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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
# Redis
REDIS_URL: str = "redis://localhost:6379/0"
REDIS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: float = 2.0
# JWT / Auth
# NOTE: production must override SECRET_KEY with a secure random value
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"""Redis-backed token-bucket rate limiting.
This module provides a reusable FastAPI dependency that rate-limits requests
per endpoint scope (optionally per-user) using an atomic Lua script on Redis.
If Redis is unavailable the limiter can either allow the request through
(fail-open) or reject it with a ``503`` (fail-closed), depending on the
policy configured for that limit. Chat send uses fail-closed by default
because flooding/abuse is worse than a temporary outage.
Example
-------
from app.rate_limit import rate_limit, named_limit
chat_send_limit = rate_limit(
named_limit("chat_send", capacity=5, refill_rate=0.2, fail_open=False),
user_id_dependency=Depends(get_current_user_id),
)
@router.post("/messages")
async def send_message(
payload: MessageCreate,
current_user: CurrentUser,
db: DbDep,
_: None = Depends(chat_send_limit),
):
...
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable
from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
from redis.asyncio import Redis
from redis.exceptions import RedisError
from app.config import settings
# Atomic token-bucket implementation.
#
# KEYS[1] is the bucket key. ARGV[1] is the bucket capacity, ARGV[2] is the
# refill rate in tokens per second, ARGV[3] is the current Unix time in
# seconds (float), and ARGV[4] is the request cost (tokens to take).
#
# The bucket state is stored as a hash with "tokens" and "ts". The script
# refills the bucket up to capacity, then takes the requested tokens. It
# returns an array:
# [0] allowed (1 or 0)
# [1] tokens remaining after the take
# [2] retry-after seconds (0 when allowed)
_TOKEN_BUCKET_LUA = """
local key = KEYS[1]
local capacity = tonumber(ARGV[1])
local refill_rate = tonumber(ARGV[2])
local now = tonumber(ARGV[3])
local cost = tonumber(ARGV[4])
local state = redis.call("HMGET", key, "tokens", "ts")
local tokens = capacity
local ts = now
if state[1] ~= false then
tokens = tonumber(state[1])
ts = tonumber(state[2]) or now
end
local elapsed = math.max(0, now - ts)
tokens = math.min(capacity, tokens + (elapsed * refill_rate))
local allowed = 0
local retry_after = 0
if tokens >= cost then
tokens = tokens - cost
allowed = 1
else
-- Time until enough tokens for a single request have accrued.
retry_after = math.ceil((cost - tokens) / refill_rate)
end
-- Keep the bucket state small and expire-able. Retaining the timestamp as a
-- float lets partial tokens accumulate smoothly between requests.
redis.call("HSET", key, "tokens", tostring(tokens), "ts", tostring(now))
redis.call("PEXPIRE", key, 600000)
return {allowed, tostring(tokens), retry_after}
"""
class RateLimitExceeded(HTTPException):
"""Raised when a rate-limit bucket has no tokens left."""
def __init__(self, retry_after: int) -> None:
super().__init__(
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail="Rate limit exceeded",
headers={"Retry-After": str(retry_after)},
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RateLimit:
"""Definition of a named token-bucket rate limit.
``capacity`` is the burst size and ``refill_rate`` is the steady-state
token accumulation rate (tokens/second). For example,
``RateLimit(name="chat_send", capacity=10, refill_rate=1.0)`` allows a
burst of 10 requests and then one request per second on average.
"""
name: str
capacity: int
refill_rate: float
# When Redis is unreachable: ``True`` allows the request (fail-open),
# ``False`` rejects it with 503 (fail-closed).
fail_open: bool = True
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if not self.name:
raise ValueError("name must be non-empty")
if self.capacity <= 0:
raise ValueError("capacity must be positive")
if self.refill_rate <= 0:
raise ValueError("refill_rate must be positive")
def default_user_scope(request: Request, user_id: int | None) -> str:
"""Scope a bucket per authenticated user, or per client IP if anonymous."""
if user_id is not None:
return f"user:{user_id}"
client = request.client
return f"ip:{client.host if client else 'unknown'}"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RateLimitConfig:
"""A named rate limit plus how it is applied to a request."""
limit: RateLimit
# Builds the Redis key fragment for the request. The resolved user id is
# passed as the second argument (or ``None`` for anonymous limits).
scope: Callable[[Request, int | None], str] = default_user_scope
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RateLimitResult:
"""Outcome of a rate-limit check (used by tests)."""
allowed: bool
remaining: int
retry_after: int
_redis_client: Redis | None = None
def get_redis() -> Redis:
"""Return a shared async Redis client for rate limiting.
The client is created lazily (``Redis.from_url`` does not connect until a
command is issued), so this dependency never blocks or fails just because
Redis is down.
"""
global _redis_client
if _redis_client is None:
_redis_client = Redis.from_url(
settings.REDIS_URL,
encoding="utf-8",
decode_responses=True,
socket_connect_timeout=settings.REDIS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
socket_timeout=settings.REDIS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
return _redis_client
class RateLimiter:
"""Enforce a token bucket in Redis.
Buckets are keyed as ``rate:{limit.name}:{scope_key}`` so multiple
endpoints can share a named limit while remaining independently bucketed.
"""
def __init__(self, config: RateLimitConfig, redis: Redis | None = None) -> None:
self._config = config
self._redis = redis
def _redis_client(self) -> Redis:
return self._redis or get_redis()
def _bucket_key(self, request: Request, user_id: int | None) -> str:
limit = self._config.limit
scope_key = self._config.scope(request, user_id)
return f"rate:{limit.name}:{scope_key}"
async def check(self, request: Request, user_id: int | None = None) -> RateLimitResult:
"""Atomically refill/take a token and return the outcome.
Redis failures are mapped to ``allowed=True`` (fail-open) or
``allowed=False`` (fail-closed, represented with ``retry_after=-1``)
according to the limit's policy, without raising.
"""
limit = self._config.limit
key = self._bucket_key(request, user_id)
try:
result = await self._redis_client().eval(
_TOKEN_BUCKET_LUA,
1,
key,
str(limit.capacity),
str(limit.refill_rate),
str(time.time()),
"1", # each request consumes one token
)
except RedisError:
if limit.fail_open:
return RateLimitResult(allowed=True, remaining=0, retry_after=0)
# Fail-closed: no reliable retry estimate is available.
return RateLimitResult(allowed=False, remaining=0, retry_after=-1)
# Redis may return ints or strings depending on decode_responses.
allowed = bool(int(result[0]))
remaining = int(result[1])
retry_after = int(result[2])
return RateLimitResult(allowed=allowed, remaining=remaining, retry_after=retry_after)
async def __call__(self, request: Request, user_id: int | None = None) -> None:
"""Enforce the rate limit, raising 429 or 503 as appropriate."""
result = await self.check(request, user_id)
if result.allowed:
return
if result.retry_after < 0:
# Redis was unavailable and this limit is fail-closed.
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
detail="Rate limiting service unavailable",
)
raise RateLimitExceeded(retry_after=result.retry_after)
def named_limit(
name: str,
*,
capacity: int,
refill_rate: float,
fail_open: bool = True,
) -> RateLimitConfig:
"""Create a named rate-limit config with the default per-user/IP scope.
``capacity`` is the burst size and ``refill_rate`` is tokens/second.
"""
return RateLimitConfig(
limit=RateLimit(
name=name,
capacity=capacity,
refill_rate=refill_rate,
fail_open=fail_open,
)
)
def rate_limit(
config: RateLimitConfig,
*,
user_id_dependency: Any = None,
) -> Callable[[Request, Any], Awaitable[None]]:
"""Build a FastAPI dependency enforcing ``config``.
``user_id_dependency`` optionally injects the authenticated user id, e.g.
``Depends(get_current_user_id)``. If omitted the limiter buckets by client
IP (the ``default_user_scope`` fallback), which is suitable for anonymous
endpoints but should be paired with an auth resolver for per-user limits.
The returned callable is intended for ``Depends(...)``.
"""
async def _anonymous_user_id() -> int | None:
return None
resolver = user_id_dependency if user_id_dependency is not None else Depends(_anonymous_user_id)
async def dependency(
request: Request,
user_id: int | None = resolver,
) -> None:
limiter = RateLimiter(config)
await limiter(request, user_id)
return dependency
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"""Tests for the Redis-backed token-bucket rate limiter.
These tests use fakeredis (Lua enabled via lupa) so no live Redis server is
required.
"""
import asyncio
import sys
import pytest
from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Request
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
sys.path.insert(0, "/workspace")
import fakeredis.aioredis
from redis.asyncio import Redis
from redis.exceptions import ConnectionError
from app.rate_limit import (
RateLimit,
RateLimitConfig,
RateLimiter,
default_user_scope,
named_limit,
rate_limit,
)
@pytest.fixture()
def fake_redis():
return fakeredis.aioredis.FakeRedis(decode_responses=True)
def make_request(client_ip: str = "127.0.0.1") -> Request:
scope = {
"type": "http",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/",
"headers": [],
"client": (client_ip, 12345),
}
return Request(scope)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_token_bucket_allows_burst_then_exhausts(fake_redis):
limiter = RateLimiter(
RateLimitConfig(
limit=RateLimit(name="burst", capacity=3, refill_rate=0.1),
),
redis=fake_redis,
)
request = make_request()
results = []
for _ in range(4):
result = await limiter.check(request, user_id=42)
results.append(result)
assert [r.allowed for r in results] == [True, True, True, False]
assert results[0].remaining == 2
assert results[1].remaining == 1
assert results[2].remaining == 0
assert results[3].retry_after > 0
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_retry_after_reflects_refill_rate(fake_redis):
limiter = RateLimiter(
RateLimitConfig(
limit=RateLimit(name="slow", capacity=1, refill_rate=0.5),
),
redis=fake_redis,
)
request = make_request()
assert (await limiter.check(request, user_id=7)).allowed is True
denied = await limiter.check(request, user_id=7)
assert denied.allowed is False
# 1 token / 0.5 tokens per second = 2 seconds.
assert denied.retry_after == 2
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_separate_scopes_get_separate_buckets(fake_redis):
limiter = RateLimiter(
RateLimitConfig(
limit=RateLimit(name="scoped", capacity=1, refill_rate=0.1),
),
redis=fake_redis,
)
request = make_request()
assert (await limiter.check(request, user_id=1)).allowed is True
assert (await limiter.check(request, user_id=2)).allowed is True
assert (await limiter.check(request, user_id=1)).allowed is False
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fail_open_returns_allowed_when_redis_unavailable():
class BrokenRedis(Redis):
async def eval(self, *args, **kwargs):
raise ConnectionError("down")
limiter = RateLimiter(
RateLimitConfig(
limit=RateLimit(name="open", capacity=1, refill_rate=0.1, fail_open=True),
),
redis=BrokenRedis(),
)
result = await limiter.check(make_request(), user_id=1)
assert result.allowed is True
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fail_closed_returns_denied_with_negative_retry_after():
class BrokenRedis(Redis):
async def eval(self, *args, **kwargs):
raise ConnectionError("down")
limiter = RateLimiter(
RateLimitConfig(
limit=RateLimit(name="closed", capacity=1, refill_rate=0.1, fail_open=False),
),
redis=BrokenRedis(),
)
result = await limiter.check(make_request(), user_id=1)
assert result.allowed is False
assert result.retry_after == -1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fail_closed_call_raises_503(fake_redis):
class BrokenRedis(Redis):
async def eval(self, *args, **kwargs):
raise ConnectionError("down")
limiter = RateLimiter(
RateLimitConfig(
limit=RateLimit(name="closed", capacity=1, refill_rate=0.1, fail_open=False),
),
redis=BrokenRedis(),
)
with pytest.raises(Exception) as exc_info:
await limiter(make_request(), user_id=1)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 503
def test_named_limit_builds_expected_config():
config = named_limit(
"chat_send",
capacity=5,
refill_rate=0.2,
fail_open=False,
)
assert config.limit.name == "chat_send"
assert config.limit.capacity == 5
assert config.limit.refill_rate == 0.2
assert config.limit.fail_open is False
assert config.scope is default_user_scope
def test_invalid_limit_definition_rejected():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
named_limit("bad", capacity=0, refill_rate=1.0)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
named_limit("bad", capacity=1, refill_rate=0)
def test_dependency_integration_returns_429_with_retry_after():
async def fake_user_id() -> int:
return 99
chat_limit = rate_limit(
named_limit("chat_send_test", capacity=2, refill_rate=0.1, fail_open=False),
user_id_dependency=Depends(fake_user_id),
)
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/probe")
async def probe(_: None = Depends(chat_limit)):
return {"ok": True}
client = TestClient(app)
assert client.get("/probe").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/probe").status_code == 200
denied = client.get("/probe")
assert denied.status_code == 429
assert denied.headers["retry-after"]
assert denied.json() == {"detail": "Rate limit exceeded"}
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# Social — Friends, Chat & Groups — Plan
> **Status:** Planned
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Feature ID:** `social`
> **Godot version:** 4.6.2 stable
> **Backend:** FastAPI + SQLAlchemy (async) + PostgreSQL + Redis
## 1. Overview
This document breaks the **Social** feature into user stories and right-sized
implementation tasks. The feature delivers:
- **Friends & following** — a friend request/accept model plus a one-way follow
relationship, with block lists.
- **Presence & status** — online/offline, custom status message, last-seen.
- **Chat** — direct messages (DM) and in-experience (world/room) chat with
**first-class safety**: server-side text filtering, report-message, and rate
limiting.
- **Groups** — named groups with roles (owner/admin/member) and a simple group
page.
- **Public profiles** — avatar, bio, favorite experiences, and a friends list
that respects privacy settings.
## 2. Why chat safety is the differentiator
The platform is explicitly meant to pull adults away from a youth-oriented
competitor. Chat is the highest-risk surface: it is real-time, user-generated,
and where abuse happens fastest. Safety is therefore treated as a **blocking
requirement**, not an add-on:
- Every message passes a **server-side text filter** before it is stored or
delivered. The client filter is cosmetic only; the server is authoritative.
- Every message can be **reported**; reports flow into a moderation queue with
actor + reason + audit trail (mirroring `content_moderation.md`).
- Sending is **rate limited** per user (Redis token bucket) to stop flooding and
harassment-by-volume.
- Report and block are always reachable from a message context in the UI.
## 3. Existing constraints (do not re-build)
- **Auth:** JWT bearer tokens; `get_current_user` / `CurrentUser` dependency in
`app/dependencies.py`. All social endpoints reuse this.
- **DB:** async SQLAlchemy + Alembic; migration `0001_initial` is the head.
- **Redis:** configured (`REDIS_URL`) but unused so far; adopted here for
presence and rate limiting.
- **Models:** `User`, `World` (owner_id), `Asset` (owner_id, is_public). Avatars
and favorite-experience references point at existing rows.
- **Client:** Godot 4.6.2, minimal `main_menu.gd`; no social UI yet.
## 4. Key design decisions
| Concern | Decision |
|---|---|
| Message transport | REST for send/history; **WebSocket** gateway for real-time delivery + presence (matches `networking.md`'s "WebSocket as secondary transport" for chat) |
| Presence store | Redis (TTL heartbeat) + persisted `last_seen_at` on the user record |
| Text filtering | Pluggable `TextFilter` interface with a deterministic default (profanity list + normalization) so it runs without external services; third-party hook later |
| Rate limiting | Redis token-bucket dependency, reusable across all social endpoints |
| Reports | `message_reports` table + moderation endpoints (list/review/resolve) with audit fields |
| Friends vs. follow | Friends = mutual (request→accept). Follow = one-way (no approval). Block = hard deny that also hides content and prevents DMs |
| Privacy | Per-user settings JSON (`profile_visibility`, `friends_list_visibility`, `favorites_visibility`) enforced server-side on every read |
| Groups | `groups` + `group_members` (role: owner/admin/member) + group page aggregate endpoint |
| Real-time | One WebSocket endpoint multiplexing presence, DM, and world-chat messages via Redis pub/sub |
## 5. User stories
### US-1 Friends & following
As a player, I can send a friend request, accept/decline incoming requests,
unfriend, follow/unfollow other players, and block users so they can't interact
with me.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Friend requests are one-directional until accepted; accepted friendships are mutual.
- Follow is one-way and requires no approval.
- Block prevents DMs, hides the blocked user's profile/friends interactions, and
removes any existing friendship/follow between the two.
- Duplicate/self requests are rejected idempotently.
### US-2 Presence & status
As a player, I can see whether my friends are online, their custom status, and
when they were last seen.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Online/offline is derived from a server-side heartbeat (Redis TTL), not client claims.
- `last_seen_at` persists and is visible (subject to privacy settings).
- Custom status text is optional and length-limited.
### US-3 Public profiles
As a player, I can view a public profile page showing avatar, bio, favorite
experiences, and a friends list that respects the owner's privacy settings.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Avatar and bio are editable by the owner only.
- Favorite experiences reference existing `World` rows.
- A viewer sees only the sections the owner's privacy settings allow; blocked
users see a restricted view.
### US-4 Chat (DM + in-experience) with safety
As a player, I can send direct messages and chat inside a world/room. Messages
are filtered, rate limited, and reportable.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Server filters message text before storing/delivering; filtered content is either
rejected (blocking) or redacted (configurable per filter policy).
- Send rate is limited per user (token bucket); excess sends get `429`.
- Every message has a stable id, author, timestamp, and conversation/world scope.
- Any message can be reported with a reason; reports are stored and reviewable.
- Real-time delivery over WebSocket with REST fallback for history.
### US-5 Groups
As a player, I can create a group, join/leave groups, and (as owner/admin)
manage roles and view a simple group page.
**Acceptance criteria**
- Each group has exactly one owner and any number of admins/members.
- Role transitions are authorized (only owner can transfer ownership or promote/demote admins).
- Group page lists name, description, member list with roles, and member count.
### US-6 Godot client
As a player, I can access friends, presence, chat, profiles, and groups from the
game UI.
**Acceptance criteria**
- An API client handles JWT auth, HTTP, and WebSocket for all social calls.
- Dedicated screens/panels: friends+presence, DM & world chat (with report),
profile page, group page.
- Client-side filtering is cosmetic; server responses remain authoritative.
## 6. Task breakdown
Right-sized to 1–3 files / one coherent piece of functionality each. Task IDs
are sequential for dependency chaining.
| # | Task | Story | Depends on |
|---|------|-------|-----------|
| 1 | Friends/follow/block models + Alembic migration | US-1 | — |
| 2 | Friends & follow API router | US-1 | 1 |
| 3 | Presence & status model + endpoints (Redis heartbeat) | US-2 | — |
| 4 | Profile model + migration + own-profile endpoints | US-3 | 1 |
| 5 | Public profile view + favorites + privacy enforcement | US-3 | 2, 4 |
| 6 | Chat data models + migration (conversations, messages, reports) | US-4 | — |
| 7 | Text filtering service + profanity config | US-4 | — |
| 8 | Redis rate-limiting dependency | US-4 | — |
| 9 | DM chat send/list endpoints (filter + rate limit) | US-4 | 6, 7, 8 |
| 10 | Report-message endpoint + moderation queue | US-4 | 6, 9 |
| 11 | In-experience (world/room) chat endpoints | US-4 | 9 |
| 12 | Real-time WebSocket gateway (presence + DM + world chat) | US-4 | 3, 9, 11 |
| 13 | Group + membership models + migration | US-5 | — |
| 14 | Groups API (CRUD, join/leave, roles, group page) | US-5 | 13 |
| 15 | Godot API client (auth + HTTP + WebSocket) | US-6 | 2 |
| 16 | Godot friends & presence UI | US-6 | 3, 15 |
| 17 | Godot chat UI (DM + world chat + report) | US-6 | 12, 15 |
| 18 | Godot profile page UI | US-6 | 5, 15 |
| 19 | Godot groups UI + group page | US-6 | 14, 15 |
## 7. Phasing
- **Phase 1 (data + core APIs):** tasks 1–5 (friends, presence, profiles).
- **Phase 2 (chat safety — the differentiator):** tasks 6–12 (chat + safety +
realtime). This is the critical path and highest priority.
- **Phase 3 (groups):** tasks 13–14.
- **Phase 4 (client):** tasks 15–19, each landing after its backend dependency.
## 8. Out of scope for this feature
- Age verification / maturity gating (covered by `content_moderation.md`).
- Voice chat, media/image messages, message editing/deletion history.
- Third-party profanity/toxicity vendors (the `TextFilter` interface leaves a
hook, but the default is deterministic and dependency-free).
- Mobile push notifications.