extends Node

func _ready():
	print("=== SANDBOX PROBE 2: Sandboxing Mechanisms ===")
	probe_scriptserver()
	probe_script_restrictions()
	probe_subviewport_isolation()
	probe_engine_restrictions()
	probe_allowlist_approach()
	print("=== SANDBOX PROBE 2 END ===")
	get_tree().quit()

func probe_scriptserver():
	print("--- ScriptServer ---")
	# Does ScriptServer exist and what can it do?
	print("ScriptServer has_method('get_language_count'): ", ScriptServer.has_method("get_language_count"))
	print("ScriptServer has_method('get_language'): ", ScriptServer.has_method("get_language"))
	# Can we enumerate registered script languages?
	if ScriptServer.has_method("get_language_count"):
		var count = ScriptServer.get_language_count()
		print("  language count: ", count)
		for i in range(count):
			var lang = ScriptServer.get_language(i)
			print("  language[", i, "] = ", lang)

func probe_script_restrictions():
	print("--- Script restrictions ---")
	# Can we restrict which classes/globals a script can access?
	# Test: does GDScript have any built-in allowlist mechanism?
	var gd = GDScript.new()
	gd.source_code = "extends RefCounted\nfunc evil():\n\treturn OS.get_environment('HOME')\n"
	var err = gd.reload()
	print("  GDScript with OS access reload err=", err)
	if err == OK:
		var inst = gd.new()
		print("  evil() result: ", inst.call("evil"))
	# Can we block specific global classes?
	print("  GDScript has method to restrict globals: ", gd.has_method("set_global_scope"))

func probe_subviewport_isolation():
	print("--- SubViewport isolation ---")
	# SubViewports isolate rendering, but do they isolate script execution?
	var vp = SubViewport.new()
	print("  SubViewport.new() = ", vp)
	# SubViewports share the same process/engine - scripts still have full access
	print("  SubViewport does NOT isolate script execution (same process)")
	vp.free()

func probe_engine_restrictions():
	print("--- Engine restrictions ---")
	# Is there a way to disable OS/File/Network access globally?
	print("  Engine.has_singleton('OS'): ", Engine.has_singleton("OS"))
	print("  Engine.has_singleton('FileAccess'): ", Engine.has_singleton("FileAccess"))
	# Check if there's a '--disable-*' flag or project setting
	print("  ProjectSettings has 'application/run/disable_*': ", ProjectSettings.has_setting("application/run/disable_os"))
	# Check for any sandbox-related project settings
	var settings = ProjectSettings.get_property_list()
	var sandbox_settings = []
	for s in settings:
		if "sandbox" in String(s.name).to_lower() or "restrict" in String(s.name).to_lower():
			sandbox_settings.append(s.name)
	print("  Sandbox-related project settings: ", sandbox_settings)

func probe_allowlist_approach():
	print("--- Allowlist approach ---")
	# The allowlist approach: parse GDScript source and reject disallowed patterns
	# Test: can we detect dangerous API calls via string analysis?
	var dangerous_patterns = [
		"OS.execute", "OS.create_process", "OS.get_environment",
		"FileAccess.open", "DirAccess.open", "TCPServer", "HTTPClient",
		"load(", "preload(", "ClassDB", "Engine.get_main_loop",
		"get_tree().quit", "ProjectSettings"
	]
	var test_script = """
extends Node
func _ready():
	var f = FileAccess.open("/etc/passwd", FileAccess.READ)
	OS.execute("rm", ["-rf", "/"])
	"""
	print("  Test script contains dangerous patterns:")
	for p in dangerous_patterns:
		if p in test_script:
			print("    DETECTED: ", p)