoke test + manual verify | 1,2,3 |
## Design decisions captured (resolved in task 1)
- Token storage: in-memory singleton property for the MVP; a `save_to_disk` seam is left
open but not required yet (no re-login on restart in this slice).
- Error contract: every call returns a discriminated result (`ok`/`error`) so callers
never crash on network failure; non-2xx surfaces `{status, detail}` from the backend.
- Base URL: read from a ProjectSetting, defaulting to `http://127.0.0.1:8000`.
- Login is form-encoded; register is JSON — the client helper must support both content types.
## Notes
- The main-menu auth UI does **not** exist yet (main_menu.gd currently has only Play/Quit
stubs). Task 2 must **build** the login/register UI, not merely wire an existing one.
- The world-list screen also needs to be **built** (a new scene), not just wired.
-295
View File
@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
# Economy — Currency, Marketplace & Creator Payouts — Plan
> **Status:** Planned
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Feature ID:** `economy`
> **Godot version:** 4.6.2 stable
> **Backend:** FastAPI + SQLAlchemy (async) + PostgreSQL + Redis
## 1. Overview
This document breaks the **Economy** feature into user stories and right-sized
implementation tasks. The feature delivers:
- **Virtual currency ("Credits")** — a single, server-authoritative currency
with an immutable, append-only transaction ledger.
- **Premium purchase** — buying Credits with real money through a pluggable
payment-provider hook.
- **Marketplace** — user-generated content (UGC) listings where creators sell
items (assets, avatar items, experience passes) to players for Credits.
- **Creator payouts** — accumulating creator earnings and paying them out to
external accounts through a pluggable payout-provider hook.
- **Godot client** — wallet/transaction history, marketplace browse/buy/sell,
and creator payout screens.
The economy is the monetization backbone of the platform. Because it moves
virtual value between real people, correctness (no double-spend, no lost funds,
no balance drift) and safety (fraud prevention, moderation, audit) are treated
as **blocking requirements**, not add-ons.
## 2. Why correctness is the differentiator
The platform is a creator economy (players buy UGC from other players). The
economy is the highest-risk surface after chat: a single arithmetic or
concurrency bug can mint or destroy value and irreversibly erode trust.
Correctness is therefore designed in from the start:
- **One currency, integer units.** Credits are whole-number integers. There are
no floats, no rounding, and no client-computed totals.
- **Append-only ledger.** Every balance change is a row in a `transactions`
table with a signed amount, a `balance_after` snapshot, a reference to the
event that caused it, and an **idempotency key** so retries cannot double
credit or double debit.
- **Atomic, locked mutations.** Balance changes run in a single database
transaction with row locking (`SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`) so concurrent
purchases/payouts cannot race.
- **Escrow hold.** Marketplace proceeds are held in `pending_escrow` for a
configurable window before becoming available to the seller, so fraudulent
or moderated sales can be reversed without clawing back paid-out funds.
- **Server-authoritative fees.** The platform commission is computed
server-side from a configured rate; the client never supplies the fee or the
seller's net.
## 3. Existing constraints (do not re-build)
- **Auth:** JWT bearer tokens; `get_current_user` / `CurrentUser` dependency in
`app/dependencies.py`. All economy endpoints reuse this.
- **DB:** async SQLAlchemy + Alembic; migration `0001_initial` is the head.
Existing tables: `users`, `sessions`, `worlds`, `assets`.
- **Redis:** configured (`REDIS_URL`) but unused so far; adopted here for
idempotency short-caching and rate limiting.
- **Models:** `User` (owner_id), `Asset` (owner_id, is_public, asset_type).
Marketplace items reference existing `assets` rows and/or avatar items.
- **Content moderation:** `docs/architecture/content_moderation.md` defines
flag vocabulary, age gate, and moderation actions. Marketplace items and
listings must inherit and enforce these rules (see §7).
- **Client:** Godot 4.6.2, minimal `main_menu.gd`; no economy UI yet.
## 4. Key design decisions
| Concern | Decision |
|---|---|
| Currency model | Single virtual currency **"Credits" (CR)**, integer units. One wallet row per user; no fractional amounts. |
| Ledger | Append-only `transactions` table: signed `amount`, `balance_after`, `reference_type`/`reference_id`, unique `idempotency_key`. |
| Concurrency | `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` on the wallet row inside the mutation transaction; never read-modify-write from stale data. |
| Payments | Pluggable `PaymentProvider` interface with a **no-op default** that simulates a confirmed payment for dev/testing (clearly flagged). Stripe/PayPal later. |
| Marketplace items | `catalog_items` (what is sold) + `marketplace_listings` (a seller's offer with a price/status). One item can have multiple listings over time. |
| Purchase flow | Atomic transaction: debit buyer → hold funds in escrow (`pending_escrow`) → grant item. Platform fee computed server-side. |
| Escrow | Configurable hold window (default 72h) before `pending_escrow` becomes available seller earnings. Refunds during the window reverse the sale. |
| Fees | Single configurable `MARKETPLACE_FEE_RATE` (default `0.30`). `seller_net = floor(price * (1 - fee_rate))`. |
| Creator balance | `creator_balances` table: `available` (earned, payable), `pending` (inside an open payout request), `lifetime_earned`. Updated in the same transaction as the sale completion. |
| Payouts | Pluggable `PayoutProvider.pay()` with a no-op default (simulated external ref). Minimum payout threshold, admin review for large payouts. |
| Idempotency | Every money-moving request carries a client-generated `Idempotency-Key`; duplicate keys return the original result. |
| Rate limiting | Redis token-bucket dependency reused from the social feature for purchase/listing/payout endpoints. |
| Moderation | Listings enforce content flags + age gate; moderators can `delist`/`remove`; fraud/chargeback reversal is an audited admin action. |
## 5. User stories
### US-1 Currency & wallet
As a player, I can see my Credit balance and transaction history, and the system
credits/debits my wallet only through server-authoritative events.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Exactly one wallet per user, created lazily on first use.
- Balance is always a non-negative integer; no operation can make it negative.
- Every mutation appends an immutable ledger row with amount, resulting balance,
reference, and idempotency key.
- Retrying a request with the same idempotency key does not double-apply.
- `GET` endpoints expose current balance and paged transaction history.
### US-2 Premium purchase (buy Credits)
As a player, I can purchase Credits with real money and have them credited only
after the payment is confirmed.
**Acceptance criteria**
- A purchase session is created through the payment provider (or the no-op
default) and is idempotent.
- Credits are granted exactly once, only after a verified provider confirmation
(webhook/confirm endpoint), never on client claim.
- Purchase amounts are bounded and server-defined; clients cannot pick arbitrary
prices.
- Confirmation is idempotent and audited (provider reference recorded).
### US-3 Marketplace listing (sell)
As a creator, I can list a catalog item for sale at a Credit price and
manage/remove my listings.
**Acceptance criteria**
- A listing references a valid `catalog_item` owned by the seller (or an
authorized seller).
- Price is bounded (min/max) and set server-side; status transitions are
explicit (`active`, `sold`, `delisted`, `removed_by_moderation`).
- Only the seller (or a moderator) can update/remove a listing.
- Listings are searchable/filterable (item type, price range, owner).
### US-4 Marketplace purchase (buy)
As a player, I can buy a listed item. The purchase is atomic, holds funds in
escrow, grants the item, and splits the payment between platform and seller.
**Acceptance criteria**
- A single transaction debits the buyer, holds funds in escrow, and grants the
item — no partial states on failure.
- Platform fee and seller net are computed server-side from the configured rate.
- After the escrow hold window, funds move from escrow to the seller's
available balance.
- Refunds during the hold window reverse the sale and return funds to the buyer.
- Concurrent purchases of a one-of-a-kind listing cannot both succeed.
### US-5 Creator payouts
As a creator, I can view my earned balance, request a payout, and track its
status; admins can review and approve/reject payouts.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Available balance is derived only from completed (escrow-released) sales and
completed payouts; it never goes negative.
- Payout requests are bounded (min threshold, max per period) and rate-limited.
- Large payouts require admin review; all payout requests carry an audit trail
(requested by, reviewed by, provider reference, status).
- The payout provider is called exactly once; idempotent on retry.
### US-6 Godot client
As a player, I can manage Credits, browse/buy/sell marketplace items, and manage
payouts from the game UI.
**Acceptance criteria**
- An API client handles JWT auth, HTTP, and idempotency keys for all economy
calls.
- Dedicated screens: wallet + transaction history, marketplace browse/buy,
sell-listing, and creator payout.
- The client never computes balances, fees, or seller nets — it only displays
server responses.
## 6. Task breakdown
Right-sized to 1–3 files / one coherent piece of functionality each. Task IDs
are sequential for dependency chaining.
| # | Task | Story | Depends on |
|---|------|-------|-----------|
| 1 | Wallet & ledger models + Alembic migration (`wallets`, `transactions`) | US-1 | — |
| 2 | Wallet service (atomic credit/debit, idempotency, locking) + wallet/transactions API | US-1 | 1 |
| 3 | Premium purchase: `PaymentProvider` interface + purchase/confirm endpoints | US-2 | 1 |
| 4 | Catalog item & listing models + migration (`catalog_items`, `marketplace_listings`, `creator_balances`) | US-3 | 1 |
| 5 | Marketplace listing API (create/list/search/update/remove) | US-3 | 4 |
| 6 | Marketplace purchase service + API (atomic escrow, fee split, item grant) | US-4 | 2, 4, 5 |
| 7 | Creator payout request models + API (`payout_requests`) | US-5 | 2, 6 |
| 8 | Payout admin review + `PayoutProvider` + audit | US-5 | 7 |
| 9 | Marketplace moderation + content-flag/age-gate enforcement | cross-cutting | 5, 6 |
| 10 | Godot economy API client (auth + HTTP + idempotency) | US-6 | 2 |
| 11 | Godot wallet & transaction history UI | US-6 | 10 |
| 12 | Godot marketplace browse/buy UI | US-6 | 6, 10 |
| 13 | Godot selling & payout UI | US-6 | 5, 7, 10 |
## 7. Phasing
- **Phase 1 (currency + payments):** tasks 1–3. The foundation — ledger and
money movement must be rock-solid before anything spends Credits.
- **Phase 2 (marketplace):** tasks 4–6. Listing and atomic purchase with escrow.
- **Phase 3 (payouts):** tasks 7–8. Turn released escrow into creator payouts.
- **Phase 4 (moderation):** task 9. Lock down the marketplace against mature
content and abuse.
- **Phase 5 (client):** tasks 10–13, each landing after its backend dependency.
## 8. Data model sketch
```text
wallets
id bigint PK
user_id int UNIQUE FK -> users.id
balance bigint NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (balance >= 0)
created_at timestamptz
updated_at timestamptz
transactions (append-only ledger)
id bigint PK
wallet_id bigint FK -> wallets.id
type enum(credit_purchase, marketplace_purchase,
marketplace_sale, escrow_release, payout,
refund, admin_adjustment)
amount bigint NOT NULL (signed)
balance_after bigint NOT NULL
reference_type text (e.g. "purchase", "sale", "payout_request")
reference_id text
idempotency_key text UNIQUE
metadata_json jsonb
created_at timestamptz
catalog_items
id bigint PK
owner_id int FK -> users.id
asset_id int FK -> assets.id (nullable; null for non-asset virtual items)
item_type enum(asset, avatar_item, experience_pass)
name text
description text
metadata_json jsonb
created_at timestamptz
marketplace_listings
id bigint PK
catalog_item_id bigint FK -> catalog_items.id
seller_id int FK -> users.id
price bigint NOT NULL CHECK (price > 0)
status enum(active, sold, delisted, removed_by_moderation)
created_at timestamptz
updated_at timestamptz
purchases
id bigint PK
listing_id bigint FK -> marketplace_listings.id
buyer_id int FK -> users.id
seller_id int FK -> users.id
price bigint NOT NULL
platform_fee bigint NOT NULL
seller_net bigint NOT NULL
status enum(pending_escrow, completed, refunded, reversed)
escrow_hold_until timestamptz
created_at timestamptz
creator_balances
id bigint PK
user_id int UNIQUE FK -> users.id
available bigint NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
pending bigint NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
lifetime_earned bigint NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
updated_at timestamptz
payout_requests
id bigint PK
creator_id int FK -> users.id
amount bigint NOT NULL CHECK (amount > 0)
status enum(pending, approved, paid, rejected)
external_ref text
provider_ref text
requested_by int FK -> users.id
reviewed_by int FK -> users.id (nullable)
reviewed_at timestamptz
created_at timestamptz
```
## 9. Security, anti-fraud & audit
- **Server-authoritative balances/fees:** clients never compute totals; amounts
are validated server-side against bounds and the current listing.
- **Row locking:** wallet and creator-balance mutations use `SELECT ... FOR
UPDATE` within one transaction.
- **Idempotency:** every money-moving endpoint requires an `Idempotency-Key`;
duplicate keys return the stored original outcome.
- **Rate limiting:** purchase, listing, and payout endpoints are token-bucket
rate-limited per user.
- **Escrow & reversibility:** funds are not payable until the hold window
elapses; chargebacks/refunds reverse before release.
- **Moderation:** listings carry the item's effective content flags; mature
items require age verification (per `content_moderation.md`); moderators can
`delist`/`remove` and trigger audited reversals.
- **Audit:** the ledger plus `payout_requests` review fields form an append-only
audit trail for every movement of value.
## 10. Out of scope for this feature
- Real Stripe/PayPal/KYC integrations (provider interfaces leave the hooks; the
defaults are deterministic no-ops).
- Subscriptions, recurring billing, or premium memberships.
- Gift cards, promotional codes, or user-to-user Credit transfers.
- Partial refunds, chargeback disputes, and seller tax/VAT handling.
- In-world vending machines / scripted economy triggers (future, built on this
ledger via the scripting sandbox).
-170
View File
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
# Social — Friends, Chat & Groups — Plan
> **Status:** Planned
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Feature ID:** `social`
> **Godot version:** 4.6.2 stable
> **Backend:** FastAPI + SQLAlchemy (async) + PostgreSQL + Redis
## 1. Overview
This document breaks the **Social** feature into user stories and right-sized
implementation tasks. The feature delivers:
- **Friends & following** — a friend request/accept model plus a one-way follow
relationship, with block lists.
- **Presence & status** — online/offline, custom status message, last-seen.
- **Chat** — direct messages (DM) and in-experience (world/room) chat with
**first-class safety**: server-side text filtering, report-message, and rate
limiting.
- **Groups** — named groups with roles (owner/admin/member) and a simple group
page.
- **Public profiles** — avatar, bio, favorite experiences, and a friends list
that respects privacy settings.
## 2. Why chat safety is the differentiator
The platform is explicitly meant to pull adults away from a youth-oriented
competitor. Chat is the highest-risk surface: it is real-time, user-generated,
and where abuse happens fastest. Safety is therefore treated as a **blocking
requirement**, not an add-on:
- Every message passes a **server-side text filter** before it is stored or
delivered. The client filter is cosmetic only; the server is authoritative.
- Every message can be **reported**; reports flow into a moderation queue with
actor + reason + audit trail (mirroring `content_moderation.md`).
- Sending is **rate limited** per user (Redis token bucket) to stop flooding and
harassment-by-volume.
- Report and block are always reachable from a message context in the UI.
## 3. Existing constraints (do not re-build)
- **Auth:** JWT bearer tokens; `get_current_user` / `CurrentUser` dependency in
`app/dependencies.py`. All social endpoints reuse this.
- **DB:** async SQLAlchemy + Alembic; migration `0001_initial` is the head.
- **Redis:** configured (`REDIS_URL`) but unused so far; adopted here for
presence and rate limiting.
- **Models:** `User`, `World` (owner_id), `Asset` (owner_id, is_public). Avatars
and favorite-experience references point at existing rows.
- **Client:** Godot 4.6.2, minimal `main_menu.gd`; no social UI yet.
## 4. Key design decisions
| Concern | Decision |
|---|---|
| Message transport | REST for send/history; **WebSocket** gateway for real-time delivery + presence (matches `networking.md`'s "WebSocket as secondary transport" for chat) |
| Presence store | Redis (TTL heartbeat) + persisted `last_seen_at` on the user record |
| Text filtering | Pluggable `TextFilter` interface with a deterministic default (profanity list + normalization) so it runs without external services; third-party hook later |
| Rate limiting | Redis token-bucket dependency, reusable across all social endpoints |
| Reports | `message_reports` table + moderation endpoints (list/review/resolve) with audit fields |
| Friends vs. follow | Friends = mutual (request→accept). Follow = one-way (no approval). Block = hard deny that also hides content and prevents DMs |
| Privacy | Per-user settings JSON (`profile_visibility`, `friends_list_visibility`, `favorites_visibility`) enforced server-side on every read |
| Groups | `groups` + `group_members` (role: owner/admin/member) + group page aggregate endpoint |
| Real-time | One WebSocket endpoint multiplexing presence, DM, and world-chat messages via Redis pub/sub |
## 5. User stories
### US-1 Friends & following
As a player, I can send a friend request, accept/decline incoming requests,
unfriend, follow/unfollow other players, and block users so they can't interact
with me.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Friend requests are one-directional until accepted; accepted friendships are mutual.
- Follow is one-way and requires no approval.
- Block prevents DMs, hides the blocked user's profile/friends interactions, and
removes any existing friendship/follow between the two.
- Duplicate/self requests are rejected idempotently.
### US-2 Presence & status
As a player, I can see whether my friends are online, their custom status, and
when they were last seen.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Online/offline is derived from a server-side heartbeat (Redis TTL), not client claims.
- `last_seen_at` persists and is visible (subject to privacy settings).
- Custom status text is optional and length-limited.
### US-3 Public profiles
As a player, I can view a public profile page showing avatar, bio, favorite
experiences, and a friends list that respects the owner's privacy settings.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Avatar and bio are editable by the owner only.
- Favorite experiences reference existing `World` rows.
- A viewer sees only the sections the owner's privacy settings allow; blocked
users see a restricted view.
### US-4 Chat (DM + in-experience) with safety
As a player, I can send direct messages and chat inside a world/room. Messages
are filtered, rate limited, and reportable.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Server filters message text before storing/delivering; filtered content is either
rejected (blocking) or redacted (configurable per filter policy).
- Send rate is limited per user (token bucket); excess sends get `429`.
- Every message has a stable id, author, timestamp, and conversation/world scope.
- Any message can be reported with a reason; reports are stored and reviewable.
- Real-time delivery over WebSocket with REST fallback for history.
### US-5 Groups
As a player, I can create a group, join/leave groups, and (as owner/admin)
manage roles and view a simple group page.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Each group has exactly one owner and any number of admins/members.
- Role transitions are authorized (only owner can transfer ownership or promote/demote admins).
- Group page lists name, description, member list with roles, and member count.
### US-6 Godot client
As a player, I can access friends, presence, chat, profiles, and groups from the
game UI.
**Acceptance criteria**
- An API client handles JWT auth, HTTP, and WebSocket for all social calls.
- Dedicated screens/panels: friends+presence, DM & world chat (with report),
profile page, group page.
- Client-side filtering is cosmetic; server responses remain authoritative.
## 6. Task breakdown
Right-sized to 1–3 files / one coherent piece of functionality each. Task IDs
are sequential for dependency chaining.
| # | Task | Story | Depends on |
|---|------|-------|-----------|
| 1 | Friends/follow/block models + Alembic migration | US-1 | — |
| 2 | Friends & follow API router | US-1 | 1 |
| 3 | Presence & status model + endpoints (Redis heartbeat) | US-2 | — |
| 4 | Profile model + migration + own-profile endpoints | US-3 | 1 |
| 5 | Public profile view + favorites + privacy enforcement | US-3 | 2, 4 |
| 6 | Chat data models + migration (conversations, messages, reports) | US-4 | — |
| 7 | Text filtering service + profanity config | US-4 | — |
| 8 | Redis rate-limiting dependency | US-4 | — |
| 9 | DM chat send/list endpoints (filter + rate limit) | US-4 | 6, 7, 8 |
| 10 | Report-message endpoint + moderation queue | US-4 | 6, 9 |
| 11 | In-experience (world/room) chat endpoints | US-4 | 9 |
| 12 | Real-time WebSocket gateway (presence + DM + world chat) | US-4 | 3, 9, 11 |
| 13 | Group + membership models + migration | US-5 | — |
| 14 | Groups API (CRUD, join/leave, roles, group page) | US-5 | 13 |
| 15 | Godot API client (auth + HTTP + WebSocket) | US-6 | 2 |
| 16 | Godot friends & presence UI | US-6 | 3, 15 |
| 17 | Godot chat UI (DM + world chat + report) | US-6 | 12, 15 |
| 18 | Godot profile page UI | US-6 | 5, 15 |
| 19 | Godot groups UI + group page | US-6 | 14, 15 |
## 7. Phasing
- **Phase 1 (data + core APIs):** tasks 1–5 (friends, presence, profiles).
- **Phase 2 (chat safety — the differentiator):** tasks 6–12 (chat + safety +
realtime). This is the critical path and highest priority.
- **Phase 3 (groups):** tasks 13–14.
- **Phase 4 (client):** tasks 15–19, each landing after its backend dependency.
## 8. Out of scope for this feature
- Age verification / maturity gating (covered by `content_moderation.md`).
- Voice chat, media/image messages, message editing/deletion history.
- Third-party profanity/toxicity vendors (the `TextFilter` interface leaves a
hook, but the default is deterministic and dependency-free).
- Mobile push notifications.
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
# Testing at Package Checkpoints
A Package Checkpoint (PC1, PC2, ...) is a periodic review point — every few
real milestones, the client and server builds get packaged together and
independently reviewed before anyone calls anything actually done. See
`project_agp` in Claude's memory, or ask, for the full definition; this
doc is just the mechanical "how do I run the tests" part of that review.
## Running the suite
```
python scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py
```
Brings up a throwaway Postgres, runs Alembic migrations against it, runs the
backend pytest suite, starts the backend server, and runs every Godot
headless smoke test (`scripts/smoke_test_*.gd`) against it. Tears the
Postgres container down afterward (`--keep-postgres` to skip that if you
want to poke at the DB after a failure).
If port 5432 is already taken on the machine, pass `--postgres-port` with
something else.
Exit code is 0 only if everything that actually ran passed — suites with
nothing to run yet (no Godot binary found, no smoke test scripts yet) are
reported SKIPPED, not treated as a failure.
## What this does and doesn't prove
Passing this script means: migrations apply cleanly to a genuinely empty
database, the backend's unit-level logic is correct, and whatever Godot
smoke tests exist actually round-trip against a live backend. It does
**not** mean full endpoint/integration coverage exists — see
`test_inventory.md` for the current, honest list of what's tested and what
isn't. A checkpoint review should still involve reading the actual diffs
for anything this script's current coverage doesn't reach, not just running
green and calling it done.
## Growing this over time
As real integration tests get added (endpoint tests hitting the FastAPI app,
more Godot smoke coverage beyond `health_check`), they should land under
`backend/tests/` / `scripts/smoke_test_*.gd` respectively — this script
picks up new files automatically, nothing to register by hand. Update
`test_inventory.md`'s tables when you do, so the inventory stays a source
of truth instead of quietly going stale.
Eventual goal (not implemented yet): gate merges to `main` on this script
passing, the same way a real CI pipeline would. For now it's a manual step
run at checkpoint review time.
-117
View File
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
# Test Inventory
What automated coverage actually exists, what it actually verifies, and what
doesn't have coverage yet. Keep this current as tests are added — it's the
thing a Package Checkpoint review (see `docs/testing/README.md`) reads first
to know what "run the tests" actually checked.
Run everything below in one shot with `scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py`.
Last verified against `main`: 2026-08-21 — migrations + pytest + all 11
Godot smoke tests, all clean. PC1's real playtest-found bugs (login form
unreachable, 1px world cards, Play → Back losing the session) are covered
by the smoke tests below so they can't silently regress. PC2 (basic
playable world + character + movement) landed 2026-08-20/21 — see
`docs/checkpoints/` once a PC2 record exists, and the three new smoke
tests below (`smoke_test_test_level.gd`, `smoke_test_player.gd`,
`smoke_test_enter_world.gd`) for what's actually verified. The avatar
loader/customization system (`smoke_test_avatar_system.gd`) also landed
2026-08-21 — real glTF-based loading with graceful failure on missing
assets, verified since `assets/avatars/*.glb` model files don't exist yet.
## Backend — `backend/tests/` (pytest)
Run: `cd backend && python -m pytest -v` (needs `DATABASE_URL` pointed at a
reachable Postgres — see the runner script).
**Current total: 61 tests, all passing on a clean `main` checkout.**
| File | Tests | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| `test_auth_age_gate.py` | 11 | `calculate_age()` date-math correctness (exact boundary, leap years, birthday-not-yet-this-year — kept as a tested utility for a future real-DOB pass even though `/register` no longer calls it) + `RegisterRequest.over_18` field tests (true accepted, false accepted, missing rejected). 2026-08-20: the register flow was simplified from collecting/validating a date of birth to a plain client-side "I am 18 or older" confirmation, so the old date-validation parametrized cases were replaced. Backs the 18+ registration gate (PR #23, revised PC1). |
| `test_gltf_metadata.py` | 21 | glTF/GLB binary + JSON parsing: magic-byte detection, chunk-padding handling, mesh/animation/texture-reference metadata extraction, malformed-input rejection. Backs the asset-import pipeline (PR #27). |
| `test_auth_endpoints.py` | 10 | **Integration tests** for `POST /api/auth/register` and `POST /api/auth/login` against the real FastAPI app + real Postgres. Covers: successful register (201), duplicate username (409), duplicate email (409), `over_18=false` rejection (400), missing `over_18` field (422), successful login with correct credentials (200), wrong password (401), nonexistent user (401), form-encoded login (OAuth2), and JWT validity of returned tokens. |
| `test_refresh_endpoint.py` | 8 | **Integration tests** for `POST /api/auth/refresh`. Covers: successful refresh (200, new access token, same refresh token returned), refresh produces different access tokens on repeated calls, invalid refresh token (401), empty body (422), missing field (422), refresh token from login also works, returned access token is valid JWT decodable with public key, `access_token_expires_minutes` in response. |
| `test_refresh_token_jti.py` | 6 | Unit tests for refresh token uniqueness (jti claim) and model column length. Covers: two calls with same sub produce different tokens (jti uniqueness), jti is valid UUID, rapid repeated calls all produce unique jtis, jti survives decode, `RefreshToken.token` column is `String(512)`, column type is `String`. |
| `test_auth_expired_token.py` | 5 | **Integration tests** for expired-token rejection across auth endpoints. Covers: expired access JWT rejected by `GET /api/auth/me` (401), garbage access token rejected by `/me` (401), missing bearer token returns 401, expired refresh token (DB `expires_at` in past) rejected by `/refresh` (401), expired refresh JWT (past `exp` claim) rejected before DB lookup (401). |
**What these are, honestly:** a mix of pure unit tests (`test_auth_age_gate.py`,
`test_gltf_metadata.py`, `test_refresh_token_jti.py`) and real integration tests
(`test_auth_endpoints.py`, `test_refresh_endpoint.py`, `test_auth_expired_token.py`)
that hit the FastAPI app against a real Postgres database via `TestClient`.
The integration tests exercise the full stack: Pydantic validation → DB →
JWT → response. The suite is also re-runnable without manual cleanup —
`backend/tests/conftest.py` has a session-scoped autouse fixture that
truncates all app tables once before the suite runs.
**Known coverage gaps** (real gaps, not placeholders — nothing enforces filling
these yet):
- No endpoint tests for `GET /api/worlds`, `GET /api/assets/*`, or any
world/asset CRUD routes — only auth endpoints have integration coverage
(`GET /api/worlds` is covered indirectly via the Godot smoke tests below).
- No tests for the moderation schema/migration beyond "the migration runs."
- No tests for the `GET /api/auth/me` endpoint's response body (only its
auth-header validation is covered via expired-token tests).
- No tests for session management (create/validate/revoke sessions).
## Godot client — `scripts/smoke_test_*.gd`
**12 smoke tests merged into `main`.** Ten need a live backend, one
(`smoke_test_network_client.gd`) needs a live dedicated server instead,
and one (`smoke_test_avatar_system.gd`) needs neither — it only exercises
local catalog/loadout/loader logic. Backend-dependent tests read
`AGP_API_BASE_URL` env var, falling back to the
`application/agp/api_base_url` project setting (default
`http://127.0.0.1:8000`) if unset.
| File | What it covers |
|---|---|
| `smoke_test_api.gd` | Exercises `ApiClient.health_check()` against a live backend. Verifies the real HTTP request path (`HTTPRequest` node lifecycle, JSON parse, result-dictionary contract). Exits 1 on failure. |
| `smoke_test_auth.gd` | Tests the full auth flow via `ApiClient` autoload: register unique user (201), duplicate username (409), `over_18=false` registration (400), correct login (200), wrong password (401), nonexistent user (401). |
| `smoke_test_e2e.gd` | End-to-end flow: health check → register → login → worlds list. Verifies the full request chain with a fresh user, including token storage and `get_worlds()` with auth header. |
| `smoke_test_world_list.gd` | Registers a user, **seeds a real world via `POST /api/worlds/`** (without this, `run_checkpoint_tests.py`'s always-fresh DB means the populated-card render path never actually runs in CI, only the empty-list path would), instantiates `world_list.tscn` as a real scene, waits for `_refresh_worlds()` to complete, confirms it reached the populated (not empty) state, and asserts **each rendered card's real computed width is >= 200px**. That last check is the one that matters: 2026-08-20, a real bug shipped where every card existed in the tree with a non-zero child count and no crash, but rendered at 1.0px wide (`ScrollContainer`'s `size_flags_horizontal`/`vertical` used the raw integer `4` = `Control.SIZE_SHRINK_CENTER` instead of `3` = `SIZE_EXPAND_FILL`) — invisible on screen, and a child-count-only check would never have caught it. Confirmed by deliberately reintroducing the bug: card width check correctly fails at 25px. |
| `smoke_test_main_menu_ui.gd` | Instantiates `main_menu.tscn`, confirms the auth panel starts hidden, and confirms a **real signal emission** on LoginButton/RegisterButton (not calling the handler method directly) actually opens it. This is the check that would have caught 2026-08-20's real bug: the auth panel and its logic were fully correct, but nothing in the scene was ever wired to open it, so Login/Register were completely unreachable from the UI. |
| `smoke_test_main_menu_full_flow.gd` | Full click-through: open the register form, fill it exactly as a user would, submit, confirm Play actually becomes enabled, the welcome message shows, and the auth buttons hide themselves. Calls the submit handler directly (awaited) rather than via `auth_button.pressed.emit()` — see the note at the top of the file: a synthetic `.emit()` on an `await`-using handler doesn't get driven forward reliably in `--script`/SceneTree headless mode the way real GUI input event dispatch does, confirmed by comparing direct-call vs `.emit()` behavior. Not a bug in the actual click-driven flow, just a headless-test-harness quirk to route around when writing tests. |
| `smoke_test_main_menu_back.gd` | Regression test for Play → Back logging the user out even with a valid token still held. Registers a user, loads `main_menu.tscn` (asserts it restores the authenticated state via a real `auth_state_ready` signal wait, not a frame-count guess), clicks Play → `world_list.tscn`, clicks Back → `main_menu.tscn`, and asserts the menu is still authenticated. Checks `WelcomeLabel.is_visible_in_tree()`, not just `.visible` — the label lives inside AuthPanel, so `.visible` alone is a false positive if the panel itself is hidden (a real bug briefly present: `_show_authenticated()` hid AuthPanel while claiming the welcome label was visible, which rendered nothing). |
| `smoke_test_test_level.gd` | Loads `scenes/worlds/test_level.tscn` directly (the level is player-agnostic and self-contained per `docs/architecture/pc2_test_level.md` §4) and confirms it has real content: 5 props, a `DirectionalLight3D` ("Sun"), and a `WorldEnvironment` — not an empty void. |
| `smoke_test_player.gd` | Loads `scenes/game.tscn` and confirms the player exists as a real `CharacterBody3D` with a `CollisionShape3D`+shape, a `CapsuleMesh`, and spawns at the level's `PlayerSpawn` marker position. Also asserts `JUMP_VELOCITY` is positive and a `Camera3D` exists and is `current` — both were real bugs found 2026-08-20/21 (jump velocity was negative, pushing the player down instead of up; no camera existed at all, so the game was unplayable even though the character could technically move). Structural checks only — real movement/jump *direction* correctness was verified separately via a throwaway headless physics simulation during development, not by an automated test that's part of this suite. |
| `smoke_test_enter_world.gd` | The full PC2 path end to end: register → seed a real world → load `world_list.tscn` → click the real "Enter World" button on a real card (found by walking the card's children, not by index, so it doesn't silently pass if the card layout changes) → confirms `scenes/game.tscn` actually becomes `current_scene` with the player spawned at the level's `PlayerSpawn` marker → sends a real `KEY_ESCAPE` input event (not a direct method call) and confirms it returns to `world_list.tscn`. This is the test that proves "browse → enter → walk around → leave" actually works as one continuous flow, not just that each piece works in isolation. |
| `smoke_test_network_client.gd` | **Real two-process integration test** for `scripts/network_client.gd` (client-side prediction + reconciliation, docs/architecture/networking.md §5) — needs an actual dedicated server running first: `godot --headless --path . scenes/server.tscn &`, *not* the usual HTTP backend. Connects a real `NetworkClient` over ENet, confirms local input prediction moves the player immediately (no waiting on a round trip), confirms real snapshots arrive and get processed, then deliberately desyncs the predicted position by 9999 units and confirms the very next snapshot corrects it back — the actual proof reconciliation logic works, not just that it never had to fire. Known simplification, stated in the script's own docstring: the server's snapshot doesn't currently echo back a per-peer "last input seq processed," so reconciliation corrects against the *most recent* prediction rather than true tick-exact rollback-and-replay (docs/architecture/networking.md §5.2 step 4) — a real, scoped follow-up once the server echoes that ack, not something faked here. |
| `smoke_test_avatar_system.gd` | Confirms `AvatarSystem` is a real autoload, the committed `assets/avatars/catalog.json` actually parses, `get_assets_for_slot("base_body")` returns real entries, an `AvatarLoadout` can set `base_body` and equip a real catalog accessory, the loadout round-trips through `to_json()`/`load_loadout_from_json()`, and — since `assets/avatars/*.glb` model files don't exist yet — that `AvatarLoader.load_base_body()` against a real catalog entry with a missing file fails *gracefully*: returns `null` and emits `load_error` rather than crashing. Visual rendering itself can't be verified until real assets exist. |
Run (once, to build the class cache): `godot --headless --path . --import`,
then for each smoke test: `godot --headless --path . --script
res://scripts/smoke_test_<name>.gd` — **no `--quit`**, it kills these before
their awaited HTTP calls finish.
**Known gaps:**
- No smoke tests for chunk loading/streaming (`chunk.gd`, `chunk_scene.gd`).
- No smoke tests for dynamic/static object nodes.
- All smoke tests require a live backend; no offline/unit smoke tests exist.
- `smoke_test_world_list.gd` and `smoke_test_main_menu_*.gd` are the only
ones that exercise a real `.tscn` scene instantiation — others only test
the `ApiClient` autoload directly.
- `get_me()` (`GET /auth/me`) is implemented in `scripts/api_client.gd` but
has no smoke coverage yet.
- The Login path (as opposed to Register) through `main_menu.gd` isn't
separately smoke-tested — it shares the same `_on_auth_button_pressed()`/
`_on_auth_complete()` code path already exercised for Register, but that's
inference, not a direct check.
## Client export
`scripts/build.sh` produces real Linux (`agp-game.x86_64`) and Windows
(`agp-game.exe`) binaries via `--export-release`. Verified 2026-08-20: both
exports complete clean from a fresh checkout and produce valid binaries
(confirmed via `file` — real ELF64/PE32+, not empty or truncated). Neither
export is exercised by an automated GUI test (headless Godot can't drive a
window) — actually launching and clicking through the exported binary is a
manual step, see `docs/checkpoints/PC1.md` for playtest instructions.
## What "full coverage" should eventually mean here
Not defined precisely yet — the honest target as of 2026-08-20 is
"integration tests for every endpoint + smoke tests for every major scene."
As real integration/endpoint tests get added, update the tables above
rather than letting this doc drift stale; a wrong inventory is worse than
no inventory.
-74
View File
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
[preset.0]
name="Linux"
platform="Linux/X11"
runnable=true
advanced_options=false
dedicated_server=false
custom_features=""
export_filter="all_resources"
include_filter="*.json"
exclude_filter=""
export_path="export/linux/agp-game.x86_64"
encryption_include_filters=""
encryption_exclude_filters=""
encrypt_pck=false
encrypt_directory=false
script_export_mode=2
[preset.0.options]
custom_template/debug=""
custom_template/release=""
debug/export_console_wrapper=1
binary_format/embed_pck=true
texture_format/bptc=true
texture_format/s3tc=true
texture_format/etc=false
texture_format/etc2=false
binary_format/architecture="x86_64"
ssh_remote_deploy/enabled=false
[preset.1]
name="Windows Desktop"
platform="Windows Desktop"
runnable=true
advanced_options=false
dedicated_server=false
custom_features=""
export_filter="all_resources"
include_filter="*.json"
exclude_filter=""
export_path="export/windows/agp-game.exe"
encryption_include_filters=""
encryption_exclude_filters=""
encrypt_pck=false
encrypt_directory=false
script_export_mode=2
[preset.1.options]
custom_template/debug=""
custom_template/release=""
debug/export_console_wrapper=1
binary_format/embed_pck=true
texture_format/bptc=true
texture_format/s3tc=true
texture_format/etc=false
texture_format/etc2=false
binary_format/architecture="x86_64"
codesign/enable=false
application/icon=""
application/console_wrapper_icon=""
application/icon_interpolation=4
application/file_version=""
application/product_version=""
application/company_name=""
application/product_name=""
application/file_description=""
application/copyright=""
application/trademarks=""
application/export_angle=0
application/export_d3d12=0
d3d12/agility_sdk_multizip=0
-63
View File
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
; Engine configuration file.
; It's best edited using the editor UI and not directly,
; but it can also be edited by hand.
config_version=5
[application]
config/name="AGP-Game"
run/main_scene="res://scenes/main_menu.tscn"
config/features=PackedStringArray("4.6.2")
agp/api_base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8000"
[autoload]
ApiClient="*res://scripts/api_client.gd"
AvatarSystem="*res://scripts/avatar/avatar_system.gd"
Session="*res://scripts/session.gd"
[display]
window/size/viewport_width=1920
window/size/viewport_height=1080
window/stretch/mode="canvas_items"
[input]
move_forward={
"deadzone": 0.5,
"events": [Object(InputEventKey,"resource_local_to_scene":false,"resource_name":"","device":-1,"window_id":0,"alt_pressed":false,"shift_pressed":false,"ctrl_pressed":false,"meta_pressed":false,"pressed":false,"keycode":0,"physical_keycode":87,"key_label":0,"unicode":119,"location":0,"echo":false,"script":null)
]
}
move_left={
"deadzone": 0.5,
"events": [Object(InputEventKey,"resource_local_to_scene":false,"resource_name":"","device":-1,"window_id":0,"alt_pressed":false,"shift_pressed":false,"ctrl_pressed":false,"meta_pressed":false,"pressed":false,"keycode":0,"physical_keycode":65,"key_label":0,"unicode":97,"location":0,"echo":false,"script":null)
]
}
move_right={
"deadzone": 0.5,
"events": [Object(InputEventKey,"resource_local_to_scene":false,"resource_name":"","device":-1,"window_id":0,"alt_pressed":false,"shift_pressed":false,"ctrl_pressed":false,"meta_pressed":false,"pressed":false,"keycode":0,"physical_keycode":68,"key_label":0,"unicode":100,"location":0,"echo":false,"script":null)
]
}
move_down={
"deadzone": 0.5,
"events": [Object(InputEventKey,"resource_local_to_scene":false,"resource_name":"","device":-1,"window_id":0,"alt_pressed":false,"shift_pressed":false,"ctrl_pressed":false,"meta_pressed":false,"pressed":false,"keycode":0,"physical_keycode":83,"key_label":0,"unicode":115,"location":0,"echo":false,"script":null)
]
}
interact={
"deadzone": 0.5,
"events": [Object(InputEventKey,"resource_local_to_scene":false,"resource_name":"","device":-1,"window_id":0,"alt_pressed":false,"shift_pressed":false,"ctrl_pressed":false,"meta_pressed":false,"pressed":false,"keycode":0,"physical_keycode":69,"key_label":0,"unicode":101,"location":0,"echo":false,"script":null)
]
}
[physics]
; Fixed 30 Hz sim -- the multiplayer server, client prediction, and snapshot
; rate all key off this. See docs/architecture/networking.md 3.1.
common/physics_ticks_per_second=30
[rendering]
renderer/rendering_method="gl_compatibility"
renderer/rendering_method.mobile="gl_compatibility"
-174
View File
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
extends Node
func _ready():
print("=== SANDBOX PROBE 6: Corrected Evidence Gathering (Godot 4.6.2) ===")
probe_script_loading()
probe_os_apis()
probe_file_access()
probe_network()
probe_classdb()
probe_expression_engine()
probe_engine_singletons()
probe_worker_threads()
probe_project_settings()
probe_allowlist()
print("=== SANDBOX PROBE 6 END ===")
get_tree().quit()
func probe_script_loading():
print("--- Script loading ---")
var gd = GDScript.new()
gd.source_code = "extends RefCounted\nfunc hello():\n\treturn 42\n"
var err = gd.reload()
print("GDScript.reload() from source_code err=", err)
if err == OK:
var inst = gd.new()
print(" instantiated, hello()=", inst.call("hello"))
var res = load("res://test_script.gd")
print("load('res://test_script.gd') = ", res)
if res:
print(" get_source_code() available: ", res.has_method("get_source_code"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_ast': ", gd.has_method("get_ast"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_parser': ", gd.has_method("get_parser"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_script_method_list': ", gd.has_method("get_script_method_list"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_script_property_list': ", gd.has_method("get_script_property_list"))
func probe_os_apis():
print("--- OS APIs ---")
var out = []
var exit_code = OS.execute("echo", ["hello"], out)
print("OS.execute('echo') exit=", exit_code, " out=", out)
print("OS.get_environment('HOME') = ", OS.get_environment("HOME"))
print("OS has 'create_process': ", OS.has_method("create_process"))
print("OS.get_cmdline_args() = ", OS.get_cmdline_args())
print("OS.get_user_data_dir() = ", OS.get_user_data_dir())
print("OS.get_executable_path() = ", OS.get_executable_path())
func probe_file_access():
print("--- File access ---")
var f = FileAccess.open("/etc/hostname", FileAccess.READ)
print("FileAccess.open('/etc/hostname') = ", f)
if f:
print(" content: ", f.get_as_text())
f.close()
var w = FileAccess.open("/tmp/godot_probe_write.txt", FileAccess.WRITE)
print("FileAccess.open('/tmp/...', WRITE) = ", w)
if w:
w.store_string("probe")
w.close()
print(" wrote to /tmp OK")
var dir = DirAccess.open("/")
print("DirAccess.open('/') = ", dir)
if dir:
var names = dir.get_files()
print(" root files count: ", names.size())
var res_dir = DirAccess.open("res://")
print("DirAccess.open('res://') = ", res_dir)
var user_dir = DirAccess.open("user://")
print("DirAccess.open('user://') = ", user_dir)
func probe_network():
print("--- Network ---")
var tcp = TCPServer.new()
var bind_err = tcp.listen(0)
print("TCPServer.listen(0) err=", bind_err)
var http = HTTPClient.new()
print("HTTPClient instantiated: ", http != null)
var http_req = HTTPRequest.new()
print("HTTPRequest instantiated: ", http_req != null)
var udp = PacketPeerUDP.new()
print("PacketPeerUDP instantiated: ", udp != null)
var ws = WebSocketPeer.new()
print("WebSocketPeer instantiated: ", ws != null)
func probe_classdb():
print("--- ClassDB ---")
print("ClassDB.class_exists('OS'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("OS"))
print("ClassDB.class_exists('FileAccess'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("FileAccess"))
print("ClassDB.class_exists('TCPServer'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("TCPServer"))
print("ClassDB.class_exists('HTTPClient'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("HTTPClient"))
var class_list = ClassDB.get_class_list()
print("ClassDB.get_class_list() count: ", class_list.size())
var os_methods = ClassDB.class_get_method_list("OS")
print("OS method count: ", os_methods.size())
var inst = ClassDB.instantiate("Node")
print("ClassDB.instantiate('Node') = ", inst)
print("ClassDB has 'class_get_singleton': ", ClassDB.has_method("class_get_singleton"))
func probe_expression_engine():
print("--- Expression engine ---")
var expr = Expression.new()
var err = expr.parse("1 + 2")
print("Expression.parse('1 + 2') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result = expr.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result)
var expr2 = Expression.new()
err = expr2.parse("OS.get_environment('HOME')")
print("Expression.parse('OS.get_environment') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result2 = expr2.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result2)
var expr3 = Expression.new()
err = expr3.parse("get_environment('HOME')", ["OS"])
print("Expression.parse with base_instance err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result3 = expr3.execute([], OS)
print(" Expression.execute with OS base = ", result3)
var expr4 = Expression.new()
err = expr4.parse("FileAccess.open('/etc/hostname', 1)")
print("Expression.parse('FileAccess.open') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result4 = expr4.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result4)
var expr5 = Expression.new()
err = expr5.parse("get_tree().quit()")
print("Expression.parse('get_tree().quit()') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result5 = expr5.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result5)
func probe_engine_singletons():
print("--- Engine singletons ---")
print("Engine has 'remove_singleton': ", Engine.has_method("remove_singleton"))
print("Engine has 'add_singleton': ", Engine.has_method("add_singleton"))
print("Engine.get_main_loop() = ", Engine.get_main_loop())
func probe_worker_threads():
print("--- Worker threads ---")
var thread = Thread.new()
print(" Thread.new() = ", thread)
print(" WorkerThreadPool has 'add_task': ", WorkerThreadPool.has_method("add_task"))
func probe_project_settings():
print("--- Project settings ---")
var settings = ProjectSettings.get_property_list()
var relevant = []
for s in settings:
var name = String(s.name)
if "sandbox" in name.to_lower() or "restrict" in name.to_lower() or "security" in name.to_lower():
relevant.append(name)
print(" Sandbox/security project settings: ", relevant)
print(" ProjectSettings has 'application/run/disable_os': ", ProjectSettings.has_setting("application/run/disable_os"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'application/run/disable_file_access': ", ProjectSettings.has_setting("application/run/disable_file_access"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'application/run/disable_network': ", ProjectSettings.has_setting("application/run/disable_network"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'set_setting': ", ProjectSettings.has_method("set_setting"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'save': ", ProjectSettings.has_method("save"))
func probe_allowlist():
print("--- Allowlist / static analysis ---")
var dangerous_patterns = [
"OS.execute", "OS.create_process", "OS.get_environment",
"FileAccess.open", "DirAccess.open", "TCPServer", "HTTPClient",
"load(", "preload(", "ClassDB", "Engine.get_main_loop",
"get_tree().quit", "ProjectSettings"
]
var test_script = """extends Node
func _ready():
var f = FileAccess.open("/etc/passwd", FileAccess.READ)
OS.execute("rm", ["-rf", "/"])
"""
print(" Test script contains dangerous patterns:")
for p in dangerous_patterns:
if p in test_script:
print(" DETECTED: ", p)
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
[gd_scene load_steps=2 format=3]
[ext_resource type="Script" path="res://probe6.gd" id="1"]
[node name="Probe6" type="Node"]
script = ExtResource("1")
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
; Engine configuration file.
config_version=5
[application]
config/name="sandbox_probe"
run/main_scene="res://probe6.tscn"
config/features=PackedStringArray("4.6")
-4
View File
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
extends RefCounted
func hello():
return "from test_script.gd"
View File
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
[gd_scene load_steps=2 format=3 uid="uid://avatar_customization"]
[ext_resource type="Script" path="res://scripts/avatar_customization_screen.gd" id="1"]
[node name="AvatarCustomization" type="Control"]
layout_mode = 3
anchors_preset = 15
anchor_right = 1.0
anchor_bottom = 1.0
grow_horizontal = 2
grow_vertical = 2
script = ExtResource("1")
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
[gd_scene load_steps=2 format=3 uid="uid://c0avpre7dev0rig"]
[ext_resource type="Script" path="res://scripts/tools/avatar_preview.gd" id="1"]
[node name="AvatarPreview" type="Node3D"]
script = ExtResource("1")

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More