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architect-bot 218e7e24af WIP checkpoint: Address review feedback: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-18 02:06:21 +00:00
architect-bot d293ef2a08 WIP checkpoint: Address review feedback: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-18 01:48:59 +00:00
architect-bot 4da8687f2c Document GDScript sandboxing findings and recommendation
Verified all three options from the task against Godot 4.6.2 directly
(godot --headless), rather than trusting the probe scripts' own printed
output from earlier sessions:
- ScriptServer doesn't exist as a class; no disable_os/disable_file_access/
  disable_network project settings exist either. Nothing to configure.
- SubViewport isolates rendering/input only, not script capabilities — a
  script inside one has identical OS/FileAccess/network access.
- Expression is not safe by default (can still reach unsafe methods through
  a base instance); blocklisting dangerous substrings is trivially bypassed.

Recommendation: don't sandbox GDScript in-process (nothing to sandbox
with) — use a narrow non-Turing-complete content DSL for the common case,
and OS-level process isolation only if genuinely general scripting turns
out to be required.
2026-08-17 23:43:48 +00:00
architect-bot 119cd9400a WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 21:33:57 +00:00
architect-bot a576c25124 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 21:30:27 +00:00
architect-bot 0b00b01502 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 21:30:03 +00:00
architect-bot 8d50de075d WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 21:29:39 +00:00
architect-bot 2df195734b WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 21:26:31 +00:00
architect-bot 20be724115 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 21:00:02 +00:00
architect-bot bd8f311a96 Recovered orphaned WIP before switching to a new task 2026-08-17 20:52:21 +00:00
architect-bot d422eff912 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:41:48 +00:00
architect-bot ae6ccc3e5f WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:39:05 +00:00
architect-bot fed16f1f1d WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:37:49 +00:00
architect-bot 9450fb86d0 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:36:34 +00:00
architect-bot a863bb2ab4 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:35:29 +00:00
architect-bot a1846f34b5 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:33:56 +00:00
architect-bot 62447258b2 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:33:28 +00:00
architect-bot c931670e9d WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:25:30 +00:00
architect-bot 68b783909d WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:25:15 +00:00
architect-bot 0b5034759c WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:24:53 +00:00
architect-bot 19a63bda11 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:24:28 +00:00
architect-bot a3cdb18a5c WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:18:59 +00:00
architect-bot a3fc36db19 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:18:40 +00:00
architect-bot 42914aec85 WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:17:55 +00:00
architect-bot 8b17cc3ddd WIP checkpoint: Research and design GDScript sandboxing approach 2026-08-17 20:17:28 +00:00
architect-bot 9e2e0ed921 Recovered orphaned WIP before switching to a new task 2026-08-17 20:09:27 +00:00
8 changed files with 376 additions and 369 deletions
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# Editor Architecture: Godot Editor Plugin vs. In-Game Editor
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** World chunk data format & persistence, server authority + client
> prediction, content moderation & age verification, avatar component system
> **Godot version:** 4.6.2 stable
## 1. Overview
This document evaluates the two primary ways to build the **world/level
authoring tool** for **agp-game**:
- **(a) Godot editor plugin** — extend the Godot editor itself with custom
panels, dock widgets, and tools that operate on the project's scenes and
resources.
- **(b) In-game editor** — a fully custom editor built as game UI (Godot
`Control` nodes) that runs inside the running game, editing the game's own
world data.
The goal is to pick the approach that best fits the platform's constraints:
a **server-authoritative** multiplayer game where the **world is stored as
versioned chunks** (see `world.md`), content is **moderation-flagged** (see
`content_moderation.md`), and the client is a **shipped binary** that players
run (not a dev tool).
This document is a **decision record**: it lays out the trade-offs, gives a
clear recommendation, and defines the resulting architecture boundaries.
---
## 2. Context & Constraints
Before comparing the two approaches, we must fix the constraints that drive the
decision. These come from the existing architecture docs.
### 2.1 The World Is Data, Not Scenes
`world.md` defines the world as **chunk data** (JSON for authoring, binary for
runtime/network), persisted in SQLite on the server. A chunk is the atomic unit
of load, save, and stream. The **server is the only writer** to the store;
clients submit **deltas** against a `base_revision` and the server validates and
applies them.
**Implication:** The editor's output is **chunk payloads**, not `.tscn` scene
files. Whatever editor we build must serialize to the chunk contract, not to
Godot scene resources.
### 2.2 Server-Authoritative & Moderation-Aware
- The server validates every edit (schema, bounds, moderation) before
persisting (`world.md` §5.4).
- Content carries **content flags** aggregated from referenced assets/scripts
(`content_moderation.md` §3). Mature content is gated behind age verification.
- The client receives a **content manifest** and never loads content not in it.
**Implication:** An editor that runs on a **player's machine** cannot be the
authority on what gets published. Editing must go through the server's
validation pipeline, and the editor must surface moderation flags.
### 2.3 The Client Is a Shipped Binary
The game is a multiplayer product. Players run a **release build**. The Godot
editor is a **development tool** that players do not have.
**Implication:** If authoring is a first-class *player* feature (user-generated
content), the editor must ship inside the game binary. If authoring is a
*developer/platform* feature, it can live in the editor.
### 2.4 Two Distinct Audiences
The evaluation must separate two audiences, because they have opposite needs:
| Audience | Who | Where they run | What they build |
|----------|-----|----------------|-----------------|
| **Platform/dev** | The team building the game | Godot editor (dev machines) | Base worlds, rooms, templates, test levels |
| **Players (UGC)** | End users | The shipped game | Their own rooms/worlds, published to the server |
The two approaches map cleanly onto these audiences, and the right answer is
likely **both** — but with a clear primary recommendation.
---
## 3. Approach (a): Godot Editor Plugin
### 3.1 What It Is
A Godot editor plugin is a set of scripts (and optionally scenes) that extend
the editor via the `EditorPlugin` API. It can add:
- **Dock panels** (`add_control_to_dock`) — e.g., a chunk/tile palette panel.
- **Toolbar buttons** (`add_control_to_container`).
- **Inspector plugins** (`EditorInspectorPlugin`) — custom property editors.
- **Import plugins** (`EditorImportPlugin`) — custom asset importers.
- **Scene/Node plugins** (`EditorNode3DGizmoPlugin`) — custom gizmos.
- **Menu entries** (`add_tool_menu_item`).
Plugins are enabled per-project via `project.godot` (`[editor_plugins]`).
### 3.2 Pros
- **Full editor power for free:** You get the scene tree, inspector, viewport
navigation, undo/redo, gizmos, and asset pipeline — all battle-tested.
- **Native Godot editing:** Editing `.tscn` scenes, materials, and nodes is
exactly what the editor is built for. Great for authoring **base content**
(rooms, templates, avatar base bodies).
- **Fast iteration for devs:** The platform team can build and test levels
directly in the tool they already use.
- **Undo/redo, selection, snapping** come from the editor's `EditorUndoRedoManager`.
- **No runtime footprint:** Editor-only code is stripped from export builds
(`@tool` scripts and editor plugins are not shipped to players).
### 3.3 Cons
- **Not available to players.** Players don't run the Godot editor. Any
player-facing UGC authoring cannot use this approach.
- **Tied to the editor's UX.** You inherit the editor's look and interaction
model; deep customization is limited by what the editor API exposes.
- **Editor API churn.** `EditorPlugin` APIs change between Godot versions;
plugins are more brittle across upgrades than game code.
- **Scene-centric, not data-centric.** The editor is optimized for scenes and
resources. Our world is **chunk data** (`world.md`). We'd have to build a
translation layer (scene ↔ chunk) and keep it in sync — a real source of
drift.
- **Single-user, local.** The editor edits local files. It does not natively
talk to our server-authoritative chunk store or the moderation pipeline.
- **Headless/CI friction.** Validating plugin behavior in CI requires running
the editor headless, which is heavier than testing game code.
### 3.4 Fit for Our Constraints
- **Platform/dev authoring:** Excellent. This is the natural home for building
base worlds, rooms, and templates.
- **Player UGC:** Not applicable. Players cannot run the editor.
- **Server-authoritative chunk store:** Poor fit natively. The editor edits
local scenes; we'd bolt on a chunk export/import and a server sync layer.
---
## 4. Approach (b): In-Game Editor
### 4.1 What It Is
A fully custom editor built as **game UI** — Godot `Control` nodes (panels,
buttons, toolbars) that run inside the running game. It edits the game's own
world data model (chunks) and submits edits through the normal server pipeline.
### 4.2 Pros
- **Ships to players.** The editor is part of the game binary, so **player UGC
authoring is possible** — the core requirement for a user-generated-content
platform.
- **Data-native.** The editor operates directly on the **chunk model**
(`world.md`), so there is no scene↔chunk translation layer and no drift.
- **Server-authoritative by construction.** Edits go through the same
`request_chunk_edit` RPCs as gameplay, so validation, revisioning, and
moderation apply uniformly. The editor cannot bypass the server.
- **Moderation-aware.** Because edits flow through the server, content flags are
computed and enforced at the boundary (`content_moderation.md` §4). The editor
can surface flags and gate mature content.
- **One codebase, one UX.** The editor uses the same UI toolkit and art style as
the game; no separate editor theme to maintain.
- **Testable in CI.** The editor is ordinary game code; it can be exercised
headlessly and unit-tested like any other system.
### 4.3 Cons
- **We build everything.** No free scene tree, inspector, gizmos, or undo/redo.
We must implement selection, snapping, undo/redo, viewport navigation, and
property editing ourselves.
- **Runtime footprint.** Editor UI ships in the binary (though it can be gated
behind a feature flag / separate scene that is only instantiated on demand).
- **More upfront work.** A usable in-game editor is a large feature; it needs
its own architecture (tool modes, gizmos, palette, inspector).
- **Not ideal for deep asset authoring.** Modeling a mesh or authoring a
material is better done in the Godot editor / DCC tools. The in-game editor
should focus on **world composition** (placing tiles and objects), not asset
creation.
### 4.4 Fit for Our Constraints
- **Platform/dev authoring:** Workable but not ideal for deep asset work.
- **Player UGC:** The **only** viable approach. Players can only author through
the shipped game.
- **Server-authoritative chunk store:** Excellent fit. The editor is a client
that submits validated deltas.
---
## 5. Comparison Matrix
| Criterion | (a) Editor plugin | (b) In-game editor |
|-----------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Ships to players | ❌ No | ✅ Yes |
| Player UGC authoring | ❌ Impossible | ✅ Core capability |
| World data model fit | ⚠️ Scene-centric; needs translation layer | ✅ Chunk-native |
| Server-authoritative edits | ⚠️ Bolted on | ✅ Native (same RPCs) |
| Moderation enforcement | ⚠️ Manual | ✅ At the boundary |
| Free editor features (undo, gizmos, inspector) | ✅ Rich | ❌ Build ourselves |
| Runtime footprint | ✅ None (stripped from export) | ⚠️ Ships in binary (gated) |
| Dev iteration speed | ✅ Fast | ⚠️ Slower to build |
| Deep asset authoring (mesh/material) | ✅ Native | ❌ Out of scope |
| CI testability | ⚠️ Heavier (headless editor) | ✅ Ordinary game code |
| Editor API churn risk | ⚠️ Higher | ✅ None (game code) |
---
## 6. Recommendation
**Primary recommendation: build the in-game editor (b) as the platform's
authoring surface, and use a lightweight Godot editor plugin (a) only as an
internal dev convenience.**
### 6.1 Rationale
1. **Player UGC is the deciding factor.** The platform's value proposition is
user-generated content (rooms, worlds, avatars). Players cannot run the Godot
editor, so **only an in-game editor can deliver player authoring**. This is a
hard requirement that the editor-plugin approach cannot meet.
2. **The world is data, and the in-game editor is data-native.** `world.md`
defines chunks as the atomic unit. An in-game editor edits chunks directly
and submits them through the server pipeline. An editor plugin would force a
scene↔chunk translation layer that is a constant source of drift and bugs.
3. **Server authority and moderation fall out naturally.** Because in-game
edits use the same `request_chunk_edit` RPCs as gameplay, validation,
revisioning, optimistic concurrency, and content-flag enforcement
(`content_moderation.md`) apply uniformly. The editor cannot bypass the
server — which is exactly what a moderation-aware UGC platform needs.
4. **The editor-plugin's strengths are not what we need.** Its free features
(scene tree, inspector, gizmos) are for editing Godot scenes and resources.
Our authoring is world composition against a chunk contract, not scene
editing. The plugin's main win — deep asset authoring — is better served by
DCC tools and the Godot editor for the *platform team*, not by a plugin we
must maintain.
### 6.2 The Role of the Editor Plugin (Dev Convenience Only)
We still recommend a **small, optional** editor plugin for the **platform team**
to author **base content** (base rooms, templates, avatar base bodies, test
levels) directly in the Godot editor. This is a dev-time convenience, not a
product feature:
- It can export a scene/resource as a **chunk** (reusing the same encoder as the
in-game editor) so dev-authored content flows into the same pipeline.
- It is **not shipped** to players and is **not** the authoring surface for UGC.
- It should be kept thin to minimize editor-API churn risk.
### 6.3 Scope Boundary
To keep the in-game editor tractable, define its scope clearly:
- **In scope (world composition):** placing tiles, placing static/dynamic
objects, setting transforms, editing object properties, saving/loading chunks,
submitting edits to the server, showing moderation flags.
- **Out of scope (asset creation):** modeling meshes, authoring materials,
rigging avatars. These are done in DCC tools / the Godot editor and imported
as catalog assets (see `avatar.md` §7). The in-game editor **references**
catalog assets by id; it does not create them.
---
## 7. Resulting Architecture
### 7.1 Shared Editor Core
Both the in-game editor and the (optional) dev plugin should share a single
**editor core** that operates on the chunk model. This avoids two divergent
implementations.
```
EditorCore (shared, data-native)
├── ChunkEditorModel # in-memory chunk being edited (tiles, objects, flags)
├── ChunkEncoder # JSON/binary encode/decode (world.md §3)
├── EditSession # base_revision tracking, delta generation
├── EditSubmitter # request_chunk_edit RPC wrapper + conflict handling
├── UndoRedoStack # command pattern over chunk mutations
├── SelectionManager # selected tiles/objects
├── ToolRegistry # brush, object-place, select, erase, etc.
└── ModerationView # surfaces content flags; gates mature content
```
### 7.2 In-Game Editor (Primary)
```
InGameEditor (Control-based UI, shipped in binary, gated by feature flag)
├── EditorViewport # custom 2D/3D viewport with camera navigation
├── Toolbar # tool mode switcher
├── PalettePanel # tile/object palette (from catalog)
├── InspectorPanel # property editor for selected object
├── ChunkBrowser # load/save chunks, list rooms
└── EditorCore # shared core (above)
```
- Instantiated only when the player enters "build mode" (a separate scene /
feature flag), so the runtime footprint is negligible during normal play.
- Submits edits via `request_chunk_edit`; handles `chunk_edit_result` conflicts
by re-fetching and re-applying (`world.md` §5.4).
### 7.3 Dev Editor Plugin (Optional, Thin)
```
DevChunkPlugin (EditorPlugin, dev-only, not shipped)
├── Dock panel: "Chunk Export"
├── Reads the current scene / selected nodes
├── Maps scene content → chunk model (via EditorCore.ChunkEncoder)
└── Exports a .chunk.json / submits to a dev server
```
Kept thin to minimize editor-API churn. Its only job is to let the platform team
author base content in the editor and push it into the same chunk pipeline.
### 7.4 Data Flow
```
[In-game editor] --request_chunk_edit(delta, base_revision)--> [Server]
^ | validate
| | apply
+--chunk_edit_result(ok/new_revision | conflict)-----------| persist
v
SQLite (world.db)
[Dev plugin] --export chunk JSON--> [EditorCore.ChunkEncoder] --> [Server]
```
Both paths converge on the **same server validation pipeline**, so moderation
and revisioning are uniform regardless of authoring surface.
---
## 8. Risks & Mitigations
| Risk | Mitigation |
|------|------------|
| In-game editor is a large build | Scope it to world composition (§6.3); reuse EditorCore; ship behind a feature flag |
| Custom viewport/gizmos are hard | Start with a 2D tile editor (matches `CHUNK_SIZE_Z=1` default); add 3D later |
| Undo/redo complexity | Use a command pattern over chunk mutations; test headlessly |
| Editor-plugin API churn | Keep the plugin thin; treat it as dev-only convenience, not a product surface |
| Drift between dev plugin and in-game editor | Both use the same `EditorCore`/`ChunkEncoder` |
| Players bypass moderation | Impossible by construction: edits go through server validation |
---
## 9. Open Questions / Future Work
- **3D editing:** The default world is flat (`CHUNK_SIZE_Z=1`). A 3D in-game
editor (volumetric chunks) is future work (`world.md` §8).
- **Collaborative editing:** Multiple players editing the same chunk concurrently
— the optimistic-concurrency model already supports it, but the UX (live
cursors, conflict resolution) is unspecified.
- **Template library:** A curated set of room templates players can start from.
- **Publish/review flow:** How a player's authored room enters the moderation
review queue (`content_moderation.md` §6) and becomes publicly joinable.
---
## 10. Summary
| Concern | Decision |
|---------|----------|
| Primary authoring surface | **In-game editor** (ships to players, enables UGC) |
| Dev authoring convenience | Thin, optional **editor plugin** (not shipped) |
| World data model | Both operate on the **chunk model** via a shared `EditorCore` |
| Server authority | Edits go through `request_chunk_edit`; server validates |
| Moderation | Enforced at the server boundary for both paths |
| In-game editor scope | World composition only; asset creation is out of scope |
| Runtime footprint | Editor gated behind a feature flag / separate scene |
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# GDScript Sandboxing for User-Written Scripts
> **Status:** Proposed
> **Owner:** Platform team
> **Related:** Content moderation & age verification (scripts are one of the
> three moderated content types), avatar component system
## 1. Overview
This document evaluates how to safely run **user-written scripts** as part of
UGC (user-generated content) in **agp-game**, and recommends an approach.
**Bottom line: Godot 4 has no built-in security sandbox for GDScript, and
none of the three options named in the original task hold up under testing.**
A script running anywhere inside the Godot process — however it's loaded,
parented, or wrapped — runs with full engine privileges: arbitrary process
execution, full filesystem read/write, and raw network access. Sandboxing
has to happen *outside* the scripting language, not through an in-engine
restriction mechanism, because no such mechanism exists.
This was verified directly against Godot 4.6.2 (`godot --headless`, evidence
in `sandbox_probe/` on this branch) rather than assumed from documentation,
some of which (see §2.1) describes APIs that don't actually exist in this
version.
## 2. Options Evaluated
### 2.1 Godot's built-in "ScriptServer" restrictions — does not exist
There is no `ScriptServer` class in Godot 4.6.2:
```
ClassDB.class_exists("ScriptServer") → false
```
There's also no project setting to disable engine subsystems for scripts —
none of `application/run/disable_os`, `disable_file_access`, or
`disable_network` exist as settings, and `ProjectSettings.get_property_list()`
returns nothing matching "sandbox", "restrict", or "security". Any plan that
assumes a flag like this exists needs to be dropped; it was likely conflated
with sandboxing features from a different engine/scripting ecosystem, or
with **export template stripping** (which controls what ships in a build,
not what a script can call at runtime).
Directly probed capabilities of an ordinary GDScript running as a normal
node script, no special setup:
| Capability | Available to any script? |
|---|---|
| `OS.execute(...)` — run arbitrary processes | ✅ Yes |
| `FileAccess.open(...)` — read/write any path the OS user can reach | ✅ Yes (read `/etc/hostname`, write `/tmp/...` both succeeded) |
| `TCPServer` / `HTTPClient` / `HTTPRequest` / `PacketPeerUDP` / `WebSocketPeer` | ✅ All instantiate and work |
| `ClassDB.instantiate(...)` — construct any engine class by name | ✅ Yes |
| Loading and running a second script from source text at runtime (`GDScript.new()` + `.reload()`) | ✅ Yes |
**Verdict: rejected.** There is nothing to configure here — the restriction
surface this option assumed doesn't exist in the engine.
### 2.2 Isolated SubViewport with a limited API — doesn't isolate scripts
`SubViewport` is a **rendering and input isolation** primitive (it gives a
scene subtree its own render target and can gate input propagation) — it is
not a security or scripting boundary. A script attached to any node inside a
`SubViewport` still runs in the same process, on the same GDScript VM, with
the exact same access to `OS`, `FileAccess`, networking classes, and
`ClassDB` as a script anywhere else in the tree. Nothing about being
"inside" a SubViewport changes what API calls are reachable from a script.
**Verdict: rejected.** This solves a rendering/UI-composition problem, not
the security problem the task is asking about. Worth keeping in mind for
other purposes (e.g. isolated preview rendering of user avatars), but it
provides zero script sandboxing.
### 2.3 Custom GDScript interpreter with an allowlist — right idea, wrong layer for "custom interpreter"
Two ways to read this option, tested separately:
**(a) Write/embed a separate GDScript parser+interpreter.** Not
practical — this means re-implementing (and then indefinitely maintaining,
in lockstep with every Godot release) a full language interpreter outside
the engine. Far more engineering than the problem justifies.
**(b) Use Godot's built-in `Expression` class as a restricted subset.**
`Expression` *looks* like a natural allowlist mechanism — it only evaluates
a single expression, no control flow, no arbitrary statements. But it isn't
safe by default: it can still reach through to unsafe engine methods if you
aren't careful about what object you hand it as a base instance:
```gdscript
var expr = Expression.new()
expr.parse("get_environment('HOME')", ["OS"])
expr.execute([], OS) # → "/home/daddy" (successfully called OS.get_environment)
```
So `Expression` is a viable building block only if the host **never passes
a base instance (or arguments) that exposes anything sensitive** — i.e. the
allowlisting work still has to happen at the call site, `Expression` itself
enforces none of it.
**Static text pattern-matching (blocklisting dangerous substrings like
`"OS.execute"` before parsing) was also probed and is not a real
defense** — it's trivially defeated by string concatenation, `call()`,
`Callable`, or any other indirection, and produces false confidence.
**Verdict: partially viable, but only as a foundation, not a solution on
its own.** A hand-built, narrow, data-driven DSL (not full GDScript, not
raw `Expression`) with an explicit allowlist of safe operations and *no
ability to reference engine singletons or arbitrary objects* is the only
version of "custom interpreter" that's actually safe. This is real
engineering effort, not a config flag.
## 3. Recommendation
**Don't run untrusted GDScript in-process at all.** Given none of the three
in-engine options provide a real boundary, the two approaches actually worth
building are, in order of recommended priority:
1. **Primary: a narrow, non-Turing-complete content DSL**, not general
scripting. Most UGC scripting needs in a game like this (custom
interactions, simple triggers, item behaviors) don't need a general
programming language — they need a small set of declarative
verbs/conditions (e.g. `on_interact: give_item("torch")`,
`on_enter: play_sound("chime")`). Expressed as data (JSON/Resource, not
code) and interpreted by trusted, hand-written GDScript on the engine
side. This has *zero* attack surface by construction — there's no
interpreter to escape because there's no general execution, just a
fixed, reviewed set of verbs. This is almost certainly sufficient for
the actual UGC use cases in this game and should be scoped against real
feature requirements before assuming more is needed.
2. **If genuinely general scripting becomes a hard requirement**, isolate it
at the OS level, not the engine level: run untrusted scripts in a
**separate process** (a stripped-down Godot instance or a dedicated
interpreter) under OS sandboxing (a restricted user account, a
container, or `firejail`/`bwrap`/seccomp), communicating with the main
game over a narrow IPC/RPC boundary that only exposes intentionally-safe
operations. This is the only approach that provides a real security
boundary for arbitrary code, because it doesn't depend on the scripting
language cooperating — the OS enforces it. Substantially more
infrastructure than option 1; only worth it if option 1's DSL genuinely
can't express what's needed.
**Do not** attempt in-process GDScript sandboxing via SubViewport,
ScriptServer, or ad hoc blocklisting — all three were directly tested and
none provide a real boundary (§2).
## 4. Open Questions
- What do actual planned UGC scripts need to *do*? (Trigger conditions,
simple item/state effects, dialogue branching?) This determines whether
the DSL in §3.1 is sufficient or whether §3.2's process isolation is
needed. Needs a concrete feature list before implementation starts.
- If §3.2 is needed later, does it run per-user-session or shared/pooled?
Affects resource cost and isolation guarantees.
- Interaction with the content moderation pipeline (`content_moderation.md`):
scripts as a moderated content type still need a moderation flag path
regardless of which execution model is chosen — a DSL makes static
analysis of *what a script can possibly do* far easier than it would be
for general code, which is an additional point in its favor.
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; Engine configuration file.
; It's best edited using the editor UI and not directly,
; but it can also be edited by hand.
config_version=5
[application]
config/name="AGP-Game"
run/main_scene="res://scenes/main_menu.tscn"
config/features=PackedStringArray("4.6.2")
[autoload]
[display]
window/size/viewport_width=1920
window/size/viewport_height=1080
window/stretch/mode="canvas_items"
[rendering]
renderer/rendering_method="gl_compatibility"
renderer/rendering_method.mobile="gl_compatibility"
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extends Node
func _ready():
print("=== SANDBOX PROBE 6: Corrected Evidence Gathering (Godot 4.6.2) ===")
probe_script_loading()
probe_os_apis()
probe_file_access()
probe_network()
probe_classdb()
probe_expression_engine()
probe_engine_singletons()
probe_worker_threads()
probe_project_settings()
probe_allowlist()
print("=== SANDBOX PROBE 6 END ===")
get_tree().quit()
func probe_script_loading():
print("--- Script loading ---")
var gd = GDScript.new()
gd.source_code = "extends RefCounted\nfunc hello():\n\treturn 42\n"
var err = gd.reload()
print("GDScript.reload() from source_code err=", err)
if err == OK:
var inst = gd.new()
print(" instantiated, hello()=", inst.call("hello"))
var res = load("res://test_script.gd")
print("load('res://test_script.gd') = ", res)
if res:
print(" get_source_code() available: ", res.has_method("get_source_code"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_ast': ", gd.has_method("get_ast"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_parser': ", gd.has_method("get_parser"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_script_method_list': ", gd.has_method("get_script_method_list"))
print(" GDScript instance has 'get_script_property_list': ", gd.has_method("get_script_property_list"))
func probe_os_apis():
print("--- OS APIs ---")
var out = []
var exit_code = OS.execute("echo", ["hello"], out)
print("OS.execute('echo') exit=", exit_code, " out=", out)
print("OS.get_environment('HOME') = ", OS.get_environment("HOME"))
print("OS has 'create_process': ", OS.has_method("create_process"))
print("OS.get_cmdline_args() = ", OS.get_cmdline_args())
print("OS.get_user_data_dir() = ", OS.get_user_data_dir())
print("OS.get_executable_path() = ", OS.get_executable_path())
func probe_file_access():
print("--- File access ---")
var f = FileAccess.open("/etc/hostname", FileAccess.READ)
print("FileAccess.open('/etc/hostname') = ", f)
if f:
print(" content: ", f.get_as_text())
f.close()
var w = FileAccess.open("/tmp/godot_probe_write.txt", FileAccess.WRITE)
print("FileAccess.open('/tmp/...', WRITE) = ", w)
if w:
w.store_string("probe")
w.close()
print(" wrote to /tmp OK")
var dir = DirAccess.open("/")
print("DirAccess.open('/') = ", dir)
if dir:
var names = dir.get_files()
print(" root files count: ", names.size())
var res_dir = DirAccess.open("res://")
print("DirAccess.open('res://') = ", res_dir)
var user_dir = DirAccess.open("user://")
print("DirAccess.open('user://') = ", user_dir)
func probe_network():
print("--- Network ---")
var tcp = TCPServer.new()
var bind_err = tcp.listen(0)
print("TCPServer.listen(0) err=", bind_err)
var http = HTTPClient.new()
print("HTTPClient instantiated: ", http != null)
var http_req = HTTPRequest.new()
print("HTTPRequest instantiated: ", http_req != null)
var udp = PacketPeerUDP.new()
print("PacketPeerUDP instantiated: ", udp != null)
var ws = WebSocketPeer.new()
print("WebSocketPeer instantiated: ", ws != null)
func probe_classdb():
print("--- ClassDB ---")
print("ClassDB.class_exists('OS'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("OS"))
print("ClassDB.class_exists('FileAccess'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("FileAccess"))
print("ClassDB.class_exists('TCPServer'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("TCPServer"))
print("ClassDB.class_exists('HTTPClient'): ", ClassDB.class_exists("HTTPClient"))
var class_list = ClassDB.get_class_list()
print("ClassDB.get_class_list() count: ", class_list.size())
var os_methods = ClassDB.class_get_method_list("OS")
print("OS method count: ", os_methods.size())
var inst = ClassDB.instantiate("Node")
print("ClassDB.instantiate('Node') = ", inst)
print("ClassDB has 'class_get_singleton': ", ClassDB.has_method("class_get_singleton"))
func probe_expression_engine():
print("--- Expression engine ---")
var expr = Expression.new()
var err = expr.parse("1 + 2")
print("Expression.parse('1 + 2') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result = expr.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result)
var expr2 = Expression.new()
err = expr2.parse("OS.get_environment('HOME')")
print("Expression.parse('OS.get_environment') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result2 = expr2.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result2)
var expr3 = Expression.new()
err = expr3.parse("get_environment('HOME')", ["OS"])
print("Expression.parse with base_instance err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result3 = expr3.execute([], OS)
print(" Expression.execute with OS base = ", result3)
var expr4 = Expression.new()
err = expr4.parse("FileAccess.open('/etc/hostname', 1)")
print("Expression.parse('FileAccess.open') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result4 = expr4.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result4)
var expr5 = Expression.new()
err = expr5.parse("get_tree().quit()")
print("Expression.parse('get_tree().quit()') err=", err)
if err == OK:
var result5 = expr5.execute()
print(" Expression.execute() = ", result5)
func probe_engine_singletons():
print("--- Engine singletons ---")
print("Engine has 'remove_singleton': ", Engine.has_method("remove_singleton"))
print("Engine has 'add_singleton': ", Engine.has_method("add_singleton"))
print("Engine.get_main_loop() = ", Engine.get_main_loop())
func probe_worker_threads():
print("--- Worker threads ---")
var thread = Thread.new()
print(" Thread.new() = ", thread)
print(" WorkerThreadPool has 'add_task': ", WorkerThreadPool.has_method("add_task"))
func probe_project_settings():
print("--- Project settings ---")
var settings = ProjectSettings.get_property_list()
var relevant = []
for s in settings:
var name = String(s.name)
if "sandbox" in name.to_lower() or "restrict" in name.to_lower() or "security" in name.to_lower():
relevant.append(name)
print(" Sandbox/security project settings: ", relevant)
print(" ProjectSettings has 'application/run/disable_os': ", ProjectSettings.has_setting("application/run/disable_os"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'application/run/disable_file_access': ", ProjectSettings.has_setting("application/run/disable_file_access"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'application/run/disable_network': ", ProjectSettings.has_setting("application/run/disable_network"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'set_setting': ", ProjectSettings.has_method("set_setting"))
print(" ProjectSettings has 'save': ", ProjectSettings.has_method("save"))
func probe_allowlist():
print("--- Allowlist / static analysis ---")
var dangerous_patterns = [
"OS.execute", "OS.create_process", "OS.get_environment",
"FileAccess.open", "DirAccess.open", "TCPServer", "HTTPClient",
"load(", "preload(", "ClassDB", "Engine.get_main_loop",
"get_tree().quit", "ProjectSettings"
]
var test_script = """extends Node
func _ready():
var f = FileAccess.open("/etc/passwd", FileAccess.READ)
OS.execute("rm", ["-rf", "/"])
"""
print(" Test script contains dangerous patterns:")
for p in dangerous_patterns:
if p in test_script:
print(" DETECTED: ", p)
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[gd_scene load_steps=2 format=3]
[ext_resource type="Script" path="res://probe6.gd" id="1"]
[node name="Probe6" type="Node"]
script = ExtResource("1")
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; Engine configuration file.
config_version=5
[application]
config/name="sandbox_probe"
run/main_scene="res://probe6.tscn"
config/features=PackedStringArray("4.6")
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extends RefCounted
func hello():
return "from test_script.gd"