Compare commits

..

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
architect-bot 1cc81979a4 Merge architect's per-file test detail into the checkpoint doc fix
Architect independently reclaimed this task after my fix landed and
rewrote the same doc with more precise per-file test descriptions and a
more specific gap list -- genuinely better in places (caught real detail
I'd summarized loosely) but its own investigation also introduced one
factual error (claimed 18 tests in test_auth_age_gate.py; verified via
pytest --collect-only, it's 17) and dropped two things worth keeping:
the exact commit hash for reproducibility, and the Client export section
(it never looked at the export step).

Merged: kept the architect's richer per-file coverage descriptions and
gap analysis, restored the verified counts/commit hash/export section/
--quit gotcha from my original.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:37:01 +00:00
claude-checkpoint-tooling afc2211d70 Update test_inventory.md to reflect PC1 checkpoint reality
Was written 2026-08-19 and badly stale by the time the full PC1
checkpoint validation ran 2026-08-20: said 38 backend tests (actually
68), said zero integration/endpoint tests exist (4 real integration
test files landed since), and said nothing had merged for Godot smoke
tests (4 real ones did).

Verified for real, fresh clone of main, commit 927f9bd: migrations +
68/68 pytest + all 4 Godot smoke tests + both platform exports (Linux
ELF64 + Windows PE32+, confirmed valid via file) all clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 00:47:18 +00:00
reviewer-bot 927f9bd95e Merge pull request 'End-to-end headless smoke test: register -> login -> fetch worlds' (#39) from agent/775379a9bedc into main 2026-08-20 00:26:58 +00:00
reviewer-bot 2d1f0111c3 Merge pull request 'Write auth endpoint tests (pytest)' (#38) from agent/daf820da4497 into main 2026-08-19 23:33:04 +00:00
tester-bot c5a5476620 WIP checkpoint: Write auth endpoint tests (pytest) 2026-08-19 22:50:22 +00:00
tester-bot 06604a24a8 WIP checkpoint: Write auth endpoint tests (pytest) 2026-08-19 22:49:19 +00:00
3 changed files with 272 additions and 47 deletions
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
"""Shared pytest fixtures.
The auth integration tests hit the *real* Postgres database (per
``DATABASE_URL``), so they persist data between runs. Without cleanup a
second run of the suite fails with 409 conflicts because the users it
registered on the first run already exist. The session-scoped fixture below
truncates all application tables once before the first test, making the suite
re-runnable.
Truncation order doesn't strictly matter because ``CASCADE`` follows foreign
keys, but the tables are listed explicitly for clarity.
"""
import asyncio
import pytest
from sqlalchemy import text
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
from app.config import settings
TEST_TABLES = ("assets", "worlds", "sessions", "refresh_tokens", "users")
@pytest.fixture(scope="session", autouse=True)
def _reset_database():
"""Truncate all application tables once per test session."""
async def _truncate() -> None:
engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL)
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.execute(
text(f"TRUNCATE TABLE {', '.join(TEST_TABLES)} CASCADE")
)
await engine.dispose()
asyncio.run(_truncate())
yield
+171
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
"""Tests for expired-token rejection across auth endpoints.
Covers two distinct expiry paths:
1. An *access* JWT whose ``exp`` claim is in the past must be rejected
with 401 by ``GET /api/auth/me`` (jose's built-in ``exp`` validation).
2. A *refresh* token whose persisted ``expires_at`` is in the past must be
rejected with 401 by ``POST /api/auth/refresh`` even though its JWT
signature is still valid.
Requires migrations already applied (alembic upgrade head) before running.
"""
import asyncio
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from jose import jwt
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
from app.config import settings
from app.main import app
from app.database import get_db
from app.models.session import RefreshToken
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Test fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _override_db():
"""Override get_db so the app uses a fresh session per test."""
test_engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, poolclass=NullPool)
test_session_factory = async_sessionmaker(test_engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async def _get_db():
async_session = test_session_factory()
try:
yield async_session
await async_session.commit()
except Exception:
await async_session.rollback()
raise
finally:
await async_session.close()
app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = _get_db
yield
app.dependency_overrides.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _mint_access_token(exp: datetime) -> str:
"""Mint an RS256 access token with an explicit ``exp`` claim."""
return jwt.encode(
{"sub": "1", "exp": exp},
settings.private_pem,
algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
)
def _expire_refresh_token_in_db(token: str) -> None:
"""Set the persisted refresh token's ``expires_at`` into the past."""
async def _do():
engine = create_async_engine(settings.DATABASE_URL, poolclass=NullPool)
session_factory = async_sessionmaker(engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async with session_factory() as session:
from sqlalchemy import update
await session.execute(
update(RefreshToken)
.where(RefreshToken.token == token)
.values(expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1))
)
await session.commit()
await engine.dispose()
asyncio.run(_do())
def _register_user(client: TestClient, username: str) -> str:
"""Register a user and return its refresh token."""
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/register",
json={
"username": username,
"email": f"{username}@example.com",
"password": "secret123",
"date_of_birth": "2000-01-01",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 201
return resp.json()["refresh_token"]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Expired access token (GET /api/auth/me)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExpiredAccessToken:
def test_expired_access_token_is_rejected_by_me(self):
"""An access JWT with a past exp claim returns 401 on /me."""
client = TestClient(app)
expired_token = _mint_access_token(
datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=5)
)
resp = client.get(
"/api/auth/me",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {expired_token}"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Could not validate credentials" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_garbage_access_token_is_rejected_by_me(self):
"""A non-JWT bearer token returns 401 on /me."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/api/auth/me",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer not-a-real-jwt"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_missing_bearer_token_returns_401(self):
"""No Authorization header at all returns 401 on /me."""
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get("/api/auth/me")
assert resp.status_code == 401
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Expired refresh token (POST /api/auth/refresh)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExpiredRefreshToken:
def test_expired_refresh_token_is_rejected(self):
"""A refresh token whose DB expires_at is in the past returns 401."""
client = TestClient(app)
refresh_token = _register_user(client, "expired_rt_user")
# Force the persisted record to be expired while its JWT signature
# is still valid.
_expire_refresh_token_in_db(refresh_token)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": refresh_token},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Invalid or expired refresh token" in resp.json()["detail"]
def test_expired_refresh_token_jwt_is_rejected(self):
"""A refresh JWT with a past exp claim is rejected before DB lookup."""
client = TestClient(app)
expired_jwt = jwt.encode(
{"sub": "1", "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=5)},
settings.private_pem,
algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
)
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/refresh",
json={"refresh_token": expired_jwt},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert "Invalid or expired refresh token" in resp.json()["detail"]
+63 -47
View File
@@ -7,72 +7,88 @@ to know what "run the tests" actually checked.
Run everything below in one shot with `scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py`. Run everything below in one shot with `scripts/run_checkpoint_tests.py`.
Last verified against `main`: 2026-08-19 (commit `1c75367`). Last verified against `main`: 2026-08-20 (commit `927f9bd`) — full PC1
checkpoint run, fresh clone, migrations + pytest + all 4 Godot smoke tests +
both platform exports, all clean.
## Backend — `backend/tests/` (pytest) ## Backend — `backend/tests/` (pytest)
Run: `cd backend && python -m pytest -v` (needs `DATABASE_URL` pointed at a Run: `cd backend && python -m pytest -v` (needs `DATABASE_URL` pointed at a
reachable Postgres — see the runner script; most of these tests don't reachable Postgres — see the runner script).
actually touch the DB, but the app's import chain requires a valid URL to
construct).
**Current total: 38 tests, all passing on a clean `main` checkout.** **Current total: 68 tests, all passing on a clean `main` checkout.**
| File | Tests | What it covers | | File | Tests | What it covers |
|---|---|---| |---|---|---|
| `test_auth_age_gate.py` | 10 | `calculate_age()` date-math correctness (exact boundary, leap years, birthday-not-yet-this-year) + `RegisterRequest` date-of-birth validation (parametrized valid/invalid date rejection). Backs the 18+ registration gate (PR #23). | | `test_auth_age_gate.py` | 17 | `calculate_age()` date-math correctness (exact boundary, leap years, birthday-not-yet-this-year) + `RegisterRequest` date-of-birth validation (parametrized valid/invalid date rejection). Backs the 18+ registration gate (PR #23). |
| `test_gltf_metadata.py` | 21 | glTF/GLB binary + JSON parsing: magic-byte detection, chunk-padding handling, mesh/animation/texture-reference metadata extraction, malformed-input rejection. Backs the asset-import pipeline (PR #27). | | `test_gltf_metadata.py` | 21 | glTF/GLB binary + JSON parsing: magic-byte detection, chunk-padding handling, mesh/animation/texture-reference metadata extraction, malformed-input rejection. Backs the asset-import pipeline (PR #27). |
| `test_auth_endpoints.py` | 11 | **Integration tests** for `POST /api/auth/register` and `POST /api/auth/login` against the real FastAPI app + real Postgres. Covers: successful register (201), duplicate username (409), duplicate email (409), underage rejection (400), invalid date format (422), exact-18 registration, successful login with correct credentials (200), wrong password (401), nonexistent user (401), form-encoded login (OAuth2), and JWT validity of returned tokens. |
| `test_refresh_endpoint.py` | 8 | **Integration tests** for `POST /api/auth/refresh`. Covers: successful refresh (200, new access token, same refresh token returned), refresh produces different access tokens on repeated calls, invalid refresh token (401), empty body (422), missing field (422), refresh token from login also works, returned access token is valid JWT decodable with public key, `access_token_expires_minutes` in response. |
| `test_refresh_token_jti.py` | 6 | Unit tests for refresh token uniqueness (jti claim) and model column length. Covers: two calls with same sub produce different tokens (jti uniqueness), jti is valid UUID, rapid repeated calls all produce unique jtis, jti survives decode, `RefreshToken.token` column is `String(512)`, column type is `String`. |
| `test_auth_expired_token.py` | 5 | **Integration tests** for expired-token rejection across auth endpoints. Covers: expired access JWT rejected by `GET /api/auth/me` (401), garbage access token rejected by `/me` (401), missing bearer token returns 401, expired refresh token (DB `expires_at` in past) rejected by `/refresh` (401), expired refresh JWT (past `exp` claim) rejected before DB lookup (401). |
**What these are, honestly:** pure unit tests of standalone functions **What these are, honestly:** a mix of pure unit tests (`test_auth_age_gate.py`,
(`calculate_age`, the glTF parser, Pydantic validators). None of them spin `test_gltf_metadata.py`, `test_refresh_token_jti.py`) and real integration tests
up the FastAPI app or hit a real endpoint — they run in ~1s and don't (`test_auth_endpoints.py`, `test_refresh_endpoint.py`, `test_auth_expired_token.py`)
actually need Postgres reachable at all (the import chain just needs a that hit the FastAPI app against a real Postgres database via `TestClient`.
syntactically valid `DATABASE_URL`, nothing connects during collection). The integration tests exercise the full stack: Pydantic validation → DB →
JWT → response. The suite is also re-runnable without manual cleanup —
`backend/tests/conftest.py` has a session-scoped autouse fixture that
truncates all app tables once before the suite runs.
**Known coverage gaps** (real gaps, not placeholders — nothing enforces filling **Known coverage gaps** (real gaps, not placeholders — nothing enforces filling
these yet): these yet):
- No integration/endpoint tests at all — `/register`, `/login`, `/refresh`, - No endpoint tests for `GET /api/worlds`, `GET /api/assets/*`, or any
`/worlds`, `/assets/*` have zero tests that actually call them through world/asset CRUD routes — only auth endpoints have integration coverage
the FastAPI app (e.g. via `httpx.AsyncClient` + `ASGITransport`) against a (`GET /api/worlds` is covered indirectly via the Godot smoke tests below).
real (or test) database. Everything currently shipped works because it - No tests for the moderation schema/migration beyond "the migration runs."
was manually verified at merge time (checkpoint review), not because a - No tests for the `GET /api/auth/me` endpoint's response body (only its
test asserts it. auth-header validation is covered via expired-token tests).
- No tests for the RS256 auth upgrade (key generation, refresh-token - No tests for session management (create/validate/revoke sessions).
issuance/persistence) — PR #30, pending review as of this writing,
manually verified (correct key usage, all 38 existing tests still pass)
but not covered by an automated test of its own yet.
- No tests for the moderation schema/migration (in progress as of this
writing) beyond "the migration runs."
## Godot client — `scripts/smoke_test_*.gd` ## Godot client — `scripts/smoke_test_*.gd`
**Nothing merged into `main` yet as of this writing** — `sandbox_probe/test_script.gd` **4 smoke tests merged into `main`.** Each needs a live backend —
is the only Godot script on `main` right now, and it's **not a real `AGP_API_BASE_URL` env var, falling back to the
test** (a leftover manual probe, returns a hardcoded string, asserts `application/agp/api_base_url` project setting (default
nothing). Don't count it toward coverage; delete or repurpose it if anyone `http://127.0.0.1:8000`) if unset.
actually needs a sandbox probe again.
`scripts/smoke_test_api.gd` (PC1, PR #29, pending review as of this writing) | File | What it covers |
will be the first real one once merged — `ApiClient` autoload's |---|---|
`health_check()` against a **live backend** (set `AGP_API_BASE_URL` to point | `smoke_test_api.gd` | Exercises `ApiClient.health_check()` against a live backend. Verifies the real HTTP request path (`HTTPRequest` node lifecycle, JSON parse, result-dictionary contract). Exits 1 on failure. |
at one), verified by hand end-to-end before opening the PR: exercises the | `smoke_test_auth.gd` | Tests the full auth flow via `ApiClient` autoload: register unique user (201), duplicate username (409), under-18 registration (400), correct login (200), wrong password (401), nonexistent user (401). |
real HTTP request path (`HTTPRequest` node lifecycle, JSON parse, the | `smoke_test_e2e.gd` | End-to-end flow: health check → register → login → worlds list. Verifies the full request chain with a fresh user, including token storage and `get_worlds()` with auth header. |
result-dictionary contract), not just that the script compiles. Exits 1 on | `smoke_test_world_list.gd` | Instantiates `world_list.tscn` as a real scene, adds to tree (catches `@onready` node-path bugs), waits for `_refresh_worlds()` to complete, confirms the screen reaches a real end state (world cards, empty-list message, or error label — not stuck loading). |
failure, so it's CI/script-friendly.
Run (once merged): `godot --headless --path . --import` once (builds the Run (once, to build the class cache): `godot --headless --path . --import`,
class cache — skip this and every `class_name`-declared class falsely then for each smoke test: `godot --headless --path . --script
errors as undeclared), then for each `scripts/smoke_test_*.gd`: res://scripts/smoke_test_<name>.gd` — **no `--quit`**, it kills these before
`godot --headless --path . --script res://scripts/<name>.gd` their awaited HTTP calls finish.
**Known gap once it lands:** only `health_check()` is exercised end-to-end. **Known gaps:**
`login`, `register`, `get_worlds`, `get_me` are implemented (see - No smoke tests for the main menu scene (`main_menu.tscn`).
`scripts/api_client.gd`) but have no smoke coverage yet — each would need a - No smoke tests for chunk loading/streaming (`chunk.gd`, `chunk_scene.gd`).
real user/world fixture in the target backend to test against meaningfully. - No smoke tests for dynamic/static object nodes.
- All smoke tests require a live backend; no offline/unit smoke tests exist.
- `smoke_test_world_list.gd` is the only one that exercises a real `.tscn`
scene instantiation — others only test the `ApiClient` autoload.
- `get_me()` (`GET /auth/me`) is implemented in `scripts/api_client.gd` but
has no smoke coverage yet.
## Client export
`scripts/build.sh` produces real Linux (`agp-game.x86_64`) and Windows
(`agp-game.exe`) binaries via `--export-release`. Verified 2026-08-20: both
exports complete clean from a fresh checkout and produce valid binaries
(confirmed via `file` — real ELF64/PE32+, not empty or truncated). Neither
export is exercised by an automated GUI test (headless Godot can't drive a
window) — actually launching and clicking through the exported binary is a
manual step, see `docs/checkpoints/PC1.md` for playtest instructions.
## What "full coverage" should eventually mean here ## What "full coverage" should eventually mean here
Not defined precisely yet — the honest target as of 2026-08-19 is just Not defined precisely yet — the honest target as of 2026-08-20 is
"more than pure-function unit tests." As real integration/endpoint tests get "integration tests for every endpoint + smoke tests for every major scene."
added, update the tables above rather than letting this doc drift stale; As real integration/endpoint tests get added, update the tables above
a wrong inventory is worse than no inventory. rather than letting this doc drift stale; a wrong inventory is worse than
no inventory.